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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about innovation and economic growth in less developed territories. It is 
motivated by the inadequacy of our understanding of innovation in lagging contexts. 
It is situated in the body of literature that examines and stresses the contextually-
contingent nature of innovation. It does, however, branch out to probe the link between 
innovation and economic performance and contemplate the design of strategic 
approaches to promote the latter. It is composed of an introduction, four related 
chapters and a short conclusion.  
 
Chapter 1 relies on an investigation of a large sample of North American and European 
regions to assess whether all less developed regions are, from an innovation 
perspective, functionally the same. In particular, it addresses the issue of what makes 
the less developed regions of North America more innovative than their European 
counterparts. 
 
Chapter 2 expands the scope of the thesis to include the emerging world. It unpacks 
the processes of innovation hosted by China’s more and less developed cities, 
respectively, with a view to identify and understand the differences between the sets 
of factors that drive and shape processes of innovation in them. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between innovation and economic performance 
in less developed regions. A comparison of two types of lagging regions in Europe is 
undertaken to explore the extent to which different types of economically 
disadvantaged regions are capable of transforming knowledge and innovation into 
economic dynamism, given their unique socioeconomic and institutional 
characteristics. 
 
Chapter 4 reflects on the strategic approaches that have been relied on to promote 
innovation and economic growth more generally. It reviews a handful of ‘strategies of 
waste’ and ‘of gain’ to ascertain insights into the steps policy-makers can take to 
maximise the likelihood that territorial development policies fulfil their potential and 
contribute to the reduction of territorial disparities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Less developed territories: Forgotten but far from gone 
 
 Less developed territories the world over, be they cities, rural areas or entire 
regions, are often overlooked both in theory and in practice. Why? The answer, which 
is three-fold, is simple. 
 
 First, researchers have, on the one hand, what is now a longstanding interest in 
understanding and explaining why the world’s most developed, economically 
successful places are the way they are. It has been observed that especially dynamic 
territories, in developed and developing contexts alike, share one key similarity: most 
are densely populated, typically highly urbanised areas. This, however, offers little in 
the way of an explanation for their dynamism. Accordingly, scholars set out to 
understand how density impels or facilitates economic performance.  
 
Virtually all investigations and theorisations pointed in the same direction: the 
agglomeration of economic actors and activity gives rise to efficiency- and 
productivity-enhancing ‘agglomeration externalities’. Agglomeration economies are 
defined, by Glaeser (2010:1) as “the benefits that come when firms and people locate 
near one another”. They are, according to Duranton and Puga (2004), underpinned by 
three discrete ‘mechanisms’: “sharing, matching and learning”. 
 
The agglomeration of economic actors allows for the sharing of indivisible 
inputs; affords firms access to a greater variety of essential inputs and enables firms to 
spread or ‘pool’ risk (Combes and Gobillon, 2015:2). That is, when firms locate in 
close physical proximity, not only can the costs of typically larger-scale, fixed and 
often essential inputs and facilities be spread across several parties, other inputs to 
production processes can be sourced more easily, readily and, critically, locally and, 
in turn, with lower transactions costs. The risks incurred by firms are consequently 
lower. The investments that firms need make in fixed assets, facilities or inputs that 
are inevitably, with time, rendered obsolete are smaller and more easily amortised. 
Similarly, co-located firms need not be reliant on a single supplier and are thus able to 
 11 
respond to disruptions in the supply chain or changes in input demands and 
requirements. In short, co-location facilitates risk minimisation, cost reduction and the 
realisation of greater returns to investments in productivity activity. The co-location 
of heterogeneous firms and workers also facilitates the “matching” (Duranton and 
Puga, 2004:23) both of firms with workers that are equipped with the competencies 
and skills they require and, conversely, of workers with firms that provide the tasks 
and resources to best exploit their knowledge and expertise. This precise matching 
renders firms, and the labour they employ, more productive. Finally, operation in close 
physical proximity promotes face-to-face interactions, cooperation and collaborations 
that function as conduits for the sharing, exchange and diffusion of knowledge and 
ideas (Marshall, 1890; Jacobs, 1969; Duranton and Puga, 2004; Storper and Venables, 
2004). Co-located firms are rendered more innovative and, in turn, productive, by this 
ready access to a diversity of knowledge types and sources. 
 
 Evidence of these mechanisms at work, and the existence of the agglomeration 
externalities they give rise to, bred the perception that density and co-location are 
conducive to and supportive of firm and individual productivity; the sharing and 
combination of knowledge and, ultimately, the cultivation of innovation; and 
economic dynamism, most generally. Large, densely populated environments came to 
be seen as the places where efficiency could be maximised and economic performance 
would be optimised. The most economically developed, dynamic urban areas, in turn, 
moved firmly to the fore as the perceived drivers of regional or even national economic 
growth and have, accordingly, garnered much of the scholarly attention (Jacobs, 1969; 
Duranton, 2000; 2008; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Glaeser, 2011). 
 
 Second, policy makers, on the other hand but very much following suit, have 
embraced the notion of developed, dynamic, urbanised areas being engines of growth 
(Colenbrander, 2016). They have, accordingly, developed a keen interest in the 
promotion of agglomeration and density; strategic efforts to concentrate, or reinforce 
the concentration of, economic actors and activity, oftentimes in already-more 
developed, dynamic areas, have become the norm in many parts of the world (e.g. 
World Bank, 2009). This focus on these areas reflects a desire to leverage the size, 
density and dynamism of more developed, established places and reap the efficiency 
benefits of the agglomeration economies they host. It is equally grounded in an 
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expectation that the dynamism of these places and the wealth they come to realise will 
with time, but more or less automatically and inevitably, spread to the less developed 
areas to which they are proximate. Lagging areas are, in turn, anticipated to be 
beneficiaries of investments made and actions undertaken in more developed, dynamic 
core areas. The pursuit of spatially-concentrated, agglomeration-impelled dynamism, 
and not the promotion of more geographically widespread territorial development, is 
therefore viewed by many as the most efficient way to promote growth at the broader 
regional or national level. Nowhere is this perception more strongly advocated for than 
in The World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report (World Bank, 2009:xxi) which 
argues explicitly for the promotion of “unbalanced growth” asserting, in fact, that “to 
spread out growth is to discourage it”. 
 
Stated simply, policy approaches the world over have, following the 
aforementioned academic discourse, embraced the perceived power of agglomeration 
and density and prioritised the growth and physical expansion of already-more 
dynamic, developed places – asserting that wider benefits for the entirety of regions’ 
or nations’ populations would follow – over the reformation of less developed 
territories. Again, it has been the most dynamic of territories that have featured 
prominently in the policy discourse. 
 
Third, and finally, there is what amounts to an anecdotal perception that it is in 
the most developed of areas where ‘things’ and processes of greatest interest and 
consequence happen, where opportunities exist, and with which we should be most 
interested and concerned. Large, dynamic places, cities in particular, are home to the 
best educated, creative and able people (Florida, 2005). They house the best 
universities and host the headquarters of the world’s largest and most influential 
corporations (Sassen, 1991; Iammarino and McCann, 2013; Florida, 2017). Glaeser 
(2011) goes so far as to assert that it is, in fact, large, dynamic cities that make 
“[mankind] richer, smarter, greener, healthier and happier”. No one, to my knowledge, 
has argued that less developed territories do the same.   
 
All of this has directed the spotlight squarely and singularly towards the 
world’s most developed, dynamic places. We understand them, from a theoretical 
perspective as drivers of growth; we have acted on this and prioritised their growth in 
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the pursuit of economy-wide development; and we have developed a general 
fascination with them that extends well beyond academia or policy-spheres. Less 
developed places have been relegated to little more than an afterthought. 
 
The question we need to ask, however, is whether this is at all justifiable. Is 
there any reason, at all, to broaden our perspective and dig deeper into less developed 
places with the view to understand the diversity of oft-overlooked, underexplored 
processes that drive and shape growth and change in them? Table I-1 suggests the 
answer may be yes. 
 
 Table I-1 summarises the contributions of more and less developed territories,1 
respectively, to GDP and patenting in North America and Europe (the foci of Chapter 
1 and 3) and China (the focus of Chapter 2). Two inferences are drawn from the 
uppermost three rows. 
 
 First, in North America, Europe and China alike, less developed territories in 
spite of their statuses as such, make – and, for some time, have made – significant 
contributions to aggregate GDP. They do not, axiomatically, contribute, from an 
economic output perspective, as much as their more developed counterparts. Their 
contributions are not, however, inconsequential. North America’s and Europe’s less 
developed regions accounted for 30.9% and 27.4% of their host economies’ respective 
GDP in 2010. Similarly, China’s lagging cities were responsible for 25.4% of Chinese 
economic output in 2014. Territories that together generate over a quarter of their 
respective economies’ economic output cannot, simply stated, be overlooked.  
 
Second, that these territories have, in spite of the deficiencies from which they 
suffer – many of which are expounded upon later in this introduction and throughout 
the thesis –, managed to make such substantive contributions to their respective 
economies is indicative of the potential with which they are endowed. That is, less 
developed places have cultivated and are hosting some measure of productive activity. 
Suitable policy actions could conceivably alleviate the efficiency-impairing 
                                               
1 In North America and Europe, ‘less developed’ regions are defined as those below a given threshold in terms of 
relative wealth in 2010; 90% of the average regional GDP per capita in Canada, the US, and Europe, respectively. 
In China, ‘less developed’ cities are defined as those whose GDP per capita fall below 75% of the national average. 
The conceptualisations are addressed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2.  
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constraints and barriers to which they are subject; increase the efficiency with which 
economic activity occurs; bolster their capacities to host and sustain productive 
activity and ultimately, enable these territories to make even more substantive 
contributions to regional or national economic growth and development. Ignorance of 
this potential is, to use the words of The World Bank’s 2009 World Development 
Report, tantamount to discouraging it, and economic growth more generally. 
 
Less developed territories can be overlooked no longer. This is something that 
scholars are becoming increasingly aware of and attuned to (e.g. Dijkstra et al., 2013; 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Their potential, and the contributions they could conceivably 
make – and in some cases are already making – to the generation of economic output 
and the achievement of economic growth at a diversity of spatial scales are significant 
(Dijkstra et al., 2013:347). Our collective understanding of less developed territories, 
and specifically of many of the processes that unfold in them, has, however, suffered 
from the aforementioned preoccupation with the most dynamic, developed, oftentimes 
urban territories. There is, accordingly, huge scope for analytical exploration across a 
diversity of axes and areas to shore up a range of deficiencies of understanding. An 
especially acute and perhaps consequential deficiency relates to the innovative 
capacities and potential of these less developed territories. 
 
It is often assumed that less economically developed territories are “innovation 
averse” (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). That is, it is taken for granted that a range of 
structural, socioeconomic, institutional and even geographic deficiencies, all of which 
are addressed in some detail in Section II and throughout the chapters that compose 
this thesis, render these places incapable of generating innovation or cultivating and 
sustaining innovative activity. This assumption is, however, as Table I-1 again 
illustrates, plainly untrue. 
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Table I-1. GDP and patenting in more and less developed territories, North America, Europe and China 
 
   
North America 
(Provinces and States) 
Europe 
(TL2 Regions) 
China 
(Cities) 
   2000 2010 2000 2010 2003 2014 
Gross Domestic Product (Millions, USD/Yuan)             
  All territories $11,113,498 $16,212,896 $9,681,122 $14,655,594 ¥13,569,483 ¥67,518,224 
  More developed territories 67.6% 69.1% 72.8% 72.6% 78.7% 79.7% 
  Less developed territories 32.4% 30.9% 27.2% 27.4% 27.1% 25.4% 
Aggregate Patent Applications             
  All territories 42,726 46,342 34,195 43,598 136,860 1,669,373 
  More developed territories 78.9% 79.2% 89.1% 87.8% 90.4% 88.7% 
    Less developed territories 26.7% 26.2% 10.9% 12.2% 9.6% 11.3% 
Note: Patent applications correspond to PCT patent applications for North America and Europe; Patent applications figures for China obtained from State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R.C; Europe figures 
reflect the TL2 regions analysed in Chapter 1.  
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Less developed areas do innovate less than their more developed counterparts. 
That said, they are not wholly incapable of producing innovative output.2 In North 
America, for example, less developed territories were responsible for over a quarter 
(26.2%) of the continent’s total PCT patent applications in 2010. The contributions of 
Europe’s lagging regions in the same year were, admittedly, less impressive. They 
were, however, anything but insignificant; Europe’s less developed regions produced 
12.2% of these applications. China’s lagging cities accounted for a similar proportion 
(11.3%) of the country’s patent applications in 2014. In both the European and Chinese 
cases, that the share of patent applications generated by lagging areas has increased 
over the last 15 years suggesting they have, and are becoming, more engaged in their 
economies’ respective knowledge and innovation systems (Table I-1). 
 
The problem, however, is that the pervasiveness of the aforementioned 
assumption, coupled with a preoccupation with ‘success stories’, ‘innovative hubs’ 
and innovative processes in more developed, dynamic environments more generally, 
has led to a neglect of less developed, economically peripheral areas and a relative 
dearth of systematic econometric analyses of processes of innovation in them (Hall 
and Donald, 2009). The absence of these explorations has bred what is now a 
prevailing myth: namely, that processes of innovation, when they occur in lagging 
areas, unfold in relatively homogenous ways across otherwise heterogeneous lagging 
territories. 
 
In short, we do not know how it is that these territories innovate nor are we 
able to identify the resources they draw upon to do. Moreover, because we cannot 
pinpoint what exactly is driving and shaping the innovative processes they host, we 
are not able to design effective policies to upgrade their innovative capacities, unlock 
their innovative potential or promote innovation-driven economic growth in them. 
 
This thesis represents a concerted effort to shore up this gap in the literature 
and understanding and, ultimately disprove the prevailing myth. 
  
                                               
2 The suitability of patent statistics as proxies for innovation is addressed throughout the thesis. See, for example, 
Footnote 3. 
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i. Overview 
 
This thesis is about innovation and economic growth in less economically 
developed territories. The first two chapters explore the genesis of innovation in these 
environments, focusing specifically on the socioeconomic and structural factors that 
influence and shape it. The third chapter shifts the focus to the link between innovation 
and economic growth to assess the extent to which lagging regions are capable of 
mobilising innovation and transforming it into economic growth. The final chapter 
contemplates the promotion of economic growth and development in underdeveloped 
contexts and the actions policy-makers need consider as part of their efforts to do so.  
 
It is situated in and contributes to the body of literature that examines, and, in 
turn, stresses the contextually-contingent nature of innovation. It branches out to touch 
on other relevant topics and issues relating to both the link between innovation and 
economic performance and the design of strategic approaches to promote the latter. It 
is, however, at its roots, an exploration of innovation, and related processes, in less 
developed environments. 
 
 The first two chapters of the thesis represent explicit, concerted efforts to fill 
this void. One is a macroeconomic comparative analysis of the drivers of innovation 
in lagging regions in North America and Europe, respectively. The other is a 
comparison of China’s less developed cities to their more developed counterparts. The 
third chapter is a natural, necessary extension of the first two. It explores how the 
heterogeneity of lagging regions manifests itself not in the way they introduce 
innovation, but rather in the extent to which they are capable of transforming it into 
economic growth and dynamism. The final chapter is a more practical, policy-oriented 
application of the inferences drawn from both the chapters that precede it and a wider 
review of development approaches undertaken across the globe. 
 
 The remainder of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows: Section II 
introduces the theoretical points of departure for the thesis; exposes a prominent gap 
in the literature; and addresses the necessity of shoring up this deficiency of 
understanding. Section III summarises the four chapters that compose the thesis.  
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II. Background, motivation and relevance 
 
i. Background 
 
 Two prevailing assumptions provide the point of departure for this thesis: The 
first is that processes of innovation are shaped and subject to influence by a diversity 
of forces, factors and territorial characteristics. They, in turn, are anticipated to unfold 
in ways that reflect the heterogeneity of the territories that host them. The second is 
that innovation occurs almost, if not entirely, exclusively in more economically 
developed territories. Each is addressed in turn. 
 
Innovation as a dynamic, contextually-contingent process 
 
 The collective understanding of innovation has evolved considerably in recent 
decades (Marinova and Phillimore, 2003). Innovation was first understood as a linear, 
unidimensional and aspatial process. The so-called ‘linear models of innovation’ (e.g. 
MacLaurin, 1953; Grilliches, 1979) that exemplified early thinking on innovation 
proposed that knowledge and knowledge resources were transformed into innovation 
automatically and frictionlessly via processes that were largely unaffected by the 
socioeconomic, structural or institutional environments in which they took place 
(Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011). The implications associated with this 
perspective are twofold: First, it anticipates that efforts to increase the availability of 
knowledge ‘inputs’ will yield, more or less inevitably, proportional increases in 
innovative output. Second, it posits that processes of innovation unfold in homogenous 
ways across even the most heterogeneous territories.  
 
The pervasiveness of these linear conceptualisations is reflected in the 
strategies policy-makers the world over have pursued to impel innovation (Godin, 
2006). The prioritisation of R&D has become commonplace. These efforts to increase 
spending on knowledge-generating functions and activities are, according to linear 
models of innovation, sufficient in and of themselves to produce proportional increases 
in innovative output (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011).  
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The inadequacy of linear models of innovation has, however, since been made 
apparent (e.g. Fagerberg, 1988; Rosenberg, 1994; Morgan, 1997). Notably, factors 
beyond the extent to which territories invest in R&D have been definitively linked to 
their capacities to generate innovative output suggesting that processes of innovation 
are considerably more multidimensional and integrated than originally conceived 
(Lundvall, 1992 Maurseth and Verspagen, 1999; Iammarino, 2005; Crescenzi and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2012).  
 
The depth of the stock of skilled human capital with which a territory is 
endowed, for example, shapes both its capacity to generate new knowledge and its 
facility for the absorption, internalisation and mobilisation of various types of 
knowledge and is, in that respect, a preeminent influence on its overall innovative 
capacity (Engelbrecht, 1997; Griffith et al., 2004; Crescenzi, 2005; Leiponen, 2005; 
Usai, 2011; Vogel, 2015). Its composition matters as well; younger and more diverse 
populations have been shown to be more innovative (Ottaviano and Peri, 2004; 
Crescenzi et al., 2007; Ozgen et al., 2011). Similarly, the way in which economic 
actors are distributed across space is profoundly important. Co-location facilitates both 
the processes of collective learning, interaction, collaboration and cooperation, and the 
sharing and localised diffusion of knowledge, ideas and information that are 
indispensable to the genesis of innovation (Bathelt et al., 2004; Storper and Venables, 
2004). It also produces the more general efficiency-enhancing agglomeration 
externalities that to are conducive to the cultivation of innovation (Duranton and Puga, 
2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Glaeser, 2010). Even the suitability of a territory’s 
physical infrastructure and the nature of economic activities it hosts shape its 
innovative potential (e.g. Capello et al., 2012; Agrawal et al., 2017). 
 
Extra-local influences must be considered as well. Knowledge inevitably 
‘spills over’ the borders of the territories responsible for its generation (Audretsch and 
Feldman, 2004; Feldman and Kogler, 2010). These knowledge flows, deliberate or 
otherwise, represent exploitable sources of knowledge and catalysts for innovation for 
territories that can harness them (Bathelt et al., 2004; Moreno et al., 2005; Rodríguez-
Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011, 2016; Rodriguez, 2014; 
Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015). The extent to which territories are exposed to, and, in 
turn, capable of absorbing these inter-territorial knowledge flows will therefore affect 
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their overall innovative potential. Inter-territorial flows are, however, spatially-bound 
(Greunz, 2003; Moreno et al., 2005; Sonn and Storper, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Crescenzi, 2008). This implies that the innovative capacity of a particular territory is 
equally a function of where – specifically with reference to other territories and the 
knowledge-intensive activities they host – it is physically situated.  
 
Finally, institutions have, also come to the fore in analyses of territorial 
innovativeness (Edquist and Johnson, 1997). A territory’s innovative capacity cannot 
be abstracted from the quality and functioning of its formal and informal institutions 
(e.g. Morgan, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Bathelt, 2003; Boschma, 2005; 
Crescenzi et al., 2013; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2013; Murphy et al., 2015; Rodríguez-
Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015; Storper et al., 2015; Balazs, 2017). Investments in 
knowledge-intensive activity and innovation are more likely to be made, and 
interaction, cooperation and collaboration more likely to occur, in environments 
underpinned by well-functioning, stable formal institutions and robustly developed, 
mature informal ones that serve to minimise uncertainty, inefficiencies and mistrust.  
 
What followed from this maturation of understanding and appreciation for the 
multidimensionality of innovation was the realisation that processes of innovation 
were likely to unfold in different ways in different territories (Edquist and Chaminade, 
2006; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). Because processes of innovation are 
governed by the above features, factors and attributes that themselves vary across 
space, it is anticipated that no two places will innovate in the same way nor will they 
mobilise the exact same set of resources to do so. Simply stated, the heterogeneity of 
territories is expected to manifest itself in the innovative processes they host.  
 
This theoretical postulation is validated by empirical examination (e.g. 
Crescenzi et al., 2007, 2012; Usai, 2011; Fagerberg et al., 2014). Accordingly, the 
notion of innovation being a contextually-contingent process is subject to little debate. 
Coenen et al. (2015:487) observe, for example, that “[e]conomic geographers have 
repeatedly argued that regional characteristics and interactions at the regional scale are 
particularly important for knowledge creation and innovation processes”. Similarly, 
Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2008:54) go so far as to assert that “it has now become 
widely accepted that innovation is a territorially-embedded process and cannot be fully 
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understood independent of the social and institutional conditions of every space”. It is 
even thought, now, that local conditions, characteristics and factors actually ‘shape’ 
and ‘support’ the diffusion of the innovations generated by these contextually-
contingent processes as well (Rekers, 2016). 
 
Innovation as a developed territory phenomenon 
  
 In the developed and emerging world alike, it is a country’s most economically 
developed, dynamic cities and regions that generate the bulk of its innovation and host 
the majority of its knowledge-intensive, innovative activity (e.g. Usai, 2011; 
Belderbos et al., 2017). In the United States, for example, it is the metropolitan areas 
of San Jose, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Boston that produce the 
greatest number of patents and top the innovation table (USPTO, 2017). In Canada, 
Toronto, Ottawa-Hull, Vancouver and Montreal represent the country’s “innovation 
hotbeds” (Breau et al., 2014: 361). In the United Kingdom, it is London, and the South 
East more generally, that excel in both ‘intangible investment in innovative property’ 
(i.e. scientific and non-scientific R&D) and the more general generation of innovative 
output (Melachroinos and Spence, 2013; Centre for Cities, 2017). Elsewhere, the 
capital cities of Paris, Tokyo and Mexico City dominate the innovative landscapes of 
France, Japan and Mexico, respectively (Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2016). The same 
is true of India, where Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad and Mumbai lead the 
way (Mitra, 2007). Innovative activity is, as Chapter 2 illustrates, similarly spatially 
concentrated in China as well (Fan et al., 2012; Fu, 2015; Wang and Li, 2016). 
 
 Why this is so is generally well understood and relates back to the contextually-
contingent, multidimensional nature of innovation. More developed territories attract 
and host multinational enterprises (Sassen, 1991; Klier and Testa, 2002; Bell and 
Fageda, 2008; Goerzen et al., 2013). They cultivate and are home to entrepreneurs and 
small and medium enterprises (Bosma and Schutjens, 2009; Stam, 2009). They house 
top universities, research institutes and a diversity of other organisations, both public 
and private (Feldman and Florida, 1994; Florida, 2017). These actors invest in R&D 
functions and engage in other knowledge-generating, innovative activities meaning 
that innovation-inducing knowledge, ideas and information tend not to be in short 
supply. They also draw on the skilled human capital with which more dynamic 
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territories tend to be well endowed and leverage it not only to generate new knowledge 
but, perhaps more importantly, to apply it and other sources of knowledge in 
productive ways, oftentimes commercially viable ways (Berry and Glaeser, 2005; 
Florida, 2005; Lee et al, 2010; Moretti, 2012).  
 
The innovativeness of these actors and, by extension, the more developed 
territories that host them benefits from the extent to which they are spatially 
concentrated as well. Their proximity facilitates the exchange and sharing of 
knowledge – in more formal, structured and deliberate ways and via informal, 
unplanned interactions – that is so closely associated with the genesis of innovation 
(Bathelt et al., 2004; Storper and Venables, 2004). Similarly, it affords these actors the 
opportunity to collaborate and cooperate to combine competencies, knowledge bases 
and resources in their pursuit of technological progress (e.g. Drejer and Vinding, 2005; 
Ponds et al., 2007; Narula and Santangelo, 2009).  
 
All of these actors and processes exist and unfold on ‘economics fabrics’ that 
are more ex ante amenable to knowledge-intensive activity; they feature generally 
more technologically-sophisticated, higher-valued added functions and industries (e.g. 
Capello et al., 2012; Csómos and Tóth, 2016). Moreover, the efficient, transparent and 
stable formal institutions that underpin more developed areas provide a framework 
within which economic activities, innovative ones included, can transpire 
unencumbered by regulatory inefficiencies, unnecessarily high transactions costs and 
other efficiency-impairing actions or obstacles (North, 1991; 1992). Similarly, the 
mature, established informal institutions that regulate behaviours and practices in these 
territories make the aforementioned interactions both more likely and more 
meaningful and impactful (Morgan and Cooke, 1998; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 
2006; Rutten and Boekema, 2007; Alguezaui and Filieri, 2010; Laursen et al., 2012). 
 
Simply stated, the innovative edge that more developed territories tend to enjoy 
is a function of the suitability of their socioeconomic and institutional contexts. All of 
the prerequisites for innovation are fulfilled in these environments. They are, as a result 
conducive in most, if not all, relevant respects to the cultivation and hosting of 
knowledge-intensive, innovative activity. 
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The opposite is largely true for less economically developed territories 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; 2001). They channel fewer resources to the performance of 
R&D and other knowledge-generating activities than their more developed 
counterparts; an outcome that is attributable, at least in part, to the difficulties they 
face attracting, cultivating or, in some cases, retaining entrepreneurs and firms. Their 
inability to attract these actors is both a cause and consequence of the human and 
physical capital deficiencies from which less developed territories are thought to 
suffer. This underinvestment in R&D coupled with the aforementioned dearth of skills 
and capital hamper the generation, circulation and application of knowledge and place 
obvious limits on their innovative potential.  
 
Even more fundamentally, the underlying economic fabrics of less developed 
territories tend to be weaker, from an innovation perspective, than those of their more 
developed counterparts (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017). They are often 
dominated by smaller, less dynamic firms that operate in more traditional industries 
and are engaged in less technologically sophisticated activities and functions. This 
renders their economic fabrics both less likely to introduce knowledge and even less 
receptive to it. Institutional deficiencies are ubiquitous in these environments as well. 
Their formal institutions tend to be less efficient, established or clearly defined (e.g. 
Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). This makes corruption, rent-seeking and other 
efficiency-impairing behaviours more likely. Their informal institutions are often 
similarly underdeveloped. These institutional weaknesses distort incentives and limit 
opportunities and avenues to pursue innovation or engage in economic activity more 
generally. 
 
 Finally, many less developed territories are burdened simply by geography. 
Economic peripherality often coincides with geographic isolation. Many less 
developed territories are therefore not sufficiently proximate to their regions’ or 
countries’ more developed, more innovative hubs to be exposed to spatially-bound 
knowledge flows that emanate from them (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 
2008:63). Opportunity to supplement locally-generated knowledge with that which is 
generated extra-locally is, in turn, minimal. 
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 Taken together, a range of socioeconomic, institutional and geographic factors 
and characteristics render less developed territories less likely to generate knowledge; 
less exposed to extra-local sources of it; and, ultimately, less able to apply it and 
transform it into tangible, applied innovation. 
 
ii. Motivation 
 
 These two stylised facts lie very much at the fore of the study of the economic 
geography of innovation. They have, however, led to other assumptions being made 
both about the way innovative activity is distributed and the way innovative processes 
unfold across space. More specifically, the relative innovativeness of more developed 
territories has given rise, first, to a perception that less developed territories are largely 
incapable of cultivating and sustaining innovation and knowledge-intensive, 
innovative activity. It has also come to be assumed, because of both the perceived 
pervasiveness of the deficiencies by which less developed areas are burdened and their 
presumed un-innovativeness, that when these underdeveloped territories innovate, 
they do so in a relatively homogenous way. That is, it is anticipated that processes of 
innovation unfold in more or less the same manner irrespective of where they occur or 
how heterogeneous the territories that host them may actually be.  
 
The former assumption is, as alluded to in Section I, easily disproved (e.g. 
Table I-1). Less developed areas are less innovative. They are not, however, entirely 
incapable of generating innovation. Chapter 1, in fact, reveals that North America’s 
less developed regions do not lag far behind Europe’s more developed ones in terms 
of their respective innovative capacities. Similarly, Chapter 2 confirms, and is 
premised on the fact, that while innovation is very much a developed city phenomenon 
in the Chinese context, the country’s less developed cities are far from wholly un-
innovative.   
 
There is, however, greater uncertainty surrounding the latter assumption. 
Theoretically, conceptualisations of processes of innovation as contextually-
contingent and reflective of the heterogeneity of the territories that host them would 
lead us to expect it to be untrue. Empirically, however, it remains ambiguous. 
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Because much of the world’s innovative activity occurs in more economically 
developed contexts, studies have tended to focus on these territories with a view to 
understand how and why they have achieved their innovative success and expose the 
dynamics that underpin their respective innovation systems. The study of innovation 
in less developed environments has suffered from this preoccupation. There is a 
relative death of literature examining processes of innovation in less dynamic, 
economically disadvantaged territories. Moreover, what little there is has tended to 
focus on single territories, be they cities, regions or countries, and rely on more in-
depth, survey-driven and/or case study-based approaches (e.g. Doloreux et al., 2007; 
Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011, 2013; Pinto et al., 2015; Stephens et al., 2013; Varis 
et al., 2014; Kudic et al. 2015). Systematic, macroeconomic and, critically, 
comparative analyses are needed if the second of two aforementioned assumptions is 
to be adequately tested and either validated or disproved.  
 
It is this pronounced gap in the literature that I aim to fill.  
 
iii. Relevance 
 
One needs to look no further than the link between innovation and economic 
growth to understand the relevance of this research and the necessity of shoring up the 
aforementioned deficiency in understanding. Innovation is a catalyst for economic 
growth (e.g. Solow, 1957; Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994; Acs, 2002). Territories with robust innovative capacities will grow 
faster and more sustainably than those without; the more innovative a territory, the 
greater its potential for growth and dynamism (e.g. Howells, 2005).  
 
Upgrading the innovative capacities of less developed territories should 
therefore be viewed as an avenue worth pursuing to impel economic growth in and 
increase the dynamism of these lagging areas. Similarly, the promotion of innovation 
in less developed territories could go a long way in reducing the intra-national spatial 
disparities in economic performance that have emerged and continue to grow in 
developed and developing contexts alike. One of the reasons why more economically 
developed territories are exactly that is, in many cases, they have cultivated robust 
innovative capacities that exceed those of their less developed neighbours. If 
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innovation remains as spatially polarised along socioeconomic lines as it is now, the 
gulfs between countries’ more and less developed territories will only widen; the 
growth of more developed territories will, because of their relative innovativeness, 
outpace that of their less innovative, less developed counterparts. Inequalities will 
worsen, constraining the growth potential not only of underdeveloped territories, but 
of more developed ones as well (Cingano, 2014; Ostry et al., 2014). Social discontent 
and political instability are also likely to spread with what we have seen recently can 
be disastrous consequences, as Chapter 4 does in fact acknowledge.  
 
The innovative capacities of these less developed territories are unlikely to 
grow organically; policies geared towards both the promotion of innovation and the 
translation of that innovation into economic growth are, in that respect, unavoidable. 
These approaches will need to be tailored to the specificities of the territories in which 
they are to be pursued. Not only have a-spatial, territorial-blind policies proven largely 
ineffective in the pursuit of innovation and economic growth (e.g. Barca et al., 2012), 
innovative processes are, for the reasons outlined above, especially affected by where 
they take place to the point where a failure to account for relevant contextual 
conditions in the design of strategic approaches could completely undermine their 
effectiveness. 
 
The design of strategic approaches for the promotion of innovation and 
economic growth in less developed territories is therefore predicated on the 
development of a robust understanding of the territorially-unique characteristics and 
features that condition both processes of innovation and the processes by which 
innovation is transformed into economic growth (e.g. Tödtling and Trippl, 2006). It is 
impossible for policy-makers to devise effective territorially-specific policies to 
promote either without understanding exactly how these processes unfold in the 
territories for which they are responsible and, more importantly, the forces and factors 
by which they are impelled, shaped, or, alternatively, impaired. 
 
The macroeconomic analyses of processes of innovation in less developed 
territories undertaken in Chapters 1 and 2 provide policy-makers with an indication of 
the levers that need, or are available, to be pulled in heterogeneous underdeveloped 
contexts to stimulate innovation. With this knowledge, resources can be precisely 
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targeted towards exploiting the exact opportunities or advantages with which a 
territory is endowed or addressing the bottlenecks and inefficiencies by which it is 
plagued, and not wasted on efforts to address factors that are theoretically relevant but, 
in practice, have little bearing on its innovative capacity. Similarly, the explorations 
of the link between innovation and economic performance upon which Chapter 3 is 
based, reveals whether, and to what extent, less developed territories can mobilise 
innovation in the pursuit of economic growth and dynamism. It, in turn, provides a 
sense of if, and what, additional, concurrent steps may be needed to ensure that the 
innovation-oriented development policies pursued in less developed environments 
actually deliver on their mandate. Of course, all of these inferences, conclusions and 
insights are for not, from a policy perspective, if policy-makers are unable to 
incorporate them in the design and eventual implementation of integrated, balanced 
territorial specific development strategies. Herein lies the value of Chapter 4. 
 
Simply stated, not only does this thesis offer direly needed and previously 
unavailable insights into processes of innovation in less developed territories that, in 
turn, inform the design of spatially-sensitive innovation policies for them, it provides 
an indication of whether these policies will be sufficient to impel growth in the 
territories in which they are pursed, and, moreover, of the steps that can be taken to 
make sure they do so. 
 
III. The chapters 
 
 The thesis is composed of four related chapters and a short conclusion. The 
first and fourth chapters are co-authored with Professor Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. The 
second and third are my own work. 
 
 The first and second chapters focus explicitly on the dynamics of innovation 
in less developed environments. Chapter 1 compares the socioeconomic factors that 
drive innovation in North America’s less developed regions to those at play in their 
European counterparts. Chapter 2 contrasts processes of innovation in China’s less 
developed cities to those hosted by their more developed neighbours. The third chapter 
examines innovation in less developed contexts through a different lens. Chapter 3 
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probes the link between innovation and economic performance; it assesses the extent 
to which two subsets of the European Union’s most underdeveloped regions are 
capable of transforming knowledge and innovation into economic dynamism. The 
final chapter thinks critically and more practically about the promotion of economic 
growth and dynamism in the less developed territories with which the thesis is 
immediately concerned. It reviews a handful of successful and unsuccessful 
development strategies to ascertain insights into the steps that should be taken to 
maximise the likelihood that territorial development policies fulfil their potential, 
impel growth and contribute to the reduction of territorial disparities. The Conclusion 
summarises the chapters that compose the thesis, addresses the policy implications 
associated with their respective conclusions and offers avenues and suggestions for 
continued research. 
 
Each of the chapters is summarised in the following subsections. 
 
1. Innovating in less developed regions: What drives patenting in the lagging 
regions of Europe and North America 
 
 Not all less developed, lagging regions are the same. They are, however, in 
spite of their demonstrable heterogeneity, often ‘bundled’ together for the purposes of 
innovation policy design and implementation. This chapter attempts to determine 
whether such bundling is warranted by conducting a regional level investigation for 
Canada and the United States, on the one hand, and Europe, on the other, to, first, 
identify the structural and socioeconomic factors that drive patenting in the less 
developed regions of North America and Europe, respectively; and, second, explore 
how these factors differ between the two contexts. 
 
 The comparative analysis upon which the chapter is based covers 71 less and 
81 more developed regions in Europe and 27 less and 34 more developed provinces 
and states in Canada and the United States. It reveals that processes of innovation 
unfolding on either side of the Atlantic Ocean are governed by distinctly different 
combinations of factors, territorial attributes and influences. 
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Innovation in North America’s less developed regions is a function of the 
application of knowledge generated by R&D activities undertaken by the institutes of 
higher education they host; the mobilisation of knowledge flows emanating from the 
innovative efforts of private sector entities operating beyond their borders; the ready 
availability of skilled human capital; the youthfulness of their populations; and 
innovation-inducing externalities that arise from the co-location of economic actors 
and activity. Processes of innovation in Europe’s lagging regions are, conversely, 
driven by private sector investment in R&D; their exposure to a variety of inter-
regional knowledge spillovers; the depth of the pools of skilled labour they are home 
to; and agglomeration externalities. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that 
these regions struggle to mobilise their youth in the pursuit of innovation and, that 
their innovative potential may be hampered by the types of economic activities and 
industries they host.  
 
The analysis also indicates that the set of factors and influences that shape 
processes of innovation in North America’s and Europe’s less developed regions, 
respectively, are more similar to those at play in their more developed counterparts 
than to one another. This latter finding suggests that innovation systems are more 
likely to exist across differentially developed but physically proximate (i.e. within 
continent) territories than across similarly developed, but geographically dispersed 
ones. 
 
2. Innovating in lagging cities: A comparative exploration of the dynamics of 
innovation in Chinese cities 
 
 This chapter is similar to the first in that it explores the genesis of innovation 
in less developed territories. It differs, however, in two critical respects: First, it is 
situated in the emerging world. Second, it is a comparison not of disparate lagging 
territories, but rather of a country’s less developed areas to their more developed 
counterparts. Additionally, it is conducted at the urban as opposed to the regional level. 
 
 Innovation in China is, as it is elsewhere in the world, spatially polarised. The 
country’s more developed cities host the majority of its knowledge-intensive, 
innovative activity. Its less developed ones are, however, engaged in the knowledge 
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economy and are introducing innovative output, albeit to a more limited extent. This 
chapter sets out to expose how it is that they do so. It relies on an econometric 
investigation of 283 Chinese cities to address two related research questions: First, 
what are the socioeconomic and structural factors that govern processes of innovation 
in China’s more and less developed cities, respectively? And second, how do these 
factors differ between the two types of cities? 
 
The analysis reveals that the innovative processes and, in turn, the innovation 
systems hosted by China’s more developed cities are, most fundamentally, more 
complex, integrated and mature than those of their less developed counterparts. The 
country’s more and less developed cities alike leverage the knowledge generated by 
their R&D activities, the inter-city knowledge spillovers to which they are exposed 
and their human capital endowments to generate innovation. More developed cities, 
however, do so considerably more efficiently and realise comparatively high returns 
from these knowledge inputs. Moreover, while the innovative capacities of China’s 
more developed cities are enhanced by innovation-inducing agglomeration 
externalities and the industrially-biased economic fabrics by which they are 
underpinned, those of their less developed counterparts are seemingly hampered by 
fundamental infrastructural deficiencies and an inability to mobilise the large 
populations they are home to. Further evidence of the relative maturity of the 
innovation systems hosted by China’s more developed cities is found in the knowledge 
resource-related synergies from which their innovative capacities benefit. These 
synergies are both scarcer and, when they emerge, considerably weaker in the 
country’s less developed cities. 
 
3. Innovation and economic growth in the European Periphery: Comparing 
Europe’s lagging regions 
 
 In zeroing in on the relationship between innovation and economic 
performance, this chapter adopts a perspective that is different to that of the preceding 
two.  
 
Innovation is a preeminent driver of regional economic growth and dynamism. 
This does not, however, mean that all territories are equally capable of transforming 
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knowledge and innovation into economic growth: less developed territories are, 
because of the socioeconomic, structural and institutional deficiencies by which they 
tend to be plagued, anticipated to display the weakest facility for doing so. Of course, 
lagging regions are, as this introduction has stressed, heterogeneous entities. This 
heterogeneity is likely to manifest itself in the extent to which these territories are able 
to mobilise and productively exploit innovative activity in the pursuit of growth.  
 
Chapter 3 is motivated by this assertion. Its overarching aim is to assess the 
extent to which different types of economically disadvantaged regions are capable of 
translating different types and sources of knowledge and innovation into economic 
dynamism. The chapter is based on a comparative econometric analysis of Europe’s 
‘low-income’ and ‘low-growth regions’. Accordingly, the questions that guide the 
analysis are: (a) Are low-growth and low-income regions equally capable of 
transforming knowledge and innovation into economic growth? And (b) are processes 
of economic growth in low-income and low-growth regions, respectively, governed 
by the same, more broadly-defined set of socioeconomic and institutional forces?  
 
The analysis validates the aforementioned assertion. It reveals that low-income 
and low-growth regions are differentially capable of translating different sources of 
knowledge and innovation into economic performance. Low-income regions have a 
marked facility the translation of locally generated innovation into economic 
dynamism. The same cannot be said for their low-growth counterparts. They rely not 
on their own innovative activities, but rather on extra-locally generated knowledge and 
innovation to impel growth. It is also observed that the differences between the two 
types of lagging regions extend to the more general set of socioeconomic, structural 
and institutional factors that govern processes of growth in them. 
 
4. Strategies of gain and strategies of waste: What determines the success of 
development intervention? 
 
 The final chapter of the thesis is its most applied. There is scope in virtually all 
less developed territories for the implementation of development policies and 
strategies to stimulate economic growth. Development interventions are not, however, 
created equal; their track-record includes instances of success and failure. The relevant 
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question therefore relates not to whether less developed territories should pursue 
development interventions in the pursuit of economic growth and dynamism, but 
rather how they should go about designing interventions to maximise the likelihood of 
them succeeding. 
 
 Chapter 4 offers a comprehensive, holistic answer to this question. It tables 
four principles that, if followed, increase the likelihood that a development policy, 
whether it be innovation-oriented or otherwise, achieves its objective. First, 
interventions must operate across and address more than one development axis. 
Second, robust diagnoses of local economic conditions should be undertaken to 
facilitate both the tailoring of interventions to the specificities of the territory in which 
they are to be pursued and their targeting towards specific weaknesses, and 
deficiencies or, conversely, advantages or opportunities. Third, the design of 
interventions must reflect where on the development spectrum the territory for which 
they are designed is situated. Fourth, actions and initiatives to promote institutional 
upgrading and efficiency should be integrated directly into development interventions.  
 
The chapter also proposes a taxonomy of development strategies that serves to 
provide more general guidance relating to how they should be designed for territories 
at different points in their development trajectories. The taxonomy is based on the 
premise that development strategies must balance what we term complexity – 
understood as a function of the number and diversity of the individual elements by 
which the strategy is composed – and breadth of strategic scope – understood as the 
narrowness of the development outcomes or objectives by which the strategy is guided 
– in ways that reflect the nature of the specific development challenges by which a 
particular territory is faced. 
 
The four lessons and this more general guidance are distilled from a review of 
a handful of successful – ‘strategies of gain’ – and unsuccessful – ‘strategies of waste’ 
– development strategies. The review includes a mix of the four types of interventions 
that have dominated the policy landscape in recent decades: (1) infrastructure-
oriented; (2) inward investment-oriented; (3) innovation and/or human capital-
oriented; (4) cluster-based. The chapter’s overarching conclusion is that the potential 
of spatially-sensitive, territorial development interventions is considerable, but that 
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their impact will be modest if lessons are not learned from the past and the above 
principles and guidance are ignored. 
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1. INNOVATING IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS: WHAT DRIVES 
PATENTING IN THE LAGGING REGIONS OF EUROPE AND 
NORTH AMERICA 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The spatial concentration of innovative activity in large and economically 
advanced cities and regions – often to the detriment of less developed areas – is a well-
documented phenomenon (e.g. Feldman and Florida, 1994; Sun, 2003; Bettencourt et 
al., 2007; Mitra, 2007; Crescenzi et al., 2012; Foddi and Usai, 2013; Breau et al., 
2014). Yet, the processes that drive innovation in more and less developed areas, in 
spite of the spatial and socioeconomic similarities they often display, are far from 
homogeneous (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 2007; 2012; Usai, 2011; Fagerberg et al., 2014) 
and vary considerably from one context to another.  
 
Because of the tendency of innovation to congregate in more 
socioeconomically developed centres, a great deal is known about how processes of 
innovation transpire in these types of environments. We know much less, however, 
about how innovation unfolds in economically disadvantaged contexts and, more 
importantly, about how processes of innovation vary across them (Virkkala, 2007; Hall 
and Donald, 2009). This research aims to shed light on how innovation processes occur 
in less developed regions by examining whether processes of innovation, and the 
factors that impinge upon them, differ substantially across heterogeneous lagging 
contexts. In particular, it addresses the issue of what makes the relatively less 
developed areas of North America more innovative than those of Europe.  
 
Two related questions lie at the heart of this research: (a) what factors govern 
processes of innovation in North America’s and Europe’s economically disadvantaged 
regions? And (b) how do these factors differ between the two contexts? A 
macroeconomic investigation of provinces and states in Canada and the United States, 
on the one hand, and regions in Europe – the OECD’s Territorial Level 2 (TL2) regions 
–, on the other, between 2000 and 2010 is conducted to address the two questions. 
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Innovation is, for reasons addressed in Section 1.4, proxied in the econometric 
analysis by patent applications.3 The research is, therefore, an exploration of the key 
factors, features, and attributes that explain interregional differences in patenting 
activity. Patents have, despite their problems, been frequently employed as an 
indicative and reasonably reliable barometer of a territory’s capacity to introduce 
commercially viable, tangible, and applied innovations (e.g. Furman et al., 2002). The 
econometric analysis therefore serves as the basis for the formulation of insights into 
processes of innovation in the contexts with which this research is immediately 
concerned and, more specifically, into the socioeconomic factors that drive, shape, and 
mediate these processes. These inferences must, however, be interpreted with a 
cognisance of the limitations associated with the use of patent statistics as a proxy for 
innovation and with the appropriate degree of caution they warrant. Moreover, while 
interesting and insightful in and of themselves, the inferences drawn from the 
econometric exercise should be viewed as exploratory in nature and are as much points 
of departure for further research and exploration as they are ‘standalone’ conclusions.  
 
This research makes contributions of both an academic and policy-oriented 
nature. Generally, work on innovation in less developed contexts has consisted of in-
depth, often survey-driven investigations of single countries or regions (e.g. Doloreux 
et al., 2007; Virkkala, 2007; Doloreux and Dionne, 2008; Isaksen and Onsager, 2010; 
Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011a,b; Jauhiainen and Moilanen, 2012; Fitjar and 
Rodríguez-Pose 2013; Pinto et al., 2015; Stephens et al., 2013; Mayer and 
Baumgartner, 2014; Varis et al., 2014; Kudic et al. 2015; Pelkonen and Nieminen, 
2016). While this research has shed considerable light on innovation in what are 
thought to be relatively disadvantaged environments, a need for systematic research to 
facilitate the drawing of conclusions that go from the particular to the more general 
remains. The chapter, because of its cross-continent, comparative orientation, is 
supplemental to the work that has been and is being conducted at the case-study and 
                                               
3 The use of patent statistics is, nevertheless, problematic not least because patent statistics do not capture all, or all 
types of innovations generated in or by an economy. A great deal of innovation, especially process and incremental 
innovation remains unpatented. Moreover, some sectors have a much greater propensity to patent than others. That 
said, there is no better proxy for innovation available, at the time of writing, for regions in North America and 
Europe. Patent statistics, despite their problems, remain the only reliable and comparable quantification of 
innovative activity occurring at a regional level in these two contexts. The rationale behind the use of patents as a 
proxy for innovation is further elaborated in Section 1.4.2.1. 
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microeconomic level.4 Its most general overarching objective is to contribute to the 
development of innovation policies for North America’s and Europe’s lagging regions.  
 
The empirical analysis, covering 71 less and 81 more developed regions in 
Europe as well as 27 less and 34 more developed provinces and states in Canada and 
the United States, respectively, suggests that while there are some similarities between 
the factors that govern innovation in North America’s and Europe’s lagging regions, a 
number of not inconsequential differences between the two continents prevail. Of the 
similarities, the most prominent relate to the positive relationships between innovation 
and both the availability of skilled human capital and the agglomeration of economic 
activity, as well as to the relevance of interregional knowledge flows to the generation 
of innovation. Differences relate to the types of R&D expenditure that are linked to 
regional innovativeness and to the role of R&D knowledge flows for innovation in 
lagging areas. In addition, the sets of factors that mediate processes of innovation in 
the lagging regions of both North America and Europe, respectively, seem to bear a 
closer resemblance to those that drive innovation in their more developed neighbours 
in the same continent than to those at play in their lagging counterparts on the opposite 
side of the Atlantic. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 addresses the 
motivation for the work and presents the theoretical framework within which it is 
situated. Section 1.3 explores trends in R&D expenditure and patenting in North 
America and Europe. Section 1.4 introduces the empirical methodology, model, and 
variables employed in the analysis. Section 1.5 presents and interprets the results of 
the econometric analysis. Section 1.6 concludes by summarising the analysis and 
deriving a series of preliminary policy implications and avenues for future research. 
 
  
                                               
4 While other researchers have conducted analyses of innovation from comparative perspectives comparable to the 
one employed here (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 2007, 2012; Usai, 2011; Fagerberg et al., 2014), none, to our knowledge, 
have focused explicitly on the dynamics and drivers of innovation in less socioeconomically developed, lagging 
regions. 
 48 
1.2. The puzzle of innovating in lagging regions 
 
Two tenets have come to dominate our understanding of the economic 
geography of innovation. The first is that more economically developed territories are 
more innovative than their less developed counterparts. The second is that processes 
of innovation and the factors that influence them are as heterogeneous as the territories 
in which they occur. 
 
 The intention of the following section is to engage with these two beliefs with 
a view to expose some of the tension between the ways in which they are often 
approached or applied. It is this tension that ultimately serves as the theoretical 
motivation for this exploratory research and the questions that guide it. 
 
1.2.1. The less/more developed dichotomy 
 
Lagging regions are generally thought to be less innovative than more 
economically advanced ones. While certain economically disadvantaged areas have 
managed, often against the odds, to develop a considerable innovative capacity (e.g. 
Virkkala, 2007; Doloreux et al., 2007; Doloreux and Dionne, 2008; Fitjar and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2011a,b; 2013; Jauhiainen and Moilanen, 2012), the dominating view 
is that innovation tends to cluster in a relatively limited number of more developed 
areas (Feldman and Florida, 1994; Sun, 2003; Bettencourt et al., 2007; Mitra, 2007; 
Crescenzi et al., 2007; 2012; Foddi and Usai, 2013; Breau et al., 2014). 
 
 The dynamism of more developed territories in terms of innovative activity is 
frequently attributed to a host of socioeconomic and institutional factors. These areas 
generally have an abundance of skilled human capital, better technological 
infrastructure and ample physical capital (Feldman and Florida, 1994; Florida, 2003; 
2005; Bettencourt et al., 2007). They concentrate public organizations and private 
firms that benefit from the externalities associated with co-location and agglomeration. 
Firms reap the benefits of economies of scale, specialisation and diversification and of 
the localised circulation of knowledge (e.g. Jacobs, 1969; Glaeser et al., 1992; Anselin 
et al. 1997; Henderson, 1999; Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Duranton and Puga, 
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2004; Andersson et al., 2005; Carlino et al., 2007). Economic centres are also 
understood to be more institutionally suitable for innovative activity (Rodríguez-Pose 
1999; 2001). The agglomeration of economic actors is associated with the emergence 
of “intricate institutional systems” that support the diffusion and exchange of 
knowledge and the collaborations and interactions fundamental to processes of 
innovation (Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011a:557). 
 
Likewise, several factors constrain the innovative capacity of less developed 
areas. Most prominent among them are socioeconomic and institutional deficiencies 
and geographic isolation. These contextual deficiencies relate to the weakness of their 
‘local economic fabrics’, insufficient stocks of human and physical capital, and the 
absence of the formal and informal institutions that would normally function as the 
backbone of ‘innovation prone’ environments (Rodríguez-Pose, 2001:280, 281). 
These shortcomings are thought to stifle the generation, local circulation, and 
application of knowledge. Physical isolation, on the other hand, places many of these 
areas beyond the geographic limits of knowledge spillovers emanating from more 
innovative territories (e.g. Moreno et al., 2005; Sonn and Storper, 2008; Rodríguez-
Pose and Crescenzi, 2008), and in doing so, bars them from absorbing and exploiting 
economically useful knowledge generated elsewhere.  
 
Stated simply, the resource endowments, socioeconomic fabrics, institutional 
infrastructures and, in some cases, the geographic/physical ‘situations’ of lagging 
regions differ vastly from those of their more economically advanced counterparts. 
More relevantly here, these differences tend to be reflected in and are ultimately 
responsible for their respective – often radically different – innovative capacities. The 
contextual conditions in lagging regions, in particular, are generally thought to be less 
conducive to the development and sustenance of robust innovative capacities. It is on 
the basis of these observations that the first implicit hypothesis of this research is 
formed: namely that because economically disadvantaged regions tend to be 
characterised by structural, socioeconomic, and institutional fabrics that are less 
conducive to innovation than those of their more developed counterparts, processes of 
innovation in lagging regions, if and when they unfold, will stand in stark contrast to 
those transpiring in more economically developed areas. 
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1.2.2. Regional innovation as a contextually-contingent process 
 
The understanding of innovation processes and of what shapes them has 
evolved considerably from the earliest linear models (e.g. Maclaurin, 1953). Processes 
of innovation are now widely understood not only as only complex and dynamic, but 
also subject to influence by a variety of socioeconomic, institutional, and political 
characteristics unique to the environments in which they take place (Edquist and 
Chaminade, 2006:125, 126).  
 
While investment in R&D and knowledge generation have long been 
associated with the genesis of innovation (e.g. Grilliches, 1979), other research has 
teased out links between a multitude of factors and territories’ innovative capacities. 
These include, but are not limited to: the supply and quality of human capital (Romer, 
1990; Glaeser, 1999; Andersson et al., 2005; Crescenzi, 2005; Lee et al., 2010; Pater 
and Lewandowska, 2015); the skills composition of pools of labour (Florida, 2002; 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2005; Storper and Scott, 2009; Özgen et al., 2011); the 
agglomeration of economic activity and the knowledge-related externalities with 
which it is associated (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Storper and Venables, 2004); the 
capacity to absorb non-local knowledge (Bathelt et al., 2004); and the quality and 
functioning of local institutions (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). These 
analyses often reveal pronounced differences between the factors that affect 
innovation, their relative importance and, critically, the way in which they interact 
with one another across geographies.  
 
 Consequently, innovation processes differ depending on the context in which 
they take place. The territorially-specific nature of regional innovation becomes 
evident in comparative analyses which have unveiled pronounced differences between 
the territorial dynamics of innovation in different parts of the world. Recent empirical 
research has revealed, for example, that the exact sets of factors that influence 
processes of innovation in the United States, the European Union, India, and China, 
respectively, and the extent to and manner in which each relevant factor does so, vary 
considerably across the four economies (Crescenzi et al. 2007; 2012).  
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The research’s second hypothesis is founded on this notion that processes of 
innovation are highly contingent on local context and conditions. More specifically, it 
is posited that while less developed areas may, as mentioned earlier, share some broad 
similarities, processes of innovation in what remain heterogeneous regions will not 
transpire in the same or perhaps even similar ways. 
 
1.2.3. Do lagging areas innovate in the same way? 
 
While the cross-context diversity of processes of innovation is increasingly 
acknowledged, an implicit tendency to presume that all economically disadvantaged 
environments (a) innovate less and (b) that they do so in relatively homogenous ways 
remains. Insufficient agglomeration, poor accessibility, and weak socioeconomic and 
institutional endowments curtail innovation and offer limited alternatives for 
technological change. Hence, innovation policies tend to be similar for all lagging 
areas, regardless of local conditions. But is this truly the case? Do these regions, 
irrespective of geography and contextual conditions, innovate less and, more 
importantly, do they do so in similar ways?  
 
 Relying on a comparison between North America and Europe, this chapter sets 
out to assess whether all lagging regions are functionally the same from an innovation 
perspective. Two related research questions inform the analysis: (a) what are the 
socioeconomic factors that influence processes of innovation in North America’s and 
Europe’s lagging regions, respectively? And (b) how do these factors differ between 
the two contexts? 
 
The regions that compose the continents with which we are concerned have 
been categorised purely in accordance with their respective levels of economic 
development. More specifically, ‘less developed’ or ‘lagging’5 regions are, for the 
purposes of the analysis, defined as those below a given threshold in terms of relative 
wealth in 2010: 90% of the average regional GDP per capita in Canada, the US, and 
Europe, respectively.6 
                                               
5 Regions that are not classified as lagging are referred to as ‘more developed regions’. 
 
6 90% of the average GDP per head is also the threshold the EU employs to distinguish between more developed 
and less developed and transition regions. 
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1.3. Knowledge generation and innovation in North America’s and 
Europe’s lagging regions 
 
Prior to delving into the econometric analysis, let us consider both the basic 
‘inputs’ to and ‘outputs’ of innovation process in North America and Europe. The 
input we focus on is R&D expenditure. R&D investment is by no means the only input 
to processes of innovation. It is, however, intimately linked to the generation and 
absorption of “new economic knowledge” (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004) and is the 
only input for which there is reliable and comparable data at the regional level for both 
North America and Europe. For outputs, we consider patent applications – again a not 
uncontroversial measure of innovation  (see Footnote 3) – but the only one for which 
comparable data exist.  
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates expenditure trends in business enterprise (Panel 1A), 
higher education (Panel 1B) and government sector (Panel 1C) R&D in both the 
lagging and the more developed regions of North America and Europe. Three 
inferences can be drawn from the figures. 
 
First, business enterprise is the most prominent type of R&D expenditure 
across North American and European regions, regardless of level of development 
(Figure 1.1, Panel 1A). There are, however, considerable differences in business R&D 
expenditure across different types of territories. North America’s more developed 
regions invest considerably more in business enterprise R&D than their lagging 
counterparts. In 2010, for example, the continent’s more developed regions spent 
1.32% of their GDP on business enterprise R&D. Its lagging regions, by comparison, 
directed an average of only 0.94%. A much greater gulf exists in Europe. In 2010, 
business enterprise R&D expenditure accounted for 1.12% of the GDP of its more 
developed regions and only 0.48% of its economically disadvantaged ones. 
 
Second, the balance between private and public R&D varies between the two 
continents, and between their less developed regions in particular (Figure 1.1, Panels 
1B and 1C). In North America’s lagging regions, the public effort represented 45% of 
the 1.8% of GDP invested in R&D in 2010. In Europe, the involvement by the private 
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sector was less prominent, and public investment accounted for 0.5% of GDP in a total 
investment in R&D which hovered around 1% of GDP.  
 
Figure 1.1. Average regional R&D expenditure by sector as a percentage of GDP, 
2000-2010 
 
Authors’ elaboration 
Third, levels of public R&D investment in North America’s lagging regions – 
that is both higher education and government R&D – are reasonably comparable to 
those in its more developed regions (Figure 1.1, Panels 1B and 1C). In 2010, higher 
education R&D expenditure accounted for an average 0.43% of GDP in lagging 
regions and 0.42% in more advanced ones (Figure 1.1, Panel 1B). Likewise, the 
continent’s more developed regions spent, on average, 0.32% of their GDP on 
government sector R&D, while their less developed counterparts directed 0.41% of 
GDP to these activities (Figure 1.1, Panel 1C). By contrast, levels of public R&D in 
Europe’s lagging regions were well below those of its more developed regions. In 
2010, for example, Europe’s more developed regions directed, on average, 0.45% and 
0.23% of their GDP towards higher education and government sector R&D, 
respectively (Figure 1.1, Panels 1B and 1C). Lagging regions, on the other hand, 
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invested 0.31% and 0.14% of their GDP in the two types of R&D (Figure 1.1, Panels 
1B and 1C).  
 
Summarizing, while North America’s economically disadvantaged regions lag 
behind its more developed ones in terms of business enterprise R&D expenditure, the 
two types of regions direct, on average, similar amounts to both types of public R&D 
activities. The implications of this are twofold: First, differences in aggregate R&D 
expenditure between North America’s more and less developed regions are 
attributable to differences in private rather than public investment. Second, lagging 
regions in North America are less disadvantaged in terms of R&D investment than 
European ones relative to their respective more advanced counterparts. That is, not 
only do levels of business enterprise R&D expenditure in more developed regions 
exceed those of lagging regions by a much greater margin in Europe than they do in 
North America, Europe’s lagging regions also invest less, on average, in public R&D 
activities than their more developed neighbours. Comparable differences in public 
R&D investment are not observed between the less and more developed regions of 
North America. Overall, lagging regions in North America would seem more 
favourably positioned to produce innovation than their European counterparts. 
 
On the output side, patent application trends are broadly consistent with those 
observed in R&D expenditure (Figure 1.2). In both North America and Europe, more 
developed regions are, on average, significantly more innovative than lagging ones. 
Moreover, there has been a degree of convergence in the innovative performance of 
the more advanced regions of the two continents. Between 2000 and 2006, North 
America’s more developed regions were decidedly more innovative than their 
European counterparts. By the end of the period of analysis, however, the two 
economies’ more developed regions were producing similar numbers of patent 
applications per million inhabitants. In 2010, North America’s more developed regions 
generated, on average, 122.22 applications per million inhabitants, while in Europe the 
same category of regions produced a comparable 121.76. 
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Figure 1.2. Average regional PCT patent applications per million inhabitants, 2000-
2010 
 
Authors’ elaboration 
There remains, however, a pronounced discrepancy between the respective 
innovative performances of lagging regions on either side of Atlantic – North 
America’s lagging regions are markedly more innovative in per capita terms than their 
European counterparts (Figure 1.2). While the innovative gap between the two 
economies’ less developed regions did decrease marginally between 2000 and 2010, 
the 28.71 patent applications per million inhabitants produced by Europe’s lagging 
regions in 2010 was more than doubled by the 67.91 applications per million 
inhabitants generated by similarly disadvantaged regions in North America.  
 
A portion of the pronounced difference between the innovative output 
produced by North America’s lagging regions and that by Europe’s less developed 
ones may be explicable by the classification of certain American states that were once 
among the country’s most developed – including, for example, Michigan, Ohio and 
perhaps even, recognising the former prominence of St. Louis, Missouri – as less 
developed areas. These states are today – and were throughout the period of analysis 
– lagging states. Decades-long processes of economic decline, and, more recently, the 
global financial crisis, reversed the economic fortunes of what once were prosperous 
states. It is possible, however, that the economic dynamism these states achieved 
largely on the back of more industrial, manufacturing-type activities in the early- to 
mid-20th century endowed these regions with an above average innovative capacity 
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some of which has proved resilient to the processes of economic decline by which they 
have been plagued. It is unlikely, however, that the gulf between the innovative 
capacities of lagging regions of the two continents is explicable entirely by the long-
since-passed economic success of a small handful of states and the ‘legacy effects’ 
with which they are possibly associated. That said, this history should not be 
overlooked and needs to be acknowledged as part of the efforts to understand the 
differences between North America’s and Europe’s lagging regions.  
 
In short, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 reveal sizable differences between lagging regions 
in North America and those in Europe. More specifically, it becomes apparent that 
Europe’s lagging regions are more disadvantaged in terms of R&D expenditure, and 
investment in business R&D functions in particular, than their North American 
counterparts. Moreover, Europe’s less developed regions also lag behind North 
America’s in patent production, suggesting that the innovative capacity of North 
America’s lagging regions is greater than that of their European peers. The geography 
of patent production in North America and Europe is summarized in Appendix 1. 
 
1.4. Methodology 
 
1.4.1. The model 
 
The econometric model assumes the form of a ‘modified regional knowledge 
production function’ (Ó hUallacháin and Leslie, 2007) within which regional 
innovative capacity is a function of regional investment in knowledge generation; the 
innovative activities occurring in neighbouring regions; and a vector of socioeconomic 
factors.  
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The basic model is specified as follows: 
 
 yi,t = βR&Di,t + θWR&Di,t + Xi,t¢δ + εi,t  
 
Where: 
 
y represents regional innovative performance proxied by patent 
intensity; 
R&D depicts regional investment in R&D activities; 
WR&D represents average R&D expenditure in neighbouring regions; 
X is a vector of socioeconomic factors; 
i,t represent region and time, respectively 
 
1.4.2. The variables 
 
1.4.2.1. The dependent variable 
 
 The dependent variable is patent applications per million inhabitants. Patent 
applications reflect the introduction of commercially viable, applied innovations 
(Furman et al., 2002) and as a result, are an oft-employed barometer of a territory’s 
innovative capacity. Despite their shortcomings, patent application statistics are the 
most suitable option for cross-country comparative econometric analyses. We opt to 
use Patent Cooperation Treaty (‘PCT’) patent applications. This decision is motivated 
by the comparative nature of the research. Crescenzi et al. (2012:1062) highlight, 
citing the OECD (2009:66), that PCT patent applications function as “‘worldwide 
patent application[s]’ [that are] much less biased than national applications”.  
 
 Prior to proceeding, it must be stressed that there is considerable debate 
surrounding the suitability of patent applications as a proxy for innovative capacity. 
Detractors assert that many innovations are not patented either because they are not 
legally patentable or because inventors have opted not to patent them (Desrochers, 
1998:57, 58). Patent applications offer a reasonably reliable measure of specifically 
commercially viable, more tangible innovation – especially that which is generated 
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by/in sectors and industries with higher propensities to patent (e.g. Mäkinen, 2007; 
Fontana et al., 2013). They do not, however, as noted by Capello and Lenzi 
(2014:189), reflect “innovative efforts that can be developed either in the form of 
process, marketing, and organisational innovations or in the form of product 
innovation not [necessarily] obtained via research and patenting activities”.  We are 
therefore only able to observe certain types of innovations and certain dimensions of 
a region’s overall innovative capacity. Hence, while patents are a generally accepted 
proxy for innovation, they do not capture all types of innovative activity. Similarly, 
the validity of patent statistics as a measure of innovativeness is adversely affected by 
biases in the types of innovations that are patented (i.e. product versus process) and by 
variability in the propensity of firms in different industries and of different sizes to 
patent (Desrochers, 1998:58). In spite of these well-documented limitations, patent 
application statistics remain the most frequently used proxy for innovation, often out 
of necessity. Moreover, their use does not impede the formulation of exploratory and 
indicative comparative insights into innovation in the types of environments with 
which this research is concerned. As Trajtenberg (1990:183) observes, they are “the 
only observable manifestation of inventive activity with a well-grounded claim for 
universality”. 
   
1.4.2.2. The independent variables 
 
 Processes of regional innovation are subject to influence by any number of 
factors. This research is most immediately concerned with those of a structural and 
socioeconomic nature.7 Theoretical and empirical literature has identified a host of 
variables that reflect the socioeconomic and structural influences that are among the 
preeminent shapers of processes of knowledge creation and application and, 
ultimately, innovation. We incorporate these variables into the empirical model. They 
are the following. 
 
                                               
7 Influences on innovative processes are by no means confined to those considered here. We have, however, because 
of the aims of the study and the documented relevance of these factors, as well as the availability of data for 
comparative analysis, elected to focus on socioeconomic and structural influences. This is not to discount the 
relevance of other regional factors or assets including, for example, formal and informal institutional conditions 
and arrangements, or other intangible assets or competencies. That said, issues related to, in the first instance, data 
availability and, in the second, the less tangible and thus quantifiable nature of certain influences and factors explain 
the exclusion of such factors from the econometric analysis that follows. 
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R&D expenditure 
 
The first of our independent variables are measures of regional R&D 
expenditure, expressed, including the spatially-lagged ones, as percentages of GDP.  
 
R&D activities are intrinsically linked to processes of innovation (e.g. 
Grilliches, 1979). Regional investment in R&D is a central determinant of a region’s 
capacity to generate new, economically useful knowledge as well as to absorb 
externally generated knowledge and innovations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Griffith 
et al., 2003; 2004; Vogel, 2015).  
 
We disaggregate regional R&D expenditure into three sub-categories: (a) 
business enterprise; (b) higher education; and (c) government sector R&D. The 
motivation for doing so is twofold. First, from a more theoretical perspective, certain 
types of R&D expenditure are more readily associated with the generation of 
innovation than others (Malecki, 1991, Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). Business R&D, on the 
one hand, is, as Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004:355) note, more 
readily linked to the generation of “new goods and services, [with] higher quality of 
output and new production processes”. Higher education and government sector R&D 
expenditure, on the other hand, are more commonly associated with advances in 
“scientific, basic knowledge and [public missions]” and the maintenance and 
expansion of the “stock of knowledge available for the society” (Guellec and Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004:356).  
 
Second, as illustrated in Section 1.3, there are marked differences in the 
allocation of R&D resources across public and private functions between North 
America and Europe, and again between their more developed and less developed 
regions. The consideration of the three subclasses of R&D expenditure is therefore 
necessary to develop nuanced insights into the returns to R&D in the lagging regions 
of both North America and Europe. 
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R&D knowledge flows 
 
 Returns to R&D investment are often realised beyond the borders of the region 
undertaking it (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Feldman and Kogler, 2010). Exposure 
to interregional knowledge flows and externally generated knowledge and innovation 
is a non-negligible influence on the innovativeness of a territory (e.g. Fritsch and 
Franke, 2004; Bathelt et al., 2004; Moreno et al., 2005; Cabrer-Borrás and Serrano-
Domingo, 2007; Sonn and Storper, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Fitjar 
and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011a,b; Rodríguez, 2014; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015). 
 
We have therefore, following, among others, Crescenzi et al. (2007), developed 
two types of spatially-lagged R&D expenditure variables to explore the relationship 
between exposure to interregional knowledge spillovers and regional innovative 
capacity. The spatially-lagged R&D variables reflect the R&D expenditure of 
neighbouring regions and are constructed for all three subcategories of R&D 
expenditure.8 
 
The spatially-lagged variables, and specifically the spatial weights matrices 
used in their calculation, were constructed using GIS software (ESRI’s ArcGIS). The 
first type of spatially-lagged variable uses first-order contiguity-based spatial weights 
and is included to estimate the influence of exposure to shorter distance knowledge 
flows on regional innovativeness. The construction of this first type of spatially-lagged 
variable does not involve the calculation of distances between regions. Rather, the 
software is used to identify the regions that are contiguous to a given region. A ‘queen’ 
conceptualisation of contiguity is employed; if a region shares a border or a vertex 
with the region of interest, it is assigned a weight of one. Non-contiguous regions are 
assigned a weight of zero.  
 
This first-type of spatially-lagged R&D variable is calculated as follows: 
 
WR&Di  = ∑ "&$%% ( '()*+,-.∑ '()*+,-.. )   ∀1 ≠ 3 
                                               
8 The methodology detailed below is also employed in the construction of the spatially-lagged 
variables relied upon in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Where R&Dj is the R&D expenditure of neighbouring region j and Contigij is 
indicative of whether region j is contiguous to region of interest i; Contigij assumes a 
value of one if this is true, and a value of zero if false.  
 
The second type uses inverse-distance spatial weights to capture longer 
distance knowledge flows. The construction of this second class of spatially-lagged 
variable does, on the other hand, require the measurement of distances between the 
regions considered in the analysis. The distance between two regions is measured, 
using GIS software, as the straight-line (i.e. ‘as the crow flies’) distance between their 
respective centroids (the calculated, literal geographic centre of a region). Regions are, 
in turn, assigned a weight that reflects the inverse of their respective straight-line 
distances from the region of interest; all regions in the sample are therefore awarded a 
weight greater than zero. 
 
This second type of spatially-lagged variable is calculated as follows: 
 
WR&Di  = ∑ "&$%% ( 4/6-.∑ 4/6-.. )   ∀1 ≠ 3 
 
Where R&Dj is the R&D expenditure of neighbouring region j and dij is the 
straight-line distance between neighbouring region j and region of interest i.  
 
Skills in the labour force 
 
 As indicated in the theoretical section, human capital and the availability of 
suitably skilled labour are key for regional innovation. Accordingly, a higher 
educational attainment variable is used to assess the relationship between regional 
innovativeness and the skills available in a region. Similarly, the efficient mobilisation 
of local human resources is linked to a region’s innovativeness (Rodríguez-Pose, 
1999). Regional unemployment is therefore included to explore the link between the 
“productive employment of human resources” (Crescenzi et al., 2007:684) and 
regional innovation.   
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Industrial composition 
 
Certain industrial compositions or ‘mixes’ are more conducive to innovation 
than others (e.g. Capello et al., 2012).  Employment in industry – the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) rev. 3 and rev. 4 “employment, industry, 
including energy”, with data expressed as a percentage of total regional employment 
– is used to assess the relevance of a region’s industrial composition to its innovative 
capacity.  
 
Agglomeration 
 
The link between agglomeration and innovation is explored, as customary in 
related literature, using regional population density (e.g. Moreno et al., 2005; 
Crescenzi et al., 2007; 2012; Usai, 2011; Paci et al., 2014). Density represents a proxy 
for the co-location of economic actors and the agglomeration of economic activity.  
 
Demographics and development 
 
 The percentage of the population aged 15-24 is included to control for regional 
demographic composition, the relevance of which to innovation has been verified by 
empirical examination (e.g. Frosch and Tivig, 2007; Poot, 2008). GDP per capita is 
added to control for a region’s relative wealth and overall level of socioeconomic 
development. 
 
1.5. Results and analysis 
 
The model is estimated using time and geographical9 fixed-effects and random-
effects at the regional level, and with robust standard errors. The analysis considers 
the TL2 regions of Canada, the United States, and a large selection of European 
                                               
9 Country fixed-effects are employed for the European estimations. In the North American case they are replaced 
by macro-region (Canada, Southern United States, North-Eastern United States, Mid-Western United States, and 
Western United States) fixed-effects to enhance the comparability of the empirical analysis. 
  
 63 
countries for the eleven-year period between 2000 and 2010. A complete list of the 
countries and regions included is provided in Appendices 2-5.10  
 
The decision to employ TL2 regions as the unit of analysis is not an arbitrary 
one and is, in fact, based on three factors. First, the comparative nature of the research 
requires the use of comparable spatial units. TL2 regions have been uniformly defined 
by the OECD, making them comparable across the countries considered in the 
empirical analysis. Second, the TL2 level is the regional level for which the data 
necessary to conduct the type of comparative econometric analysis performed here is 
available and is as complete as possible. Third, and perhaps, most importantly, the TL2 
level is the level for which many regional policies, including those geared towards the 
promotion of innovation, are designed and at which they implemented. Many of the 
European TL2 regions examined are classified by the European Commission’s 
nomenclature system as ‘NUTS2’ regions. This NUTS2 level is defined by the 
Commission as the spatial level at which regional policies are applied.11 In those cases 
where the TL2 classification differs from the NUTS2 level, the TL2 classification 
includes territories with a considerable degree of regional autonomy. These include, 
for example, German Länders and Belgian regions. Similarly, in North America, many 
of the programmes and strategies pursued to catalyse innovation and upgrade regional 
innovative potential are the responsibility of states in the US and provinces in 
Canada.12 
 
The section is structured as follows: Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 present the 
estimation results for both the lagging and the more economically advanced regions of 
North America and Europe respectively.13 In both of these sections, results for the 
                                               
10 The analysis considers all of the North American and European TL2 regions for which there is suitable data. 
Data is available for all US States and Canadian provinces. Unfortunately, there are several regions in Europe – 
mainly in Finland, Italy and Poland – for which suitable data does not yet exist. Consequently, these regions are 
not, in spite of a concerted effort, captured by the analysis. 
 
11 NUTS Overview (Eurostat): http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview 
 
12 In 2015, the Canadian province of Ontario, for example, released a multifaceted innovation agenda entitled 
“Seizing Global Opportunities: Ontario’s Innovation Agenda” (Ontario Ministry of Research and Innovation, 
2015). The overarching aim of the strategy is to deliver “a high and sustainable level of prosperity, and healthy 
communities, that provide high-quality jobs and better lives for people in Ontario” (p. 1). 
 
13 The tables provided to summarise the results of the empirical analysis include only a selection of the model 
specifications employed in the analysis. While a concerted effort has been made not to do so, Sections 1.5.1 and 
1.5.2 do reference, albeit infrequently, model specifications not included in the four tables provided. 
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more developed, non-lagging, regions are discussed with reference to lagging ones. 
Section 1.5.3 compares the estimation results for North America’s economically 
disadvantaged regions to those for their European counterparts.14 
 
1.5.1. North America 
 
Less developed regions 
 
Table 1.1 presents the estimation results for the economically disadvantaged, 
lagging regions of North America. 
 
We begin the analysis with an examination of the links between the three types 
of R&D expenditure and regional innovative capacity. Regional investment in higher 
education R&D is positively and statistically significantly associated with regional 
patent generation across all specifications of the model in which it is included 
(Specifications 3, 4). Business enterprise and government sector R&D expenditure are 
not, however, statistically significantly linked to regional innovative output 
(Specifications 1, 2, 5, 6). 
 
A positive relationship also emerges between skilled human capital and 
innovation. The tertiary educational attainment variable is positively and statistically 
significantly related to regional patent intensity (Specifications 1-6). The 
agglomeration of economic activity and the youthfulness of a region’s demographic 
composition are associated with regional innovativeness as well. The coefficients of 
the population density (Specifications 1-5) and the percentage of the population aged 
15-24 variables (Specifications 1, 2, 5, 6) are positive and statistically significant 
across most specifications of the model. Conversely, neither the unemployment rate 
(as a proxy for a region’s capacity to mobilise its human capital) nor employment in 
industry (a proxy for the industrial structure of a region’s economy) is linked to 
regional innovative output (Specifications 1-6). 
  
                                               
14 The objective of this analysis is to provide insights of a more indicative and exploratory nature. Consequently, 
the focus of the analysis remains on the ‘direction’ and significance of coefficients and, importantly, on the extent 
to which the direction and significance of relationships hold across the many specifications of the model. 
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Table 1.1. North America’s less developed regions 
 North America, less developed regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
0.791 0.918* 0.893 0.861 0.744 0.694 
(0.531) (0.542) (0.643) (0.647) (0.633) (0.640) 
Business enterprise R&D 
(BERD) (ln) 
0.0115 0.0245     
(0.0585) (0.0615)     
Higher education R&D 
(HERD) (ln) 
  0.132*** 0.132***   
  (0.0496) (0.0493)   
Government sector R&D 
(GOVERD) (ln) 
    -0.0424 -0.0440 
    (0.0322) (0.0329) 
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
0.315**      
(0.132)      
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
 1.343**     
 (0.661)     
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
  0.0667    
  (0.127)    
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
   0.547   
   (0.401)   
Spatially-lagged GOVERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
    -0.0299  
    (0.0508)  
Spatially-lagged GOVERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
     -0.164 
     (0.133) 
Tertiary educational 
attainment 
0.0468*** 0.0429** 0.0343* 0.0326* 0.0381** 0.0374* 
(0.0171) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0191) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.0150 -0.0194 -0.0167 -0.0147 -0.0108 -0.0110 
(0.0238) (0.0248) (0.0261) (0.0255) (0.0261) (0.0257) 
Employment in industry 
-0.0248 -0.0213 -0.0160 -0.0168 -0.0233 -0.0235 
(0.0177) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0206) (0.0198) (0.0200) 
Population density (ln) 
0.203** 0.182* 0.205* 0.198* 0.193* 0.204 
(0.0919) (0.102) (0.111) (0.116) (0.117) (0.125) 
Percentage of the 
population aged 15-24 
0.0568** 0.0747** 0.0523 0.0375 0.0511* 0.0467* 
(0.0242) (0.0295) (0.0321) (0.0282) (0.0305) (0.0279) 
Constant 
-5.745 -7.743 -6.675 -5.764 -5.351 -4.964 
(5.330) (5.314) (6.320) (6.432) (6.280) (6.309) 
Macro-region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 
Overall R2 0.7826 0.7495 0.6866 0.6745 0.6636 0.6563 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In North America’s less developed regions, exposure to interregional 
knowledge flows matters for regional innovative capacity. A positive and statistically 
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significant relationship exists between a region’s innovative output and its exposure to 
both short- and long-distance business enterprise R&D flows (Specifications 1, 2). The 
coefficients of the spatially-lagged higher education and government sector R&D 
variables, by comparison, are not statistically significant in any of the specifications 
(Specifications 3-6). 
 
More developed regions 
 
While there are numerous similarities between the innovation processes 
transpiring in North America’s lagging regions and those unfolding in their more 
economically advanced counterparts, there are also noticeable differences. The 
estimation results for the more developed regions of North America are presented in 
Table 1.2. 
 
Three prominent similarities between the sets of factors that govern processes 
of innovation in the less and more developed regions of North America emerge. First, 
both higher education R&D expenditure (Specifications 3, 4) and tertiary educational 
attainment (Specifications 1-6) play an important role in innovative processes in both 
areas. A positive and statistically significant relationship between the agglomeration 
of economic activity and regional patent intensity is also evident in both contexts 
(Specifications 1-6). 
 
Moreover, as is true for its lagging regions, patent generation is not consistently 
and robustly linked to regional unemployment (Specifications 1-5);15 employment in 
industry (Specifications 1-6); or investment in government sector R&D (Specifications 
5, 6) in North America’s more economically advanced regions. 
 
In spite of these similarities, two critical differences between the two types of 
regions are brought to light by the analysis. First, business enterprise R&D 
expenditure, which is not significantly linked with the generation of innovative output 
in the continent’s less developed regions, is positively and statistically significantly 
                                               
15 Specification 6 is one of only two model specifications run in which regional unemployment is significantly 
linked to regional innovativeness. This minimal frequency with which this significant relationship is insufficient 
cause to assert that regional unemployment is robustly associated with innovation.  
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connected with the innovative capacity of its more developed ones (Specification 1). 
Second, the positive, significant relationship between exposure to business enterprise 
R&D knowledge flows and patent intensity observed in North America’s lagging areas 
disappears in its richer ones (Specifications 1, 2).  
 
There is some cursory evidence to suggest that the innovative capacity of North 
America’s more economically developed areas may be negatively and significantly 
linked with exposure to long-distance business enterprise R&D knowledge flows. One 
interpretation of this negative relationship is, following Crescenzi et al. (2012:1075), 
that the concentration of innovative activity in certain regions may “promote the 
outflow of knowledge from neighbouring [ones]”. The analysis also reveals a positive 
and significant relationship between regional patent propensity and exposure to long-
distance government sector R&D knowledge flows in these regions that is not seen in 
their lagging neighbours (Specification 6). The two aforementioned relationships, 
however, only hold in model specifications that do not include regional business R&D 
expenditure.  
 
Neither exposure to shorter-distance R&D knowledge flows of any kind, nor 
exposure to longer-distance higher education R&D spillovers are linked to regional 
innovative output in North America’s more developed regions (Specifications 1, 3, 4, 
5).  
 
A final point of divergence between the two types of regions in North America 
relates to the relevance of regional demographic compositions. The innovativeness of 
North America’s more developed regions is not connected to the youthfulness of their 
respective populations like it is in the continent’s lagging regions. (Specifications 1-
6). 
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Table 1.2. North America’s more developed regions 
 North America, more developed regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
-0.147 -0.124 0.293 0.329 -0.0277 0.00245 
(0.215) (0.209) (0.213) (0.216) (0.229) (0.231) 
Business enterprise R&D 
(BERD) (ln) 
0.0883* 0.0811     
(0.0519) (0.0542)     
Higher education R&D 
(HERD) (ln) 
  0.367** 0.367**   
  (0.182) (0.183)   
Government sector R&D 
(GOVERD) (ln) 
    0.0235 0.0250 
    (0.0280) (0.0283) 
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
-0.0153      
(0.0849)      
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
 -0.306     
 (0.258)     
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
  -0.00778    
  (0.0909)    
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
   -0.172   
   (0.326)   
Spatially-lagged GOVERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
    0.0178  
    (0.0356)  
Spatially-lagged GOVERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
     0.161* 
     (0.0878) 
Tertiary educational 
attainment 
0.0427*** 0.0431*** 0.0343** 0.0343** 0.0376*** 0.0367*** 
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0139) (0.0137) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.0321 -0.0303 -0.0299 -0.0299 -0.0356 -0.0360* 
(0.0223) (0.0218) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0223) (0.0213) 
Employment in industry 
0.0273 0.0264 0.0227 0.0199 0.0224 0.0185 
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0237) (0.0228) (0.0240) (0.0230) 
Population density (ln) 
0.211** 0.214** 0.193* 0.189* 0.208** 0.191* 
(0.0913) (0.0948) (0.113) (0.113) (0.102) (0.107) 
Percentage of the 
population aged 15-24 
-0.0936 -0.0992 -0.0926 -0.0870 -0.0969 -0.0950 
(0.0652) (0.0655) (0.0706) (0.0718) (0.0737) (0.0711) 
Constant 
5.421** 5.358** 1.217 0.693 4.434* 4.390* 
(2.261) (2.237) (2.191) (2.378) (2.551) (2.602) 
Macro-region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 
Overall R2 0.6813 0.6743 0.5522 0.5475 0.5941 0.5749 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.5.2. Europe 
 
Less developed regions 
 
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results for Europe’s lagging regions. 
 
Of the three types of R&D expenditure, only investment in business enterprise 
R&D – which is rather limited in Europe’s less developed regions – is consistently 
significantly linked to the generation of innovative output. The coefficient for business 
enterprise R&D expenditure is positive and significant in all specifications of the 
model in which it is included (Specification 1, 2). By contrast, there is no significant 
association between regional innovation and higher education R&D (Specification 3, 
4) or government sector R&D expenditure (Specification 5, 6), which together 
represent half of the R&D effort in Europe’s lagging regions. 
 
Human capital endowments are linked to innovative capacity. A positive and 
statistically significant relationship is found between educational attainment and 
regional patent intensity (Specification 1, 3, 4, 5, 6). The agglomeration of economic 
activity is also positively and significantly related to regional innovativeness 
(Specification 1-6) as is employment in industry in the majority of model 
specifications (Specifications 3-6). Interestingly, the statistical significance of the 
latter relationship only holds in specifications of the model that do not control for 
business enterprise R&D expenditure, suggesting that industrial structure is not 
immediately relevant to the generation of innovative output in regions with sufficiently 
high levels of business R&D investment (Specifications 1, 2). 
 
The association between the youthfulness of a region’s population and its 
innovativeness is significant but negative (Specifications 1-6). Regional 
unemployment is not robustly linked to patent generation (Specifications 1-6). 
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Table 1.3. Europe’s less developed regions 
 Europe, less developed regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
0.759** 0.687** 0.543 0.527 0.647* 0.670* 
(0.317) (0.338) (0.383) (0.412) (0.360) (0.364) 
Business enterprise R&D 
(BERD) (ln) 
0.226*** 0.228***     
(0.0667) (0.0651)     
Higher education R&D 
(HERD) (ln) 
  0.0927 0.104   
  (0.0594) (0.0637)   
Government sector R&D 
(GOVERD) (ln) 
    0.0293 0.0263 
    (0.0284) (0.0286) 
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
0.110      
(0.0690)      
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
 1.128**     
 (0.570)     
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
  0.207**    
  (0.0917)    
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
   1.096   
   (0.693)   
Spatially-lagged GOVERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
    -0.0748  
    (0.0829)  
Spatially-lagged GOVERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
     0.385* 
     (0.234) 
Tertiary educational 
attainment 
0.0189* 0.0166 0.0207* 0.0201* 0.0205* 0.0211** 
(0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0103) 
Unemployment rate 
0.00448 0.00237 0.0104 0.00906 0.00970 0.00939 
(0.00573) (0.00609) (0.00654) (0.00656) (0.00648) (0.00646) 
Employment in industry 
0.00271 0.00272 0.00901* 0.00972* 0.00797* 0.00857* 
(0.00455) (0.00472) (0.00490) (0.00509) (0.00481) (0.00494) 
Population density (ln) 
0.263*** 0.260*** 0.288*** 0.304*** 0.278*** 0.306*** 
(0.0817) (0.0799) (0.0992) (0.103) (0.0999) (0.0956) 
Percentage of the 
population aged 15-24 
-0.140*** -0.137*** -0.164*** -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.162*** 
(0.0310) (0.0297) (0.0329) (0.0350) (0.0355) (0.0343) 
Constant 
-3.685 -2.974 -1.161 -0.133 -2.379 -2.162 
(3.398) (3.583) (4.097) (4.713) (3.821) (3.951) 
Macro-region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 768 768 757 757 768 768 
Overall R2 0.8650 0.8654 0.8432 0.8447 0.8478 0.8478 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficients of the spatially-lagged variables suggest that exposure to 
interregional knowledge flows is of relevance to processes of innovation in the less 
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developed regions of Europe. More specifically, there is evidence of a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between regional innovative capacity and exposure 
to long-distance business enterprise; short- and long-distance higher education16; and 
long-distance government sector R&D knowledge flows, respectively (Specifications 
2, 3, 6). 
 
The coefficient for tertiary educational attainment is, however, not significant 
in Specification 2 which includes the spatially-lagged variable for long-distance 
business enterprise R&D knowledge flows. This hints at the importance of long-
distance business R&D knowledge flows to the innovativeness of Europe’s lagging 
regions. Exposure to short-distance business enterprise and to short-distance 
government sector R&D spillovers are not robustly linked to regional innovativeness 
(Specifications 1, 5). 
 
More developed regions 
 
As is very much the case in the North American context, there are a number of 
similarities between the set of factors that governs processes of innovation in Europe’s 
more developed regions and that which explains the innovative capacity of their more 
economically disadvantaged neighbours. Once again, however, these similarities are 
matched by several significant differences. Table 1.4 presents the estimation results 
for Europe’s more developed regions. 
 
In terms of similarities, business R&D expenditure is the only type of R&D 
expenditure that is consistently significantly linked to patent intensity in both contexts 
(Specifications 1, 2). Regional innovativeness in lagging and non-lagging regions alike 
is also found to be positively and significantly associated with the percentage of adults 
with a tertiary education and with regional population density (Specifications 1-6). 
Similarly, the negative relationship between the youthfulness of a region’s population 
and its innovativeness that was observed in the continent’s less developed regions is 
visible in its more developed ones as well (Specifications 1-6).  
 
                                               
16 The relationship between regional patent propensity and exposure to long-distance higher education knowledge 
flows is statistically significant in specifications in which levels of business enterprise R&D are controlled for. 
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 Exposure to longer-distance business enterprise and longer-distance 
government sector R&D knowledge flows is also positively and significantly linked 
to regional innovation in both environments (Specifications 2, 6). Short-distance 
business enterprise and short-distance government sector R&D knowledge spillovers 
are not robustly linked to the generation of patents in either type of region 
(Specifications 1, 5). 
 
A number of important differences, however, emerge between Europe’s 
lagging and non-lagging regions. First, the coefficient of the short-distance higher 
education R&D knowledge spillover variable is negative and statistically significant 
for more developed areas (Specification 3). This suggests that Europe’s more 
economically developed regions may be drawing knowledge resources away from 
neighbouring areas. Relatedly, there is no indication of a statistically significant 
relationship between exposure to longer-distance higher education R&D knowledge 
flows and regional innovative output in Europe’s more economically advanced regions 
(Specification 4).  
 
Second, the mobilisation of human capital – proxied by the unemployment rate 
– is significantly linked to regional innovative capacity in Europe’s more developed 
regions but not in lagging ones (Specifications 1-6). Finally, the significant and 
positive relationship between industrial employment and patenting observed in the 
Europe’s lagging regions does not hold in richer areas (Specifications 1-6). 
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Table 1.4. Europe’s more developed regions 
 Europe, more developed regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
0.161 0.171 -0.0990 -0.0905 -0.0908 -0.0666 
(0.195) (0.196) (0.240) (0.233) (0.245) (0.241) 
Business enterprise R&D 
(BERD) (ln) 
0.266*** 0.269***     
(0.0733) (0.0754)     
Higher education R&D 
(HERD) (ln) 
  -0.0577 -0.0594   
  (0.0597) (0.0597)   
Government sector R&D 
(GOVERD) (ln) 
    0.0184 0.0379 
    (0.0382) (0.0306) 
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
0.0237      
(0.0565)      
Spatially-lagged BERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
 0.510**     
 (0.222)     
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(contiguity) (ln) 
  -0.0767*    
  (0.0448)    
Spatially-lagged HERD 
(inverse) (ln) 
   -0.703   
   (0.475)   
Spatially-lagged 
GOVERD (contiguity) (ln) 
    0.0941  
    (0.0850)  
Spatially-lagged 
GOVERD (inverse) (ln) 
     0.810* 
     (0.483) 
Tertiary educational 
attainment 
0.0167*** 0.0166*** 0.0201*** 0.0197*** 0.0162** 0.0167** 
(0.00568) (0.00572) (0.00741) (0.00746) (0.00674) (0.00666) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.0157* -0.0152* -0.0138* -0.0137* -0.0159* -0.0166** 
(0.00816) (0.00813) (0.00827) (0.00833) (0.00854) (0.00837) 
Employment in industry 
0.00760 0.00801 0.00792 0.00845 0.00818 0.00880 
(0.00596) (0.00574) (0.00638) (0.00633) (0.00649) (0.00646) 
Population density (ln) 
0.105* 0.110** 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.172*** 0.152** 
(0.0539) (0.0526) (0.0561) (0.0552) (0.0599) (0.0611) 
Percentage of the 
population aged 15-24 
-0.0725*** -0.0641*** -0.0998*** -0.0996*** -0.100*** -0.0947*** 
(0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0207) (0.0202) (0.0206) (0.0199) 
Constant 
2.904 2.674 5.493** 4.749** 5.850** 6.722*** 
(1.871) (1.896) (2.323) (2.258) (2.395) (2.480) 
Macro-region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 888 888 884 888 888 888 
Overall R2 0.8413 0.8412 0.7564 0.7637 0.7588 0.7482 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.5.3. Comparing the lagging regions of North America and Europe 
 
Are the drivers of innovation in North America’s lagging regions the same as 
those at work in their European counterparts? The following section uses the empirical 
analysis to compare the factors that govern processes of innovation in the 
economically disadvantaged regions of North America and Europe. 
 
Overall, the empirical analysis confirms the second hypothesis forwarded in 
Section 1.2: that innovation processes in North America’s and Europe’s lagging 
regions are far from identical and are governed by distinctly different combinations of 
factors. The few similarities between the territorial dynamics of innovation of the two 
contexts are overshadowed by several not-inconsequential differences.  
 
In the economically disadvantaged regions of North America, processes of 
innovation are governed by five factors. First, lagging regions in North America 
display some ability to transform their relatively high levels of investment in higher 
education R&D activities (Section 1.3, Figure 1.1, Panel 1B) into innovative output – 
a process that is indicative of a system of university-industry linkages that is more 
mature in North America (e.g. Rothaermel et al., 2007) than in Europe. These regions 
are less able to capitalise on local investment in business enterprise R&D functions 
but are, however, reasonably adept at mobilising knowledge generated by firms in both 
neighbouring and more distant regions and translating it into measureable innovative 
dynamism. This capacity to do so is attributable, at least in part, to the relatively high 
levels of public R&D investment documented in Section 1.3 (Figure 1.1, Panels 1B 
and 1C) that directly enhance the ‘absorptive capacities’ of these regions (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Griffith et al., 2003; 2004; Vogel, 2015). A greater ‘absorptive 
capacity’ permits the internalisation and exploitation of knowledge generated beyond 
a region’s borders. 
 
Socioeconomic contextual conditions in North America’s lagging regions also 
influence their respective innovative capacities. Provinces and states with a young and 
highly skilled population are more innovative. The innovativeness of the North 
America’s economically disadvantaged regions is enhanced by the co-location of 
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individuals and economic actors – and the knowledge-related externalities associated 
with agglomeration – as well. 
 
In short, innovation in the lagging regions of North America is a product, most 
immediately, of the application of basic knowledge generated via local higher 
education R&D investment and the mobilisation of more commercially applicable 
knowledge from elsewhere by economic actors operating in close physical proximity. 
These actors are able to draw upon and benefit from a skilled labour force that is 
continuously invigorated by the entry of younger and perhaps also more creative and 
dynamic individuals. The result is a set of less developed regions that are decidedly 
more innovative than their European counterparts.  
 
 Innovation in the lagging regions of Europe, on the other hand, is a product of 
a distinctly different set of influences. Most immediately, economically disadvantaged 
regions in Europe are capable of translating business enterprise R&D investment into 
measurable innovation. The challenge for these regions as it relates to R&D 
expenditure is therefore not necessarily one of exploitation, but rather one of 
underinvestment. That is, levels of business enterprise R&D investment in the less 
developed regions of Europe lag significantly behind not only those of both continents’ 
more developed regions, but also those of their lagging counterparts in North America 
(Section 1.3, Figure 1.1, Panel 1A). This implies that any facility Europe’s lagging 
regions have for the mobilisation of business R&D activities is largely wasted – or 
certainly under exploited – due to chronic underinvestment in these functions. The 
relative absence of dynamic firms capable of investing in R&D in the economically 
disadvantaged regions of Europe should therefore be seen as a serious handicap for the 
generation of innovation in these territories. This problem is compounded by a relative 
inability to mobilise public R&D expenditure, especially in contexts where business 
R&D is of an insufficient level. 
 
Moreover, underinvestment in R&D activities is not confined to the private 
sector in the Europe’s lagging regions – average levels of both higher education and 
government sector R&D expenditure in these regions are below those of their more 
developed European neighbours as well as those of both the lagging and non-lagging 
regions of North America (Section 1.3, Figure 1.1, Panels 1B and 1C).  
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Underinvestment in R&D is, however, by no means the only factor curtailing 
innovation in Europe’s lagging regions. In Europe, as in North America, access to a 
well-developed pool of human capital is conducive to innovation, as are the 
externalities associated with the co-location of individuals, firms and other actors. But, 
in contrast to North America’s economically disadvantaged regions, lagging  regions 
in Europe are less able to mobilise the skills of their young – the best educated age 
group. Persistently high levels of youth unemployment – youth unemployment in, for 
example, Greece, Spain and Italy stood at 45%, 39% and 31.6%, respectively, in 
201417 – limit the ‘absorptive capacity’ and, in turn, innovative potential of Europe’s 
lagging regions in ways which are not evident in North America. Certain industrial 
compositions may also serve as barriers to innovation in these regions  – a 
phenomenon that was less visible in their economically disadvantaged counterparts in 
North America. The influence of their industrial compositions on innovativeness is, 
however, negligible when the level of business R&D is sufficiently high. 
 
Europe’s lagging regions have, against the odds, developed some capacity to 
exploit externally generated knowledge. They are capable of drawing upon the 
knowledge generated by the higher education R&D activities of their immediate 
neighbours and the public and private R&D activities occurring in more distant 
regions. Their capacity for the mobilisation of longer-distance higher education R&D 
spillovers does, however, appear to be highly contingent on levels of local business 
enterprise R&D investment and the ‘absorptive capacity’ they foster. It would seem, 
at least in some respects, that less developed regions in Europe draw more heavily 
upon their more distant neighbours – at least in terms of the scope of the knowledge 
they source –  than their North American counterparts. That is to say, processes of 
innovation in Europe’s lagging region are shaped, to some extent, not only by exposure 
to business enterprise R&D knowledge flows emanating from more distant regions as 
is the case in North America, but also by exposure to longer-distance government 
sector R&D knowledge flows, and perhaps also longer-distance higher education 
R&D knowledge flows, though the empirical evidence is less robust for the latter. 
 
                                               
17 Eurostat Employment and Unemployment (Labour Force Survey) Database 
 77 
That Europe’s lagging regions seem to benefit primarily from the R&D 
activities of firms and economic actors in more distant locations is likely a product not 
only of chronically low levels of all types of R&D investment in these regions (Section 
1.3, Figure 1.1) that give rise to a need for externally generated knowledge, but also 
of the spatial distribution of lagging regions in Europe. That is, patterns of economic 
disadvantage in Europe are generally consistent with patterns of geographic 
peripherality, meaning that a lagging region in Europe is most immediately 
geographically proximate to other lagging regions. This stifles the extent to which they 
can rely on their closest neighbours as sources of knowledge. North America’s less 
developed regions, despite their greater physical size, tend, by contrast, to be more 
physically proximate to sources of innovation, allowing those states and provinces 
with suitably deep pools of skills to benefit from spillovers emanating from proximate 
innovation cores. Pools of skilled and knowledgeable workers and a sufficient degree 
of physical proximity between economic actors do, however, seemingly permit many 
of Europe’s lagging regions to absorb and mobilise knowledge that is being generated 
in their more geographically distant neighbours. This extra-local knowledge may be 
acting as a substitute for locally generated knowledge in contexts that struggle to create 
new economically useful knowledge endogenously and may even be the key to the 
cultivation of innovation in these types of regions (e.g. Tödtling et al., 2012; Fitjar and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2011a,b; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2016). 
 
Finally, the analysis reveals that, despite noticeable differences, lagging 
regions in North America and Europe behave, from an innovation perspective, more 
like their respective more developed counterparts than one another. Innovation in 
North America’s less and more developed regions is fuelled by the presence of 
research universities and by skilled human capital and agglomeration. In Europe, skills 
and agglomeration are also central for innovation in both types of regions, as is 
investment in business R&D and exposure to long-distance business enterprise R&D 
knowledge flows. The R&D of European universities is not, however, associated with 
higher levels of innovation in its lagging regions or in its more economically developed 
ones. Moreover, and in contrast to North America, a young population represents more 
of a barrier than an asset for innovation. In this respect, it would seem that there is 
greater continuity between the dynamics of innovation at play in the differentially 
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developed regions that make up a broader economy, be it North America or Europe, 
then there is between those shaping processes of regional innovation in similarly 
developed areas spread across different geographic contexts. 
 
1.6. Conclusions 
 
This research compared and contrasted the socioeconomic factors that govern 
processes of innovation in the less developed regions of North America and Europe in 
an effort to provide systematic, macroeconomic insights that the literature thus far has 
yet to offer. An econometric investigation of a large sample of North American and 
European regions was conducted to formulate inferences relating to the factors that 
govern innovation in the contexts considered.  
 
 The analysis showed that the generation of innovative output in North 
America’s lagging regions is most directly linked to regional investment in higher 
education R&D, the quality of local human capital, the co-location of economic actors 
and activities, and the youthfulness of the local population. Economically 
disadvantaged regions in North America also benefit from business enterprise R&D 
activities occurring in both their immediate and more distant neighbours. In Europe’s 
lagging regions, on the other hand, regional innovative capacity is robustly associated 
with regional business enterprise R&D expenditure, the availability of sufficiently 
skilled human capital, an industrially-biased economic structure, and the 
agglomeration of economic activity. Exposure to interregional knowledge flows is, 
again, positively linked to regional patent intensity – these regions seem to benefit 
from long-distance business enterprise and public sector R&D knowledge flows, and 
from short-distance higher education R&D knowledge flows. 
 
 In sum, while there are some not inconsequential similarities between the 
structural and socioeconomic factors that shape processes of innovation in the 
economically disadvantaged regions of North America and Europe, there are, as 
hypothesised in Section 1.2, several points of divergence. Most notably, they differ in 
their respective capacities to transform different types of R&D activities into 
innovative output and, although they both benefit to a degree from extra-local 
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innovative activities, there is variation in both the types of knowledge flows they can 
capitalise upon.  
 
 The analysis points in the direction of several related policy implications all of 
which must be read and interpreted with an appropriate degree of caution in view of 
the limitations imposed by, among other factors, the availability of suitable data and 
the spatial units employed in the analysis. Most generally, the analysis provides 
evidence in support of contextually tailored innovation policies (e.g. Tödtling and 
Trippl, 2005; Navarro et al, 2009).  
 
The analysis did expose a number of similarities between North America’s and 
Europe’s lagging regions that would justify commonalities between the contextually 
tailored policies that should be implemented in them. Lagging regions – be they in 
North America, Europe, or possibly elsewhere – that are characterised by larger 
endowments of skilled human capital and feature the operation of economic actors in 
close physical proximity are more capable of generating new knowledge and are 
decidedly more innovative than those that lag behind in terms of their human capital 
development and within which economic actors and activity are more dispersed and 
thus less likely to interact. The analysis also offers evidence to suggest that 
economically disadvantaged regions on either side of the Atlantic have at least some 
facility for the absorption and exploitation of extra-local knowledge and that this type 
of knowledge can catalyse innovative activity.  It would therefore be reasonable to 
assert that innovation policies for lagging areas, irrespective of location, should 
prioritise labour up-skilling and human capital development more broadly. They 
should also incorporate the development of interregional connections and relationships 
– so-called “pipelines” (Bathelt et al., 2004) – as a means to import new knowledge to 
supplement local innovative activities, or perhaps more accurately, to compensate for 
a lack of them.  
 
Policy-makers must, however, be aware that there will inevitably be certain 
policy ‘levers’ available in some economically disadvantaged contexts – and, for that 
matter, more economically advanced ones as well – that are not available in others. 
There is, for example, considerable cross-regional variation in the capacity to 
transform and capitalise upon different types of R&D. Similarly, not all interregional 
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knowledge flows and non-local connections operate in the same way or offer the same 
benefit for different lagging regions in different geographic contexts. Policy-makers 
need to recognise this latter phenomenon. They should, in turn, attempt, through the 
engagement of and consultations with local actors – a cornerstone, in fact, of bottom-
up, territorial specific policy-making – to identify the types of extra-local connections 
and relationships – be they with actors in academia, the private sector or the public 
sphere – from which local innovators garner the greatest benefit. Resources should 
then be channelled accordingly. 
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Appendix 1: Innovation in the less and more developed regions of North 
America and Europe, 2010 
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Appendix 2. Europe’s less developed regions 
 
 
BE3: Wallonia GR1: Northern Greece SI01: Eastern Slovenia 
CZ02: Central Bohemian 
Region 
GR2: Central Greece SK02: West Slovakia 
CZ03: Southwest GR4: Aegean Islands and Crete SK03: Central Slovakia 
CZ04: Northwest HU21: Central Transdanubia SK04: East Slovakia 
CZ05: Northeast HU22: Western Transdanubia UKC: North East England 
CZ06: Southeast HU23: Southern Transdanubia UKE: Yorkshire and The 
Humber CZ07: Central Moravia HU31: Northern Hungary UKF: East Midlands 
CZ08: Moravia-Silesia HU32: Northern Great Plain UKG: West Midlands 
DE4: Brandenburg HU33: Southern Great Plain UKL: Wales 
DE8: Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
IE01: Border, Midland and 
Western 
UKN: Northern Ireland 
DED: Saxony ITF1: Abruzzo  
DEE: Saxony-Anhalt ITF2: Molise  
DEG: Thuringia ITF3: Campania  
EE00: Estonia ITF4: Apulia  
ES11: Galicia ITF5: Basilicata  
ES42: Castile-La Mancha ITF6: Calabria  
ES43: Extremadura ITG1: Sicily  
ES52: Valencia ITG2: Sardinia  
ES61: Andalusia PL11: Lodzkie  
ES62: Murcia PL21: Lesser Poland  
FR22: Picardy PL22: Silesia  
FR25: Lower Normandy PL31: Lublin Province  
FR30: Nord-Pas-de-Calais PL32: Podkarpacia  
FR41: Lorraine PL41: Greater Poland  
FR43: Franche-Comté PL51: Lower Silesia  
FR52: Brittany PL63: Pomerania  
FR53: Poitou-Charentes PT11: North  
FR63: Limousin PT15: Algarve  
FR72: Auvergne PT16: Central Portugal  
FR81: Languedoc-Roussillon PT18: Alentejo  
 PT20: Azores  
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Appendix 3. Europe’s more developed regions 
 
 
AT12: Lower Austria FI19: Western Finland PL12: Mazovia 
AT13: Vienna FR10: Ile de France PT17: Lisbon 
AT21: Carinthia FR21: Champagne-Ardenne PT30: Madeira 
AT22: Styria FR23: Upper Normandy SE11: Stockholm 
AT31: Upper Austria FR24: Centre (FR) SE12: East Middle Sweden 
AT32: Salzburg FR26: Burgundy SE21: Småland with Islands 
AT33: Tyrol FR42: Alsace SE22: South Sweden 
BE1: Brussels Capital Region FR51: Pays de la Loire SE23: West Sweden 
BE2: Flemish Region FR61: Aquitaine SE31: North Middle Sweden 
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SI02: Western Slovenia 
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DE9: Lower Saxony ITC2: Aosta Valley UKJ: South East England 
DEA: North Rhine-Westphalia ITC3: Liguria UKK: South West England 
DEB: Rhineland-Palatinate ITC4: Lombardy UKM: Scotland 
DEC: Saarland LU00: Luxembourg  
DEF: Schleswig-Holstein NL1: North Netherlands  
ES12: Asturias NL2: East Netherlands  
ES13: Cantabria NL3: West Netherlands  
ES21: Basque Country NL4: South Netherlands  
ES22: Navarra NO01: Oslo and Akershus  
ES23: La Rioja NO02: Hedmark and Oppland  
ES24: Aragon NO03: South-Eastern Norway  
ES30: Madrid NO04: Agder and Rogaland  
ES41: Castile and León NO05: Western Norway  
ES51: Catalonia NO06: Trøndelag  
ES53: Balearic Islands NO07: Northern Norway  
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Appendix 4. North America’s less developed regions 
 
 
CA11: Prince Edward Island US13: Georgia US35: New Mexico 
CA12: Nova Scotia US16: Idaho US39: Ohio 
CA13: New Brunswick US18: Indiana US40: Oklahoma 
CA24: Quebec US21: Kentucky US45: South Carolina 
CA46: Manitoba US23: Maine US47: Tennessee 
US01: Alabama US26: Michigan US49: Utah 
US04: Arizona US28: Mississippi US50: Vermont 
US05: Arkansas US29: Missouri US54: West Virginia 
US12: Florida US30: Montana US55: Wisconsin 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 5. North America’s more developed regions 
 
 
CA10: Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
US17: Illinois US37: North Carolina 
CA35: Ontario US19: Iowa US38: North Dakota 
CA47: Saskatchewan US20: Kansas US41: Oregon 
CA48: Alberta US22: Louisiana US42: Pennsylvania 
CA59: British Columbia US24: Maryland US44: Rhode Island 
US02: Alaska US25: Massachusetts US46: South Dakota 
US06: California US27: Minnesota US48: Texas 
US08: Colorado US31: Nebraska US51: Virginia 
US09: Connecticut US32: Nevada US53: Washington 
US10: Delaware US33: New Hampshire US56: Wyoming 
US11: District of Columbia US34: New Jersey  
US15: Hawaii US36: New York  
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Appendix 6. Variables used in the analysis 
 
 
 
Variables (Europe) Source 
Innovative output PCT patent applications per million inhabitants OECD Regional Database 
Regional R&D expenditure 
Business enterprise R&D expenditure as % of GDP OECD Regional Database 
Higher education R&D expenditure as % of GDP OECD Regional Database 
Government sector R&D expenditure as % of GDP OECD Regional Database 
Availability and use of human 
capital 
% of population aged 25-64 with a tertiary 
education 
Eurostat Regional Education 
Statistics 
Unemployment rate OECD Regional Database 
Industrial composition Employment in "industry, including energy" as % of regional employment OECD Regional Database 
Agglomeration of economic 
activity Population density OECD Regional Database 
Demographics and 
development 
% of population aged 15-24 OECD Regional Database 
GDP per capita OECD Regional Database 
 
Note: Missing values for independent variables were interpolated linearly where possible. In the case of regional R&D 
expenditure, a regional R&D expenditure dataset prepared by Tobias Ketterer was used to replace missing values when 
reasonable linear interpolation was not possible. Missing values for the dependent variable (PCT patent applications) were not 
interpolated. Data availability constraints necessitated the use of statistics that correspond to the ISIC rev. 3 classification 
‘industry, including energy’ for the years 2008-2008 and the use of statistics that correspond to the ISIC rev. 4 classification for 
‘industry, including energy’ for the years 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
Variables (North America) Source 
Innovative output PCT patent applications per million inhabitants OECD Regional Database 
Regional R&D expenditure 
Business enterprise R&D expenditure as % of GDP OECD Regional Database 
Higher education R&D expenditure as % of GDP OECD Regional Database 
Government sector R&D expenditure as % of GDP OECD Regional Database 
Availability and use of human 
capital 
% of labour force with a tertiary education OECD Regional Database 
Unemployment rate OECD Regional Database 
Industrial composition Employment in "industry, including energy" as % of regional employment OECD Regional Database 
Agglomeration of economic 
activity Population density OECD Regional Database 
Demographics and 
development 
% of population aged 15-24 OECD Regional Database 
GDP per capita OECD Regional Database 
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2. INNOVATING IN LAGGING CITIES: A COMPARATIVE 
EXPLORATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION IN CHINESE 
CITIES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Recent decades have seen China become an important participant in the global 
knowledge economy (OECD, 2009; Griffith and Miller, 2011; Fan, 2014; Woetzel et 
al., 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2016). Its economy is transforming from one 
based on low cost, low value added manufacturing activities to one increasingly reliant 
not only on the manufacturing of higher-value added, more sophisticated goods, but 
also on the generation of the knowledge and intellectual property that underpin it (Zhao 
and Yang, 2012; Leifner and Wei, 2014; Fu, 2015; McGilvray, 2016). Moreover, the 
importance of innovation in the Chinese context is unlikely to wane. China has been, 
and remains, one of the world’s fastest growing economies. There are signs, however, 
that growth is beginning to slow as China completes its transition from a developing 
country to an emerging one (Gu et al., 2016; Eichengreen et al., 2017; World Bank, 
2017). The extent to which this slowdown can be averted, and the economy’s growth 
rates can be maintained will depend, in part, on its capacity to cultivate innovation and 
unlock the productivity gains associated with doing so (Fan, 2014; Woetzel et al., 
2015; Fu, 2015; Gu et al., 2016; Lewin et al. 2016). 
 
 All of that said, there is considerable variation in the extent to which different 
territories – cities in particular – have participated in and benefitted from the expansion 
of the country’s knowledge economy. Innovation in China is highly territorialised. The 
lion’s share of the country’s innovative activity is concentrated in its more 
economically developed regions and cities (e.g. Sun, 2000; Sun 2003; Yuan, 2005; Li, 
2009; Crescenzi et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2012; Leifner and Wei, 2014; Fu, 2015; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2016; Wang and Li, 2016). This geographic polarisation 
could prove problematic: innovation imbalances could entrench, if not exacerbate, 
already-pronounced disparities in wealth and economic performance between China’s 
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more and less developed cities (Howells, 2005; Fu, 2015; Liu and Lawell, 2015; Zhou 
and Song, 2016).  
 
 These innovation imbalances can therefore not go unaddressed. There is a need 
for policy-makers to devise ways to bolster the innovative capacity of China’s more 
developed, ‘core’ cities whilst also upgrading the innovative potential of its less 
developed ones. ‘Spatially-targeted’, contextually specific approaches, because of the 
way and extent to which processes of innovation are shaped by the specificities and 
characteristics of the territories in which they unfold (e.g. Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012), represent the only avenue for achieving both of these ends.  
 
 The development of a nuanced understanding of the factors that drive and 
shape processes of innovation in China’s more and less developed cities is prerequisite 
to the design of innovation strategies for them (e.g. Tödtling and Trippl, 2005:1216). 
It is this understanding that the research aims to provide. It is guided by two research 
questions. The first relates to identifying the factors that govern processes of 
innovation in, on the one hand, China’s more economically developed cities and, on 
the other, its less developed ones. The second question is a natural extension of the 
first. It asks whether – and if so, how – the ‘dynamics of innovation’ differ between 
the two types of cities. 
 
 The novelty of the chapter is derived from the comparative perspective it 
adopts and the territorial unit of analysis it employs. An explicit focus on processes of 
innovation in China’s less developed cities is, so far as I am aware, unique to this 
research. Underdeveloped environments in China are not wholly incapable of 
generating innovative output. How they manage to do so, however, is not sufficiently 
understood; the presumption that they are distinctly ‘un-innovative’ coupled with a 
preoccupation with the success stories that are China’s technological hubs has led to 
their neglect. This chapter represents an effort to fill this void and shed light on the 
mis-, or at least, insufficiently-understood processes of innovation that are unfolding 
in China’s economic periphery. Moreover, preceding research of this nature has been 
conducted almost exclusively at the province-level (Li et al., 2016). My research 
eschews this provincial-level focus for an urban one that renders it able to capture the 
oft-overlooked internal heterogeneity by which Chinese provinces are characterised. 
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Accordingly, the inferences derived from the econometric analysis are more granular 
than those offered by existing literature.  
  
The contributions of the chapter can therefore be summarised as follows: it 
offers insights into processes of innovation in China’s more and less developed cities 
that previous research is yet to provide.18 In doing so, the chapter exposes the policy 
‘levers’ that need be pulled to stimulate innovation across the spectrum of Chinese 
cities and, in turn, provides policy-makers with a sense of how efforts to promote 
innovative activity in China’s economically disadvantaged environments should differ 
from those undertaken in its more economically advanced ones. 
 
 The analysis, which focuses on a sample of 283 Chinese cities between 2003 
and 2014 reveals that China’s more developed cities feature innovation systems that 
are more complex, integrated and, ultimately, mature than those of their less developed 
counterparts. China’s more developed cities mobilise knowledge inputs – the 
knowledge generated by local and extra-local R&D activities and human capital – with 
comparative efficiency. Their innovative capacities are underpinned by agglomeration 
externalities and their industrially-biased economic fabrics while those of their less 
developed counterparts rely merely on the ready availability of physical infrastructure. 
Moreover, the country’s more developed cities appear to be reaping the innovative 
benefits of a range of knowledge resource-related synergies that are yet to materialise 
or mature in its less developed cities.  
 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 explores the 
geography of the Chinese knowledge economy before introducing the motivations for 
and the questions that guide the research. Section 2.3 explores the heterogeneity of 
China’s more and less developed cities via a taxonomic analysis of descriptive figures. 
Section 2.4 outlines the methodology employed to answer the research questions. 
Section 2.5 presents and offers a more comprehensive discussion of the results of the 
econometric analysis. Section 2.6 concludes. 
                                               
18 Fu (2015:8), for example, observes that “comprehensive and systematic analyses of China’s overall strategy, 
drivers and outcomes are rare with very few exceptions”. 
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2.2. Innovation in Chinese cities 
 
2.2.1. The territorialisation of innovation in China 
 
The spatial distribution of innovation in China is far from equitable. The extent 
of this polarisation is captured by Figure 2.1 which depicts the number of patent 
applications produced per capita by Chinese cities in 2014.19 Two related inferences 
are drawn from Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. Patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants, 2014 
Author's elaboration 
 First, there is considerable intra-national variation in the innovative capacities 
of Chinese cities. Different cities have participated to different extents in the country’s 
rise to innovative prominence. A handful of Chinese cities, most of which are situated 
in the country’s more economically developed eastern or coastal provinces, stand out 
as especially innovative. Shenzhen, Zhongshan, Dongguan and Suzhou – all of which 
                                               
19 The suitability of patent statistics as a proxy for innovation/innovative capacity is addressed in Section 2.4.2.1. 
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are located on the eastern seaboard – produced more than 120 patent applications per 
10,000 inhabitants in 2014. In absolute terms, Beijing and Shanghai were responsible 
for over ten percent of the country’s patent applications. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the interior cities of Zhoukou (0.45 patent applications per 10,000 
inhabitants), Ulanqab (0.35) and Zhaotong (0.30), among others, struggle, in both 
absolute and relative terms, to keep pace with their more ‘innovation prone’ 
counterparts and produce innovative output. 
 
The second inference relates to how China’s innovative activities are spread 
across its more and less economically developed cities. More developed cities are, for 
the purposes of the analysis, defined as those whose GDP per capita exceeds 75% of 
the national average. Less developed cities, on the other hand, are those whose GDP 
per capita falls below this threshold. The development of this conceptualisation and 
the separation of more developed cities from their less developed counterparts, more 
generally, is a product of necessity; if the territorial dynamics of innovation at play in 
China’s more and less economically developed cities, respectively, are to be probed 
and explicitly contrasted, the 283 cities by which the sample is composed must be 
categorised as such.20 More and less economically developed cities are, in Figure 2.1, 
marked by blue and red dots, respectively. 
 
China’s less developed cities, while not devoid of innovative activity, are far 
less innovative than their more developed counterparts. In 2014, 47 of the 50 (and 87 
of the 100) most innovative cities in China were classified as more economically 
developed. Six of these more developed cities – Beijing, Suzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Chengdu and Hangzhou – produced over a quarter of China’s total innovative output 
and, of the 19 cities that generated over half of the country’s patent applications, all 
but one qualifies as more developed. Moreover, almost half of China’s more 
economically developed cities registered more than 10 patent applications per 10,000 
inhabitants in 2014. Less than a tenth of its less developed ones, on the other hand, 
                                               
20 Any effort to categorise cities as ‘more’ or ‘less’ economically developed will be subject to debate and scrutiny. 
It is for this reason that I have employed a conceptualisation of ‘less developed’ that is relied upon by authorities 
elsewhere in the world and is one that enjoys some semblance of more widespread acceptance; “Less Developed 
Regions” in the European Union are also understood as those whose GDP per capita falls below 75% of the EU 
average. 
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managed to do so and only one, Chaoyang, located in the province of Liaoning and 
proximate to its capital, produced more than 20.  
 
The implications of this polarisation and of the innovation averseness of 
China’s less economically developed cities are not insignificant. There are two of 
particular note. First, the socioeconomic divide between China’s more and less 
developed cities will continue to widen if the innovative capacities of its less 
developed ones are not upgraded and innovation remains a ‘developed city 
phenomenon’.  Innovation is a driver of economic growth and development (e.g. 
Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). The 
territorialisation of innovative activity, in China or otherwise, is therefore tantamount 
to the territorialisation of potential for economic growth (Howells, 2005). China’s 
already more economically developed cities are, because of their more robust 
innovative capacities (Figure 2.1), also better positioned for the pursuit and 
achievement of competiveness, economic growth and dynamism than their less 
developed counterparts. Spatial inequalities, that are both detrimental to, and inhibitors 
of, economic growth and dynamism (e.g. Cingano, 2014; Ostry et al., 2014) and 
catalysts for social discontent, tensions and unrest, will become more and more 
pronounced as China’s more developed cities leverage this innovative potential and 
outperform their lagging peers.  
 
The second relates to the necessity of boosting the innovative capacities of 
China’s less innovative, less economically developed cities for the achievement of 
more widespread economic growth. Consensus is beginning to form around the notion 
that “China needs to evolve…to an innovation leader to sustain GDP growth in the 
coming decade as other drivers of growth…decline” (Woetzel et al., 2015:ii). 
Established technological hubs have and will undoubtedly continue to contribute to 
this drive. Their innovative efforts thus far, as considerable as they have been, have 
not, however, proven sufficient to arrest the now decade-long decline in the country’s 
growth rate – more innovation, and the boost to productivity it provides, is needed. 
The latent innovation potential of the country’s less economically developed cities will 
have to be tapped to generate knowledge and innovations at a rate and with a frequency 
that is sufficient to halt this stagnation and reignite economic growth. 
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Policy-makers are not, it would seem, short incentive to pursue initiatives to 
upgrade the innovative capacities of China’s less developed cities. Shoring up the 
innovative capacities of its lagging cities is necessary if pervasive spatial dipartites in 
economic performance are to be addressed, if the gulf between the country’s more and 
less developed cities is to be reduced and if a return to more robust economic growth 
is to be achieved. The design of the policies and strategies that will be relied upon to 
do so is predicated on the development of a robust understanding of the factors that 
shape the innovative capacities of these less developed cities.  
 
Herein lies the motivation for and relevance of this research. 
 
2.2.2. Innovating in the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’: Do China’s less economically 
developed cities differ from their more developed counterparts? 
 
The spatial patterns revealed in the previous section are consistent with 
expectation. Innovative activity the world over has a well-documented tendency to 
concentrate in larger, more economically developed cities and regions (e.g. Feldman 
and Audretsch, 1999; Bettencourt et al., 2007b; Carlino et al., 2007; Mitra, 2007; 
Crescenzi et al., 2007; 2012; Liu and Sun, 2009; Fan et al., 2012; Buzzard and Carlino, 
2013; Breau et al., 2014; Wang and Li, 2016).  
 
 The innovativeness of more developed cities is explicable by several factors. 
Skilled workers, entrepreneurs and a diversity of firms and public organisations come 
together in more economically developed cities that tend to be well-endowed with the 
sorts of infrastructure and resources upon which the aforementioned actors rely 
(Herman and Ausubel, 1988; Feldman and Florida, 1994; Glaeser, 1999; Acs, 2002; 
Florida, 2002; Ewers, 2007; Glaeser and Resseger, 2010; Acs et al., 2011; Bosman 
and Sternberg, 2014; Brinkman, 2014). The concentration and relative abundance of 
these public and private entities yields a similar concertation of R&D activities and 
investment that affords these places a facility for the generation of the knowledge and 
ideas without which innovation is not possible (e.g. Grilliches, 1979; Audretsch and 
Feldman, 2004). Similarly, the ready availability of skills and human capital renders 
them capable of transforming this knowledge into more applied innovation (e.g. 
Griffith et al., 2004; Crescenzi, 2005). Moreover, and perhaps most importantly (e.g. 
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Storper and Venables, 2004), the co-location of all manner of economic actors lays 
both the physical and the institutional foundation for the emergence of efficiency 
enhancing “agglomeration economies” (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2004; Glaeser, 2010) and, more specifically, for the sharing and exchange of 
knowledge and the other interactive processes that are readily associated with the 
genesis, diffusion and application of innovation (Gertler, 2003; Bathelt et al., 2004; 
Storper and Venables, 2004; Rasiah, 2011).  
 
Less economically developed cities, on the other hand, suffer from contextual 
deficiencies that hamper their innovative potential (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 2001). The 
most fundamental of these relates to the general weakness of their “economic fabrics”. 
The industrial profiles of less developed cities are often dominated by more traditional, 
technologically unsophisticated sectors where the potential for innovation is scarce. 
Accordingly, economic actors operating in these environments have little incentive 
and/or opportunity to invest in R&D or engage in knowledge-intensive activities more 
generally. This, in turn, curtails the innovative potential the economy as a whole. 
Further limits are imposed by a characteristic scarcity of human, physical and financial 
capital that undermines both the generation and application of knowledge in these 
territories. The socioeconomic deficiencies by which less developed cities are faced 
are also, in many cases, compounded by geographic ones; many less developed cities 
are situated beyond the spatial limits of knowledge spillovers emanating from more 
innovative territories and are thus deprived of an exploitable, and in some cases 
needed, source of knowledge (e.g. Moreno et al., 2005; Sonn and Storper, 2008; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). 
 
These generalisations hold true for the Chinese context. China’s more 
developed cities direct more resources to R&D functions than their less developed 
counterparts. Their more robust financial commitments to the generation of “new 
economic knowledge” (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004:2716) are anticipated to lend 
them a greater capacity to do so. This indispensable ‘input’ (e.g. Grilliches, 1979; 
Audretsch and Feldman, 2004) to processes of innovation is, accordingly, more 
abundant in China’s more developed cities than it is in its less developed ones. Skilled 
human capital is, like the aforementioned ‘new economic knowledge’, more readily 
available in these cities as well. Their facility for the mobilisation and productive 
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application of this knowledge in innovative processes is, in turn, expected to be 
greater. China’s more developed cities are also, on balance, more densely populated 
than their less developed neighbours. This density of economic actors and activity is 
prerequisite for, and conducive to, the diffusion, sharing and exchange of knowledge, 
ideas and innovation, and the emergence of other innovation-enhancing, 
agglomeration-induced externalities.  
 
Conversely, China’s less developed cities suffer from more than a comparative 
underinvestment in R&D and a relative dearth of human capital, both of which impair 
their capacity to generate and absorb knowledge; their underlying economic fabrics, 
in which manufacturing activity features less prominently, are not especially amenable 
to innovative activity. They are also, as is characteristic of less developed cities, both 
more sparsely populated and more geographically isolated; while many of China’s 
more developed cities are clustered on the country’s east coast, its less developed ones 
are scattered across the country and without immediately proximate neighbours 
(Figure 2.1). The scope for the realisation of benefit from local and extra-local 
knowledge spillovers is therefore likely more limited. 
 
That China’s more economically developed cities host a disproportionate 
amount of the country’s innovative activity is, in that respect, what prevailing theories 
would predict. China’s less developed cities are not, however, wholly incapable of 
generating innovation. As much as innovation in China is a ‘developed city 
phenomenon’, it is nonetheless occurring, albeit with less intensity and frequency, in 
the country’s less developed cities (Figure 2.1). 
 
That said, it cannot be assumed that the factors and forces behind the 
innovativeness of China’s more developed, innovation-prone cities are identical to 
those which shape processes of innovation in its less developed ones. Innovative 
processes, as Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012:529) note, “display very 
differentiated territorial processes in different contexts” in accordance with territories’ 
socioeconomic, institutional and political factors, characteristics, features and 
attributes. That is, not only are territories that, for example, direct different amounts 
of resources to R&D, are differentially endowed with human capital or host different 
types of firms, sectors and industries anticipated to display different innovative 
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capacities, it is thought that they will actually generate innovation in different ways. 
Contextual similarities between China’s more and less developed cities are, as alluded 
to above and as Section 2.3 explores and expounds on, few. It is therefore unlikely that 
innovative processes in China’s less economically developed cities will resemble those 
unfolding in their more developed counterparts.  
  
 It is from this hypothesis that the chapter’s research questions are derived. The 
overarching aim of the chapter is to contrast the innovative processes hosted by 
China’s more economically advanced cities with those occurring in their less 
economically developed neighbours with a view to discern how they differ. Two more 
specific questions guide the analysis: (a) what are the socioeconomic and structural 
factors that govern processes of innovation in, on the one hand, China’s more 
economically developed cities and, on the other, their less dynamic, developed 
counterparts? And (b) how do these factors differ between the two types of cities? 
 
2.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Prior to proceeding with the econometric analysis, I consider the heterogeneity 
of Chinese cities and assess how the country’s more economically developed cities 
differ from their less developed counterparts. The presentation and taxonomic analysis 
of the descriptive statistics and figures that follows also facilitates the establishment 
of a cursory understanding of the links between the innovative capacity of China’s 
more and less developed cities and a series of socioeconomic factors and territorial 
characteristics. 
 
 Figure 2.2 plots patent intensity against GDP per capita. It visualises the key 
difference between the two types of cities: China’s more developed cities are more 
innovative than their less developed counterparts.  
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Figure 2.2. Patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants and GDP per capita, 2014 
Author's elaboration 
There is some variation in the innovative capacities of China’s more 
economically developed cities. This variation is itself reflective of the intra-national 
variation in urban innovative capacities flagged in Section 2.2. Less developed cities, 
on the other hand, are similarly ‘innovation averse’ and there are next to no ‘outliers’.  
The virtual absence of outliers is indicative of the difficulties less developed cities face 
cultivating higher-value added, knowledge-intensive activities.  
 
Figures 2.3 through 2.8 adopt a slightly different perspective. They do, 
however, yield similar conclusions. 
 
Figure 2.3 depicts R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP against 
innovative capacity, proxied by patent intensity. Two key inferences emerge. The first 
is that China’s more developed cities channel more resources to knowledge generating 
activities than their less developed counterparts. 
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Figure 2.3. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP and patent intensity, 2014 
 
Author's elaboration 
Second, Figure 2.3 reveals a positive relationship between R&D expenditure 
and patent intensity. Chinese cities that invest more in knowledge generating functions 
are, as anticipated by linear models of innovation (e.g. Grilliches, 1979; Godin, 2006; 
Balconi et al., 2010), more innovative than those that opt not, or are unable, to do so. 
Deeper analysis, however, reveals that this positive relationship is driven by the 
country’s more developed cities that both invest more in R&D and transform it into 
innovative output more efficiently than their less dynamic counterparts (Figures 2.4A 
and 2.4B). 
 
Additional inferences are drawn from the curvature of the trend-lines depicted 
in Figures 2.4A and B. The concave trend-line that captures the relationship between 
R&D expenditure and patenting for China’s more developed cities implies that R&D 
investment in these cities may be subject to diminishing returns (Figure 2.4A). 
Conversely, the convex trend-line featured in Figure 2.4B suggests that R&D 
investments in less developed cities may be subject a threshold effect; there appears to 
be a level below which increases in R&D expenditure yield minimal, if any, returns in 
less developed environments. Once, however, the threshold is exceeded, there may be 
increasing returns to be realised from investments in the generation of new knowledge. 
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These observations, and the former in particular, are consistent with Schumpeterian 
perspectives on innovation that posit that a critical mass of R&D expenditure must be 
reached before returns to the investments are realised (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; 
2001). 
 
Figure 2.4. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP and patent intensity in China’s 
more and less developed cities, 2014 
     A. More developed cities   B. Less developed cities 
Author's elaboration 
Similar conclusions are reached about the relationship between the availability 
of human capital in, and the innovative capacity of Chinese cities. Figure 2.5 reveals 
a positive correlation between tertiary educational attainment and patent intensity. 
 
Once again, however, the positive relationship is a function of the strength of 
the relationship in the country’s more developed cities where skilled human capital is 
more abundant (Figure 2.6A). There is evidence of a positive relationship between 
skills endowments and patenting propensity in China’s less dynamic regions. It is, 
however, made apparent by Figures 2.6A and B that China’s more developed cities 
mobilise their deeper pools of human capital with greater efficiency than their less 
developed counterparts. 
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Figure 2.5. Tertiary educational attainment and patent intensity, 2014 
 
Author's elaboration 
Figure 2.6. Tertiary education attainment and patent intensity in China’s more and 
less developed cities, 2014 
     A. More developed cities   B. Less developed cities 
Author's elaboration 
 Figures 2.7 and 2.8, which plot patent intensity against employment density 
and employment in manufacturing activities, respectively, fulfil two related purposes. 
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Figure 2.7. Employment density and patent intensity, 2014 
 
Author's elaboration 
 First, they provide further evidence of the heterogeneity of China’s more and 
less developed cities; manufacturing activities are more, albeit marginally, prevalent 
and account for a greater share of employment (Figure 2.8) in China’s more 
economically developed cities that are also more densely populated (Figure 2.7). 
 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 also suggest that processes of innovation in Chinese cities 
are shaped by more than just the availability of ‘knowledge inputs’. There is evidence 
that agglomeration may be conducive to innovation in Chinese cities; patent intensity 
is positively correlated with employment density across the sample of cities. Similarly, 
higher levels of employment in manufacturing are associated with the generation of 
innovative output signalling that a city’s innovative capacity is not free from influence 
by its economic fabric or industrial structure. 
 
 Taken together, Figures 2.2 through 2.8 confirm that China’s more 
economically developed cities differ from their less developed counterparts in several 
fundamental and not inconsequential ways. China’s more developed cities invest more 
in R&D than their less developed counterparts (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). They are also 
endowed with skilled labour forces whose respective capacities for the identification, 
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internalisation and exploitation of knowledge are greater than those of their less 
developed neighbours (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). Economic actors and activity are situated 
in closer physical proximity in China’s more developed cities as well (Figure 2.7) 
which creates scope for the emergence of innovation-inducing externalities that are 
less likely to materialise in China’s less densely populated, less developed cities. 
Finally, the economic fabrics by which China’s more developed cities are underpinned 
are, because of relative prevalence of manufacturing activities, marginally more 
conducive to knowledge-intensive, innovative activity (Figure 2.8). 
 
Figure 2.8. Manufacturing employment and patent intensity, 2014 
 
Author's elaboration 
These observations provide an indicative sense of why, as Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
reveal, China’s more developed cities are more innovative than their less developed 
counterparts. The econometric exercise that follows facilitates the testing of these 
theorisations and the formulation of more robust conclusions in this direction. What 
remains wholly unaddressed, however, is whether these differences manifest 
themselves in the way these cities generate innovation. The prevailing theoretical 
discourse suggests they should. Innovation is a contextually-contingent process (e.g. 
Doloreux and Parto, 2005; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012); processes of 
innovation unfold in ways that reflect the socioeconomic, political and institutional 
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uniqueness of the territories in which they transpire, and the opportunities and 
challenges that contextual conditions present and impose (e.g. Edquist and 
Chaminade, 2006). It is therefore appropriate, given the observed heterogeneity of 
China’s more and less developed cities, to propose that innovative processes in its less 
economically developed cities are unlikely to resemble those unfolding in their more 
developed counterparts. 
 
2.4. Methodology 
 
2.4.1. The model 
 
A ‘modified knowledge production function’ (e.g. Ó hUallacháin and Leslie, 
2007; Crescenzi et al., 2007; 2012) within which innovative capacity is a function of: 
investment in R&D; exposure to knowledge spillovers emanating from neighbouring 
cities; the availability of skilled human capital and a vector of structural factors is 
employed to model the innovative capacity of China’s more and less developed cities. 
 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
 yi,t = β1R&Di,t + β2WR&Di,t + β3HumanKi,t + Structurali,t¢δ + ft + li +  εi,t  
 
Where: 
 
y represents innovative performance proxied by patent intensity; 
R&D represents local investment in R&D; 
WR&D is a spatially-lagged variable that reflects the average R&D 
expenditure of neighbouring cities; 
HumanK represents the availability of skilled human capital; 
Structural is a vector of structural factors; 
i,t represent city and time, respectively 
 112 
2.4.2. The variables 
 
2.4.2.1. The dependent variable 
 
 The dependent variable is patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants. Patent 
statistics capture and quantify the development and introduction of applied innovations 
and technological developments. It is for this reason that researchers undertaking 
econometric analyses of this nature rely on patent intensity as a proxy for innovative 
capacity. Patent intensity is by no means a perfect measure of a territory’s innovative 
capacity. Its limitations are, however, well understood21 and, importantly, do not 
impair one’s capacity to draw the sorts of inferences the research sets out to provide. 
 
2.4.2.2. The independent variables 
 
Knowledge inputs 
 
  Innovation involves the application of knowledge; “new economic 
knowledge” is the key ‘input’ to processes the ‘outputs’ of which are more tangible, 
applied and commercially viable innovations (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004:2716). 
This knowledge is generated by, embodied in, and drawn from a diversity of activities 
and sources. I consider three: 
 
 R&D activities are undertaken by public and private actors alike with the aim 
of generating basic, economically useful knowledge.22 Their importance as a source 
of this knowledge and an influence on a territory’s innovative capacity can therefore 
                                               
21 Nagaoka et al. (2010) contemplate the validity and suitability of patent statistics as “innovation indicators”. Pavitt 
(1988) and Desrochers (1998), among others, discuss the limitations and shortcomings of patent applications as a 
proxy for innovative capacity. The most prominent criticism levelled against the use of patent applications as a 
proxy for innovation is that patent statistics – for reasons relating to the (i) patentability (or lack thereof) of certain 
inventions and innovations, and (ii) variability in the propensities of different firms, sectors and industries to apply 
for patents – do not capture all of the innovations introduced by, and in turn, the innovative capacity of an economy 
and are, in that respect, somewhat biased (e.g. Desrochers, 1998).  The case for their employment is presented by 
Trajtenberg (1990:183) who asserts that patent statistics are “the only observable manifestation of inventive activity 
with a well-grounded claim for universality”. 
 
22 The OECD (2002:30) conceptualizes R&D as “work undertaken on a systemic basis in order to increase the stock 
of knowledge […] and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.” Similarly, Arora et al. (2017) 
consider “why firms invest in R&D”. It is proposed that R&D functions generate scientific knowledge that then 
feeds into processes of innovation.  
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not be overstated. Audretsch and Feldman (2004:2716), for example, observe that “the 
greatest source generating new economic knowledge is generally considered to be 
R&D”. Accordingly, R&D expenditure, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is included 
in the model to capture extent to which cities are engaging in these functions and 
generating the essential knowledge that spurs innovation. 
 
 Economically useful knowledge is also generated by and embodied in human 
capital (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Dachs, 2009; Rupietta and Backes-Gellner, 2017). This is 
not, however, the only avenue through which educated workers contribute to 
innovative processes. Skilled workforces facilitate the identification, absorption and 
mobilisation of knowledge, locally generated or otherwise (e.g. Griffith et al., 2004; 
Dachs, 2009). The second ‘knowledge input’ considered is therefore tertiary 
educational attainment. The inclusion of this variable permits the formulation of 
inferences relating to the extent to which the depth of a city’s pool of skilled workers 
shapes its innovative capacity, both directly (i.e. as an input) and indirectly (i.e. as a 
facilitator of the absorption of other sources of knowledge). 
 
 Finally, territories are, through various mechanisms and channels, exposed to 
knowledge that is generated beyond their borders (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; 
Feldman and Kogler, 2010). This extra-locally sourced knowledge is an important 
input to innovative processes (e.g. Bathelt et al., 2004; Sonn and Storper, 2008; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015). To neglect these 
knowledge flows would be to overlook a potentially powerful catalyst for innovation. 
A spatially-lagged R&D variable is included in the analysis to explore if, and how, a 
city’s innovative potential is conditioned by its exposure to intercity R&D knowledge 
flows.  
 
Structural factors 
 
 Innovative processes are shaped by a multitude of other territorial 
characteristics, features and attributes (Doloreux and Parto, 2005; Edquist and 
Chaminade, 2006; Buesa et al., 2010; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). The 
relationships between a set of preeminent structural influences and factors and the 
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innovative capacities of Chinese cities are probed via the inclusion of five additional 
variables: 
 
1. Externalities associated with the agglomeration of economic actors and 
activities are a catalyst for innovation (e.g. Carlino and Kerr, 2014). The 
importance of these externalities, and of co-location more generally, to the 
generation of innovative output is often examined in empirical analyses via 
the inclusion of measures of density (Ke, 2010). Employment density (e.g. 
Carlino et al., 2007) is employed here to assess the link between 
agglomeration and innovation. 
 
2. Territories’ innovative capacities are not free from influence by their 
demographic compositions (e.g. Frosch and Tivig, 2007; Poot, 2008); 
younger populations, in particular, are anticipated to be more innovative (e.g. 
Crescenzi et al., 2007). Following Crescenzi et al., (2007; 2012), the 
percentage of the population aged 15-24 is incorporated into the analysis to 
control for the youthfulness of a city’s population. 
 
3. A city’s propensity to patent has been linked to the size of the population it is 
home to as well (e.g. Bettencourt et al., 2007a,b). Population size is, 
accordingly, added to the model to explore whether a having a larger 
population is supportive of, or detrimental to, a city’s innovative potential. 
 
4. Cities, as Capello et al., (2012:152) note, may also realise “benefit from a 
favourable industrial mix [that supports] innovation”. I explore the extent to 
which a city’s innovative capacity is a function of its economic fabric, and 
more specifically, of the types of activities it hosts, via the inclusion of 
employment in manufacturing as a percentage of total employment.  
 
5. Finally, a well-developed stock of physical infrastructure may be a boon to 
innovative capacity (e.g. Agrawal et al., 2017). An infrastructure density 
variable is, therefore, included to assess how an urban environment’s 
innovative potential is affected by the ready availability (or lack thereof) of 
physical infrastructure. 
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2.5. Results and analysis 
 
The model is estimated using a panel data regression approach with time and 
city fixed-effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by city. The analysis considers 
a sample of 283 Chinese cities between 2003 and 2014. The cities included in the 
sample are listed in Appendices 1 and 2. The estimation results are presented in Tables 
2.1 through 2.5. Table 2.1 summarises the results of the first, most basic iteration of 
the model. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarise iterations of the model to which a series of 
interaction terms are added. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the results of a set of 
estimations that include the spatially-lagged R&D variable.  
 
The interaction terms included in Tables 2.2 through 2.5 facilitate the 
formulation of more nuanced inferences relating to the extent to which the 
socioeconomic and structural factors captured by the model (i.e. employment density, 
demographic composition, etc.) directly affect and shape a city’s capacity to mobilise 
both the knowledge generated by the R&D activities they host and that which they are 
exposed to via intercity knowledge flows and transform it into applied innovation. 
Simply stated, they reveal the indirect effect of these factors and influences on the 
innovative capacity of China’s more and less developed cities, respectively. The 
‘knowledge-related synergies’ they expose provide an indicative sense, as I will 
address, of how integrated and evolved the innovation systems hosted by the two types 
of cities are.  
 
The full sample specifications (Table 2.1, Specifications 1-4) provide a 
baseline against which the results for the more developed and less developed cities can 
be implicitly compared. They are, in that that respect, the most suitable point of 
departure.
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Table 2.1. Full sample, more and less developed cities estimations, without interaction terms 
 All cities More developed cities Less developed cities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
R&D expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
1.666*** 1.263** 1.082** 1.086** 7.903*** 6.773*** 5.889*** 5.722*** 0.230 0.334** 0.330** 0.326** 
(0.539) (0.588) (0.510) (0.492) (2.380) (2.523) (2.167) (2.066) (0.209) (0.139) (0.139) (0.134) 
Tertiary educational 
attainment 
3.210*** 3.079*** 3.165*** 3.137*** 2.369*** 2.493*** 2.752*** 2.694*** 0.873* 0.943** 0.906** 0.885** 
(0.547) (0.510) (0.498) (0.499) (0.594) (0.549) (0.547) (0.552) (0.487) (0.437) (0.438) (0.432) 
Employment density 
 0.995** 0.874* 0.868*  1.175** 1.029** 1.029**  -0.0194 -0.0239 -0.0386 
 (0.435) (0.451) (0.453)  (0.460) (0.489) (0.490)  (0.0285) (0.0295) (0.0382) 
Share of the population 
aged 15-24 
 -1.262 -1.058 -0.761  -2.076 -1.807 -1.230  -0.0810 -0.0827 -0.0722 
 (0.869) (0.830) (0.735)  (1.440) (1.431) (1.330)  (0.0795) (0.0778) (0.0784) 
Population 
 -0.0220 -0.0205 -0.0145  -0.0192 -0.0183 -0.0148  -0.0163** -0.0158** -0.0162** 
 (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0201)  (0.0298) (0.0309) (0.0258)  (0.00641) (0.00633) (0.00638) 
Employment in 
industry/ manufacturing 
  0.0899** 0.105*   0.150** 0.182**   -0.00114 -0.00143 
  (0.0450) (0.0543)   (0.0687) (0.0817)   (0.0142) (0.0140) 
Infrastructure density 
   -0.0955    -0.150    0.0568** 
   (0.152)    (0.161)    (0.0278) 
Constant 
-11.69*** 15.47 8.437 1.189 -19.95*** 18.35 7.474 -3.372 -1.688 6.131* 6.063 5.974 
(2.512) (18.24) (16.71) (12.55) (4.810) (25.83) (25.12) (21.26) (1.056) (3.669) (3.670) (3.688) 
City fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,385 3,309 3,278 3,268 1,897 1,860 1,837 1,828 1,488 1,449 1,441 1,440 
R-squared 0.742 0.765 0.765 0.757 0.743 0.771 0.770 0.762 0.643 0.673 0.673 0.678 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The first four specifications included in Table 2.1 imply that processes of 
innovation in the 283 Chinese cities that compose the sample are shaped by four of the 
factors captured by the model. R&D expenditure is found to be positively and 
statistically significantly associated with patent generation in all four of the 
specifications (Table 2.1, Specifications 1-4). The innovative capacities of these cities 
appear to be mediated by the depth of their skilled labour forces as well. The 
coefficients of the tertiary educational attainment variable are positive and strongly 
significant across Specifications 1-4. Positive relationships also emerge between 
patent intensity and both the agglomeration of economic activity – captured by the 
inclusion of the employment density variable – (Table 2.1, Specifications 2-4) and 
employment in manufacturing (Table 2.1, Specifications 3, 4). There is, on the other 
hand, no evidence to suggest that the innovative performance of these cities is linked 
to the youthfulness or size of their respective populations (Table 2.1, Specifications 2-
4) or the state of their infrastructure endowments (Table 2.1, Specification 4). 
 
 There is, however, reason to believe that the full sample specifications do not 
tell the whole story. Theory suggests, as alluded to in Section 2.2 and at the end of 
Section 2.3, that the socioeconomic heterogeneity of China’s more and less developed 
cities, respectively, will influence how, and, in turn, be reflected in the way, the two 
types of cities generate innovative output. The testing of this underlying hypothesis is 
facilitated by the disaggregation of the sample into more and less developed cities. 
 
A more nuanced story does, in fact, emerge when China’s more economically 
developed cities are separated from their less developed counterparts.  
 
Processes of innovation in China’s more developed cities are shaped by five 
factors. First, China’s more developed cities succeed in transforming R&D into 
innovation. The positive and significant relationship between R&D expenditure and 
patent generation unearthed by the analysis implies that China’s more developed cities 
are realising considerable benefit, in the form of tangible innovative outputs and 
technological progress, from the sizable financial commitments they make to the 
cultivation of knowledge (Table 2.1, Specifications 5-8). A similar inference is formed 
about the link between exposure to extra-locally generated knowledge flows and 
innovative performance. The direction and statistical significance of the coefficient for 
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the spatially-lagged R&D variable across all specifications of the model indicates that 
China’s more developed cities have a robust facility for the translation of R&D 
knowledge flows emanating from neighbouring cities into innovative output (Table 
2.4, Specifications 1-5). These cities’ facilities for the mobilisation and exploitation of 
both local and extra-local R&D are attributable, at least in part, to their relatively 
highly skilled workforces that function not only as facilitators of the absorption, 
internalisation and exploitation of knowledge (e.g. Griffith et al., 2004; Vinding, 
2006), but also are themselves evidently catalysts for innovation. That is, a positive, 
statistically significant relationship between tertiary education attainment and 
patenting suggest that the innovative capacities of these more developed cities are 
directly enhanced by the ready availability of skilled labour (Table 2.1, Specifications 
5-8). The positive and significant relationship between employment density and patent 
intensity that emerges from the analysis provides evidence to support the assertion that 
externalities associated with the agglomeration of economic activity are a boon to the 
innovative capacity of China’s more economically developed cities as well (Table 2.1, 
Specifications 6-8). Finally, the innovative capacities of China’s more developed cities 
are also a function of the prevalence of manufacturing activities in them; employment 
in manufacturing is positively and significantly linked to patent generation (Table 2.1, 
Specifications 7, 8). 
 
Stated simply, the innovativeness of China’s more developed cities is 
explicable by a marked facility for the application of basic knowledge and a supportive 
structural and socioeconomic context. That is, China’s more developed cities exploit 
locally and extra-locally generated knowledge with a considerable degree of 
efficiency. The former is made readily available by the well-funded R&D efforts they 
undertake. They are amply exposed to the latter in large part because of the extent of 
the clustering of China’s more economically developed cities on the country’s east 
coast (Figure 2.1). This ready availability of knowledge is matched by a comparable 
availability of skills. Their skilled human capital, much of which is employed in more 
innovation-prone manufacturing activities, works in close physical proximity to 
translate knowledge into applied innovation. All of this gives rise to innovative 
capacities that exceed those of China’s less developed cities. 
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Table 2.2. More developed cities estimations, with interaction terms 
 More developed cities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 
8.404*** 6.498*** 8.521*** 8.083*** 
(2.379) (2.173) (2.940) (2.696) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
2.476*** 2.601*** 2.579*** 2.656*** 
(0.468) (0.545) (0.547) (0.528) 
Employment density 
0.983** 0.945** 0.986** 1.073** 
(0.474) (0.459) (0.487) (0.476) 
Share of the population aged 15-24 
-1.156 -1.070 -1.204 -1.337 
(1.301) (1.289) (1.318) (1.252) 
Population 
-0.0222 -0.0161 -0.0173 -0.0217 
(0.0235) (0.0251) (0.0247) (0.0251) 
Employment in industry/manufacturing 
0.164** 0.176** 0.171** 0.174** 
(0.0806) (0.0832) (0.0816) (0.0788) 
Infrastructure density 
-0.177 -0.149 -0.165 -0.309 
(0.160) (0.161) (0.158) (0.198) 
R&D expenditure x Tertiary educational 
attainment 
1.110***    
(0.297)    
R&D expenditure x Employment density 
 0.574**   
 (0.262)   
R&D expenditure x Employment in 
industry/manufacturing 
  0.197**  
  (0.0830)  
R&D expenditure x infrastructure density 
   0.436** 
   (0.205) 
Constant 
21.53 18.54 18.70 24.43 
(21.65) (22.52) (22.65) (21.52) 
City fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-squared 0.771 0.765 0.766 0.767 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The innovative capacities of China’s less developed cities are, similarly, a 
function of five of the factors contemplated by the analysis. First, China’s less 
developed cities have an unexpected facility for the translation of knowledge generated 
both within and beyond their borders into innovative output. Lower levels of 
investment in R&D – that could conceivably, in many cases, fail to exceed the 
threshold below which returns to this expenditure are unlikely to materialise –, 
shallower pools of skilled human capital and weaker economic fabrics are chief among 
the factors that should render them less receptive to and less able to absorb and apply 
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the knowledge they generate or are exposed to. Yet, the positive and statistically 
significant relationship between R&D expenditure and patent intensity implies that 
investments in R&D do not represent a waste of scarce financial resources in China’s 
less developed cities (Table 2.1, Specification 10-12).23 Likewise, the positive 
coefficient of the spatially-lagged R&D variable indicates that these cities can and do 
leverage the knowledge they are exposed to via intercity knowledge spillovers to 
generate innovation (Table 2.5, Specification 1-5).  
 
Skills support innovation in these environments as well; a significant 
relationship is observed between tertiary education attainment and patent generation 
(Table 2.1, Specification 9-12). Unlike their more developed peers, neither 
employment density nor employment in manufacturing are robustly associated with 
the innovative capacities of China’s less developed cities. Rather it is the availability 
of physical infrastructure that conditions their innovative capacities (Table 2.1, 
Specification 12). The implications of the positive and statistically significant 
relationship between infrastructure density and patent intensity are two-fold: first, 
infrastructural deficiencies are a barrier to achieving innovation in these cities. Second, 
there is benefit to be realised from appropriate investments in the upgrading of the 
infrastructure endowments of China’s less developed cities. Finally, the analysis 
provides an indication that population size cannot be overlooked in the context of 
China’s less economically developed cities. That is, the negative and significant 
coefficients of the population size variable in the less developed specifications suggest 
that overcrowding in these generally populous cities has an adverse effect on their 
innovative potential (Table 2.1, Specifications 10-12). 
 
  
                                               
23 It should also be highlighted that the significance of the relationship between R&D expenditure and patent 
intensity does not hold for China’s less developed cities when the spatially-lagged R&D variable is introduced 
(Table 2.5), with the implication being if sufficiently exposed to it, less developed cities rely more on the extra-
locally generated knowledge emanating from their neighbours and less on domestic R&D efforts to cultivate 
innovation.  
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Table 2.3. Less developed cities estimations, with interaction terms 
 Less developed cities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 
1.981** 0.409* 0.345 1.356** 
(0.947) (0.228) (0.259) (0.552) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
0.939** 0.888** 0.885** 0.913** 
(0.463) (0.433) (0.431) (0.424) 
Employment density 
-0.0409 -0.0452 -0.0385 -0.0382 
(0.0416) (0.0356) (0.0384) (0.0412) 
Share of the population aged 15-24 
-0.0796 -0.0712 -0.0723 -0.101 
(0.0796) (0.0788) (0.0784) (0.0800) 
Population 
-0.0170** -0.0160** -0.0162** -0.0157** 
(0.00652) (0.00639) (0.00640) (0.00613) 
Employment in industry/manufacturing 
-0.00637 -0.00166 -0.00159 -0.00430 
(0.0135) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0134) 
Infrastructure density 
0.0555** 0.0578** 0.0568** 0.0699** 
(0.0269) (0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0285) 
R&D expenditure x Tertiary educational 
attainment 
0.441**    
(0.223)    
R&D expenditure x Employment density 
 0.0191   
 (0.0242)   
R&D expenditure x Employment in 
industry/manufacturing 
  0.000767  
  (0.00586)  
R&D expenditure x infrastructure density 
   0.128** 
   (0.0550) 
Constant 
10.93*** 10.49*** 10.68*** 10.65*** 
(3.257) (3.293) (3.335) (3.163) 
City fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
R-squared 0.686 0.678 0.678 0.688 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Innovative processes in China’s less developed cities do, in some respects, 
confound expectation. Notably, these cities are able to translate knowledge and 
knowledge resources into innovation. The issue it would therefore seem is not 
necessarily one of ability but rather of availability. China’s less developed cities invest 
less in R&D activities than their more developed neighbours; locally generated 
knowledge is therefore less ubiquitously available. These cities tend to be more 
physically isolated as well, which limits their exposure to innovation-inducing 
knowledge spillovers. As a result, whatever capacity these cities have for the 
 122 
mobilisation and productive application of knowledge goes un- or certainly 
underexploited. The same can be said of skills. The skilled labour with which these 
cities are endowed does support innovative processes in, and enhance the respective 
innovative capacities of, these less developed areas. Skilled labourers are, however, 
few and far between in these cities.  
 
Table 2.4. More developed cities estimations, with interaction terms and the spatially-
lagged R&D variable 
 More developed cities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 
3.424** 4.981** 3.921** 4.269** 3.648** 
(1.710) (1.940) (1.790) (2.118) (1.735) 
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
33.37*** 29.55*** 35.15*** 32.50*** 33.56*** 
(7.451) (6.998) (7.824) (7.199) (7.533) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
2.769*** 2.990*** 2.780*** 2.738*** 2.782*** 
(0.516) (0.535) (0.514) (0.516) (0.516) 
Employment density 
1.018** 1.004** 1.012** 1.012** 1.031** 
(0.474) (0.467) (0.474) (0.477) (0.481) 
Share of the population aged 15-24 
-1.270 -1.278 -1.258 -1.264 -1.310 
(1.295) (1.280) (1.289) (1.299) (1.297) 
Population 
-0.0133 -0.0146 -0.0125 -0.0141 -0.0141 
(0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0262) (0.0257) (0.0258) 
Employment in 
industry/manufacturing 
0.120 0.117 0.115 0.116 0.119 
(0.0797) (0.0805) (0.0809) (0.0801) (0.0795) 
Infrastructure density 
-0.196 -0.231 -0.227 -0.195 -0.236 
(0.156) (0.160) (0.169) (0.157) (0.191) 
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Tertiary educational attainment 
 0.570***    
 (0.170)    
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Employment density 
  0.338**   
  (0.155)   
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Employment in indu/manu 
   0.0519  
   (0.0389)  
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Infrastructure density 
    0.0582 
    (0.0399) 
Constant 
-32.59 -27.09 -37.03 -32.49 -32.15 
(28.51) (28.08) (29.50) (28.49) (28.57) 
City fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-squared 0.770 0.773 0.771 0.770 0.770 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The facility these cities have for the mobilisation of knowledge inputs and 
human capital provides a sense of why these underdeveloped environments are not 
wholly un-innovative. The scarcity of these inputs however, also begins to explain 
why these cities lag so far behind their more developed counterparts in terms of 
innovation. Further limits to the innovative capacities of these cities are imposed by 
infrastructural deficiencies by which less developed environments are 
characteristically plagued and by large populations that the analysis suggests are 
impediments to innovation. 
 
At first glance, the factors shaping processes of innovation in China’s more 
developed cities do not seem wholly dissimilar to those at play in its less developed 
ones. A closer look, however, suggests that China’s more developed cities differ from 
their less developed counterparts in two critical, related respects.  
 
First, while both types of cities have at least some facility for the mobilisation 
of different types of ‘knowledge inputs’ – knowledge resources generated by local and 
extra-local R&D activities and their skilled workforces –, China’s more developed 
cities do so considerably more efficiently. The size and statistical significance of the 
coefficients of the R&D expenditure, spatially-lagged R&D expenditure and tertiary 
educational attainment variables in the more developed city specifications (Table 2.1, 
Specifications 5-8; Table 2.4, Specifications 1-5) exceed those of the coefficients that 
appear in the less developed city iterations (Table 2.1, Specifications 9-12; Table 2.5, 
Specifications 1-5). The implication of this is that China’s more economically 
developed cities are realising returns from (i) the R&D activities they host, (ii) the 
knowledge spillovers to which they are exposed and (iii) the human capital they are 
home to that massively outstrip those available in their less developed neighbours. So, 
not only are these cities investing more in R&D activities; more exposed to intercity 
knowledge flows and better endowed with skilled human capital than their less 
developed counterparts, they are putting the outputs of these investments, these 
spillovers and these skills to work with a comparatively advanced degree of efficiency 
and realising comparatively large returns from them. This renders the innovation gap 
between China’s more and less developed cities that much more understandable.  
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Table 2.5. Less developed cities estimations, with interaction terms and the spatially-
lagged R&D variable 
 Less developed cities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 
0.136 0.192 0.170 0.137 0.199 
(0.129) (0.145) (0.140) (0.165) (0.136) 
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
3.390*** 4.327*** 3.591*** 3.389*** 4.450*** 
(1.279) (1.612) (1.331) (1.282) (1.458) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
0.833* 0.867* 0.836* 0.833* 0.856** 
(0.423) (0.447) (0.424) (0.424) (0.427) 
Employment density 
-0.0323 -0.0322 -0.0460 -0.0323 -0.0330 
(0.0390) (0.0410) (0.0348) (0.0391) (0.0433) 
Share of the population aged 15-24 
-0.0646 -0.0672 -0.0626 -0.0646 -0.0734 
(0.0771) (0.0771) (0.0772) (0.0774) (0.0766) 
Population 
-0.0174*** -0.0181*** -0.0172*** -0.0174*** -0.0178*** 
(0.00659) (0.00673) (0.00654) (0.00659) (0.00660) 
Employment in 
industry/manufacturing 
-0.00268 -0.00474 -0.00307 -0.00270 -0.00411 
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0136) 
Infrastructure density 
0.0517** 0.0508** 0.0528** 0.0517** 0.0547** 
(0.0260) (0.0256) (0.0261) (0.0258) (0.0254) 
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Tertiary educational attainment 
 0.242*    
 (0.141)    
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Employment density 
  0.0263*   
  (0.0154)   
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Employment in indu/manu 
   0.000143  
   (0.00534)  
Spatially-lagged R&D expenditure 
x Infrastructure density 
    0.0870** 
    (0.0344) 
Constant 
5.297** 5.355** 4.782* 5.298** 4.599* 
(2.629) (2.613) (2.637) (2.629) (2.543) 
City fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
R-squared 0.682 0.683 0.682 0.682 0.684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The second point of divergence between the two types of cities is discerned 
from the interaction terms that feature in Tables 2.2 through 2.5. There is considerably 
more scope for the emergence of 'knowledge-related synergies’ in China’s more 
developed cities. The various iterations of the model, and, more specifically, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficients of the R&D- and spatially-lagged 
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R&D-interaction terms, respectively, provide evidence to suggest that the skilled 
workforces and physical infrastructure with which China’s more developed cities are 
endowed (Table 2.2, Specification 1, 4; Table 2.4, Specification 2); the industrially-
biased economic fabrics by which they are characterised (Table 2.2, Specification 3) 
and the agglomeration externalities (Table 2.2, Specification 2; Table 2.4, 
Specification 3) from which they benefit directly enhance their capacity to translate 
knowledge and/or knowledge spillovers into tangible innovative output. These 
synergies are fewer and further between in China’s less developed cities.24 Moreover, 
the coefficients of the significant interaction terms indicate that when they materialise, 
these synergistic relationships are considerably weaker in less developed cities than 
they are in their more developed counterparts. 
 
All of this points in the direction of a singular, more general inference. The 
empirical analysis implies that China’s more and less developed cities are not 
necessarily leveraging completely different sets of factors, resources or characteristics 
to cultivate innovation. Differences do exist, but more and less developed cities are 
both relying on similar ‘knowledge inputs’ to generate innovation. Where China’s 
more and less developed cities differ most profoundly is in the complexity of the 
processes of innovation they host and the maturity of the innovation systems they are 
home to. 
 
Processes of innovation in China’s less developed cities conform closely to 
linear conceptualisations of innovation (e.g. Maclaurin, 1953; Grilliches, 1979). The 
analysis suggests that increases in R&D investment, exposure to knowledge flows or 
efforts to upgrade human capital will yield innovation. There is, however, 
comparatively little to suggest that the processes by which these knowledge inputs are 
translated into innovative outputs are profoundly affected or mediated by features, 
attributes or characteristics of the environments in which they transpire. Their 
innovative capacities are, for example, unconnected to their industrial compositions 
and the extent to which actors and activity are co-located. Weaker contextual 
                                               
24 There is cursory evidence to suggest: (1) that, if they are endowed with them, adequately developed stocks of 
human capital and physical infrastructure may grant these less developed cities a marginally greater facility for the 
exploitation of the R&D investment (Table 2.3, Specifications 1, 4); and (2) that human capital, physical 
infrastructure and agglomeration externalities, again when they are available or arise in less developed 
environments, can aid, albeit minimally, in the absorption and mobilisation of intercity knowledge flows (Table 
2.5, Specifications 2, 3, 5) 
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conditions, like those by which China’s less developed cities are characterised (Section 
2.3), are anticipated to be more than just unsupportive of innovation. They can actually 
compromise a territory’s innovative potential (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). Moreover, it 
does not appear that the innovation systems these cities host have matured or become 
integrated to a point where all elements of the innovation system work synergistically 
to maximise the efficiency with which knowledge inputs are mobilised; ‘knowledge-
related synergies’ are considerably scarcer and weaker in less developed cities than 
they are in their more developed neighbours. Simply stated, ‘outside’, contextual 
influence on the processes by which knowledge inputs are translated into outputs is 
minimal – exactly as is envisioned by linear models. The result is that returns to 
knowledge and knowledge resources in China’s less developed cities are modest and 
potentially limited, especially when compared to those being realised in more 
developed territories.  
 
The exact opposite is true for China’s more developed cities. Knowledge inputs 
are, in these cities, transformed into innovation via a process that is considerably more 
multidimensional and, because of the array of influences to which it is evidently 
subject, complex. Their innovative potential is, for one, directly affected by much 
more than the availably of knowledge inputs in ways anticipated not by linear models 
of innovation, but rather by more recent conceptualisations of innovative processes 
that stress their dynamic and, especially, contextually-contingent nature (e.g. Edquist 
and Chaminade, 2006). There is evidence to suggest, as literature has anticipated, that 
both externalities associated with the agglomeration of economic activity enhance 
their innovative capacities as do their industrially-biased economic fabrics (Storper 
and Venables, 2004; Glaeser, 2010). More revealing of the maturity and complexity 
of these innovation systems, however, is the abundance of knowledge-related 
synergies from which they benefit. The innovation systems of China’s more developed 
cities have evolved to such an extent that territorial characteristics and attributes – that 
themselves impel innovation – interact and work in mutually-reinforcing ways to 
facilitate the maximisation of returns from inputs to innovative processes. The ultimate 
reflection of this, and of the maturity of these cities’ innovation systems more 
generally, is the comparatively robust efficiency with which they mobilise and 
productively apply knowledge, and, relatedly, the returns they manage to realise from 
knowledge inputs that dwarf those available in China’s less developed cities.  
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In short, their innovative processes are more complex, and their innovation 
systems, more evolved, integrated and mature, than those hosted by their less 
developed counterparts. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
The preceding research sought to unpack processes of innovation in China’s 
more and less developed cities, respectively, with a view to identify and understand 
the differences between the sets of factors that drive and shape them in these 
heterogeneous environments. A comparative econometric analysis of 283 cities was 
employed to form policy relevant insights and inferences that previous empirical 
research is yet to provide.  
 
 The analysis revealed that China’s more advanced cities, on the one hand, 
mobilise and productively exploit R&D, knowledge spillovers and human capital with 
a comparatively high degree of efficiency. Processes of interaction, collaboration and 
a host of other proximity-related externalities, borne out of the agglomeration of 
economic actors and activity in them, are profoundly supportive of the innovative 
activities they host. These innovative processes unfold on more industrially-biased 
economic fabrics – functions of the types of economic actors, activities and sectors by 
which they are composed – that are themselves conducive to innovation. Innovation 
enhancing ‘knowledge-related synergies’ were also found to be abundant; factors, 
features and territorial characteristics that are anticipated to, by themselves, support 
innovative activity, are working in mutually reinforcing ways to ensure that knowledge 
resources, locally generated or otherwise, are mobilised and productively exploited as 
efficiently as possible. 
 
A different story emerged for China’s less developed cities. While knowledge 
inputs do not go unexploited in these environments, they are translated into innovative 
outputs relatively inefficiently. Their innovative potential is detached from the 
broadly-defined types of economic activities they engage in and they are unable to 
reap the innovative benefits of, and the externalities associated with, co-location and 
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density. If anything, their generally large populations serve as barriers to innovative 
processes. Moreover, it is only the most basic of public investments – those in physical 
infrastructure – that are anticipated to yield returns in the form of innovative output 
suggesting that these cities may be suffering from fundamental deficiencies the shoring 
up of which is likely prerequisite to the establishment of any measureable innovative 
capacity. Finally, the ‘knowledge-related synergies’ that are abundant in China’s more 
developed environments are both fewer and further between and, when they emerge, 
relatively weak in these cities. 
 
All of this suggests that the innovation processes, and by extension, systems 
hosted by China’s more developed cities are more complex, integrated and mature than 
those that have and are emerging in the country’s less developed cities where processes 
of innovation seem to unfold in a manner that is more consistent with basic, linear 
conceptualisations of innovation. 
 
 It is from this overarching conclusion that the chapter’s preeminent policy 
implication is derived. Policy-makers responsible for the promotion of innovation in, 
and, in turn, the growth of China’s less developed cities will need to walk a tightrope 
of sorts. That is, there is an obvious need to, on the one hand, capitalise on the facility 
these cities have for the mobilisation and application of knowledge and knowledge 
inputs. This will involve the pursuit of more traditional innovation policies – of the 
sort rooted in the aforementioned linear models – based, for example, on the 
prioritisation of R&D and basic knowledge generation or, even more rudimentarily, 
infrastructure expansion. Such policies would, however, represent ‘quicker-fixes’ 
designed not with the longer-term performance or sustainability of the innovation 
systems in mind, but rather to cultivate innovative output, promote growth and stem 
the emergence of spatial inequalities in the immediate, shorter-term. Measures to impel 
the maturation of the innovation system as a whole will likely be necessary to achieve 
the former. These might include efforts to promote the integration of a system’s 
constituent components and intra-system connectivity more generally, or interventions 
to upgrade the socioeconomic and structural environments within which these systems 
exist and, more specifically, address the deficiencies by which they are burdened. 
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Policy-makers responsible for China’s more developed cities, on the other 
hand, face an arguably less daunting task. Further increasing the availability of 
knowledge inputs and/or expanding the innovation system via the attraction of 
economic actors and activity will undoubtedly be integral to the maintenance and 
expansion of their innovative capacities here as well. What is more important, 
however, is ensuring that these inputs and actors complement, and are integrated into, 
what are already mature innovation systems. Simply stated, special attention should 
be paid to the maintenance of the synergistic dynamics – and the cultivation of new 
ones – that underpin these reasonably evolved innovation systems. 
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Appendix 1. China’s less developed cities 
 
Handan Shuangyashan Ji'an Huanggang Qinzhou Ziyang 
Xingtai Yichun Yichun Suizhou Guigang Liupanshui 
Baoding Jiamusi Fuzhou Hengyang Yulin Zunyi 
Zhangjiakou Qitaihe Shangrao Shaoyang Baise Anshun 
Hengshui Heihe Linyi Zhangjiajie Hezhou Qujing 
Datong Suihua Heze Yiyang Hechi Baoshan 
Jinzhong Bengbu Kaifeng Yongzhou Laibiri Zhaotong 
Yuncheng Huainan Pingdingshan Huaihua Chongziio Lijiang 
Xinzhou Huaibei Anyang Loudi Luzhou Pu'er 
Linfen Anqing Xinxiang Shantou Mianyang Lincang 
Luliang Huangshan Puyang Zhanjiang Guangyuan Weinan 
Fuxin Chuzhou Luohe Meizhou Suining Hanzhong 
Tiding Fuyang Nanyang Shanwei Neijiang Ankang 
Chaoyang Suzhou Shangqiu Heyuan Leshan Shangluo 
Huludao Lu'an Xinyang Qingyuan Nanchong Baiyin 
Siping Bozhou Zhoukou Chaozhou Meishan Tianshui 
Baicheng Chizhou Zhumadian Jieyang Yibin Wuwei 
Qiqihar Xuancheng Shiyan Yunfu Guang'an Zhangye 
Jixi Jiujiang Xiaogan Guilin Dazhou Pingliang 
Hegang Ganzhou Jingzhou Wuzhou Ya'an Qingyang 
Bazhong Dingxi Wuzhong Guyuan   
 
Appendix 2. China’s more developed cities 
 
Beijing Changzhou Weifang Sanya Harbin Dandong 
Tianjin Suzhou Jinin Chongqing Daqing Jinzhou 
Shijiazhuang Nantong Taian Chengdu Mudanjiang Yingkou 
Tangshan Lianyungang Weihai Zigong Shanghai Liaoyang 
Qinhuangdao Huai'an Rizhao Panzhihua Nanjing Panjin 
Chengde Yancheng Laiwu Deyang Wuxi Changchun 
Cangzhou Yangzhou Dezhou Guiyang Xuzhou Putian 
Langfang Zhenjiang Liaocheng Kunming Yingtan Sanming 
Taiyuan Taizhou Binzhou Yuxi Jinan Quanzhou 
Yangquan Suqian Zhengzhou Xi'an Qingdao Zhangzhou 
Changzhi Hangzhou Luoyang Tongchuan Zibo Nanping 
Jincheng Ningbo Hebi Baoji Zaozhuang Longyan 
Shuozhou Wenzhou Jiaozuo Xianyang Dongying Chenzhou 
Hohhot Jiaxing Xuchang Yan'an Yantai Guangzhou 
Baotou Huzhou Sanmenxia Yulin Dongguan Shaoguan 
Wuhai Shaoxing Wuhan Lanzhou Zhongshan Shenzhen 
Chifeng Jinhua Huangshi Jiayuguan Nanning Zhuhai 
Tongliao Quzhou Yichang Jinchang Liuzhou Foshan 
Erdos Zhoushan Xiangyang Jiuquan Beihai Baishan 
Hulunbuir Taizhou Ezhou Xining Fangchenggang Songyuan 
Bayannur Lishui Jingmen Yinchuan Haikou Ningde 
Ulanqab Hefei Xianning Shizuishan Xinyu Nanchang 
Shenyang Wuhu Changsha Urumqi Jiangmen Jingdezhen 
Dalian Maanshan Zhuzhou Karamay Maoming Pingxiang 
Anshan Tongling Xiangtan Jilin Zhaoqing  
Fushun Fuzhou Yueyang Liaoyuan Huizhou  
Benxi Xiamen Changde Tonghua Yangjiang  
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Appendix 3. Variables used in the analysis 
 
Variables   Source 
Innovative output Number of patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants 
SIPO (State 
Intellectual Property 
Office of the P.R.C) 
R&D expenditure Local investment in R&D as % of GDP 
China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
Availability of human 
capital 
Workers with a college-level or higher degree as a share 
of total employment (aged 25-64 years) 
China Population 
Census Data 
Industrial composition Employment in manufacturing as % of employment 
China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
Agglomeration of 
economic activity 
Population density (number of persons per square 
kilometre) 
China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
Demographics 
% of population aged 15-24 
Population size (population at year end) 
China Population 
Census Data 
Infrastructure density 
Per capita area of paved roads in urban areas (meters 
squared per person) 
China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
Note: Missing values for variables were linearly interpolated/extrapolated where appropriate.  
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3. INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN 
PERIPHERY: COMPARING EUROPE’S LAGGING REGIONS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between knowledge, innovation and economic performance 
is increasingly well understood: innovation and knowledge-intensive activities are 
often cited drivers of economic growth, dynamism and more broadly-defined 
development (e.g. Solow, 1957; Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994). Improved economic performance is not, however, an inevitable 
outcome of investment in or the generation of knowledge and innovation. Sterlacchini 
(2008:1098), for example, notes “a significant relationship at a regional level between 
knowledge and economic growth cannot be taken for granted”. Knowledge-intensive 
activity is transformed into economic change via a complex process that is subject to 
influence by an array of factors and forces the exact relevance of which vary from 
context to context (e.g. Maurseth and Verspagen, 1999; Rodríguez-Pose, 2001; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Villareal Peralta, 2015). It is therefore anticipated not only that 
this process will transpire in different ways in different environments, but more 
importantly, that certain territories will – owing to their unique features, conditions 
and characteristics – have different facilities for the mobilisation of knowledge and 
innovation and for their translation into economic growth and dynamism (Crescenzi, 
2005; Capello and Lenzi, 2014). Less economically developed environments, in 
particular, are thought to be among the least capable of capitalising on knowledge and 
innovative activity (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). This does not, however, mean that all 
economically disadvantaged regions are characterised by the same facility – or lack 
thereof – for its mobilisation. 
 
The overarching aim of this research is to explore the extent to which different 
types of economically disadvantaged regions are capable of transforming both the 
knowledge-intensive, innovative activities they host and those to which they are 
exposed into economic growth and dynamism, given their unique socioeconomic and 
institutional characteristics. More specifically, it relies on a comparison of two types 
of lagging regions in Europe – ‘low-income’ and ‘low-growth’ regions – to address 
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two related research questions: (a) Are low-growth and low-income regions equally 
capable of transforming knowledge and innovation into economic growth? And (b) 
are processes of economic growth in low-income and low-growth regions, 
respectively, governed by the same, more broadly-defined set of socioeconomic and 
institutional forces? 
 
In doing so, this research builds on the body of literature that examines the 
determinants of regional economic performance in Europe (e.g. Crescenzi, 2005; 
Sterlacchini, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012; Paci and Marrocu, 2013; Capello and Lenzi, 2014; Crespro-Cuaresma et 
al., 2014; Crescenzi et al., 2016; Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2016). The comparative 
perspective it adopts facilitates both the formulation of inferences pertaining to the 
triadic relationship between knowledge, innovation and growth in a subset of Europe’s 
most economically disadvantaged regions as well as an assessment of how, and the 
extent to which, their socioeconomic and institutional heterogeneity is manifested in 
it. The contributions of this chapter are not, however, confined to the academic realm 
– because the research focuses on a subset of regions that have been prioritised by the 
European Commission, any conclusions drawn can be applied to the development of 
the innovation and growth policies that are sure to follow for these regions.  
 
The analysis suggests, most generally, that Europe’s low-income and low-
growth regions display markedly different facilities for the mobilisation of different 
types of knowledge and innovation. Low-income regions are able to translate locally 
generated innovations into economic dynamism. Their low-growth counterparts, on 
the other hand, while unable to capitalise on local innovative efforts, are capable of 
converting the knowledge and innovation that is generated in and flows out of their 
European neighbours into growth. The differences between the two types of lagging 
regions do not, however, stop there. The dynamism of Europe’s low-income regions 
is, for example, more readily linked to ‘structural’ factors and influences. The 
economic performance of its low-growth ones is, conversely, mediated by the 
availability of suitably skilled human capital, by externalities associated with 
agglomeration and by their physical proximity to markets and the activities they host. 
The efficiency and functioning of regional institutions emerges as a preeminent 
determinant of the economic performance of both types of lagging regions.   
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the 
theoretical underpinning of and motivations for the research. Section 3.3 presents the 
sample of regions with which it is concerned. Section 3.4 relies on a series of 
descriptive statistics to expose and assess the heterogeneity of Europe’s low-income 
and low-growth regions. Section 3.5 introduces the econometric model and outlines 
the variables included in the analysis. The results of the analysis, and a substantive 
interpretation of them, are provided in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2. Knowledge, innovation and growth in lagging regions 
 
Knowledge, technological change and innovation are fundamentally important 
to the achievement of economic growth. Innovation and knowledge-intensive activity 
spur increases in productivity that, in turn, catalyse and support growth, dynamism and 
development (e.g. Solow, 1957; Rosenberg, 1972; Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Cooke and 
Leydesdorff, 2006). Consequently, the most technologically sophisticated territories 
tend to be both more economically advanced and more favourably positioned for the 
continued pursuit of competitiveness and dynamism. Lower-levels of technological 
sophistication, on the other hand, often coincide with weaker economic performances 
and comparably lower levels of socioeconomic development (Maurseth and 
Verspagen, 1999; Howells, 2005). Implicit in these statements is an inference that is 
found at the heart of development policies pursued across the globe in recent years: it 
is anticipated that increasing a region’s knowledge endowment and, in turn, its 
innovative capacity will inevitably yield proportional improvements in economic 
performance. This latter inference rests, however, on an assumption that may not be 
defensible – namely that all regions are similarly capable of mobilising knowledge and 
innovative activity and transforming it into economic growth.  
 
A number of authors have suggested that the extent to which a region is capable 
of translating innovative efforts into growth is mediated by its unique attributes, 
features and characteristics (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; Crescenzi, 2005; Rodríguez-
Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Conte et al., 2009; Capello and Lenzi, 2014). Capello and 
Lenzi (2014:190), in fact, note that there is “a wide consensus [in the literature] on the 
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importance of some territorial preconditions to create knowledge and innovation and 
to turn them into growth”.  
 
Prior to proceeding, it should be clarified that while knowledge and innovation 
are intrinsically related, they are not one in the same, nor is the way in which they 
relate to economic performance. The relationship between them is one of 
complementarity. Knowledge is an input to innovative processes. Innovation, on the 
other hand, is a consequence of the mobilisation and application of knowledge and is, 
in that respect, the output of innovative processes.25  
 
The link between innovation and economic performance is more direct than 
that between knowledge and growth. Knowledge, including that which is generated 
via R&D, must be mobilised, combined and cross-fertilised to yield the more tangible, 
applied innovations that impel economic growth (e.g. Fagerberg, 2003).  The process 
by which knowledge is converted into innovation is affected by a multitude of 
territorially-specific socioeconomic and institutional influences (Edquist and 
Chaminade, 2006; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). The availability of human 
capital and skills (Romer, 1990; Glaeser, 1999; Andersson et al., 2005; Lee et al., 
2010; Pater and Lewandowska, 2015); the maturity and character of the local 
economic fabric (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; 2001; Capello et al., 2012); the local 
circulation and exchange of knowledge facilitated, in part, by physical co-location 
(Duranton and Puga, 2004; Storper and Venables, 2004); a territory’s exposure to and 
ability to exploit inter-territorial spillovers (Moreno et al., 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Crescenzi, 2008; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2016); the 
maturity of its informal institutional constructs and arrangements (Morgan, 1997; 
Cooke and Morgan, 1998); and the efficiency of its formal institutions (Rodríguez-
Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015) are among the factors and influences that are thought to 
shape a region’s facility for the application of knowledge and, ultimately, its 
innovative capacity.   
 
                                               
25 Griliches’ (1979) ‘knowledge production function’ offers the clearest conceptualization of this relationship. In 
said function, innovative output is understood to be a function of a variety of inputs, one of which is “technological 
knowledge, determined in part by current and past research and development expenditures” (p. 95). Capello and 
Lenzi (2014:187) also distinguish knowledge from innovation asserting that “both knowledge and innovation are 
crucial, albeit different, drivers of economic growth”.  
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The set of factors that conditions a region’s capacity to generate innovation is 
not dissimilar to that which is anticipated to determine its facility for mobilising it. 
That said, three factors stand out as especially relevant to the relationship between 
innovation and economic performance.  
 
The first is the economic structure of a region. The relevance of regional 
economic structure to the mobilisation of innovation is derived from the fact that a 
region’s demand for knowledge and innovation, and the number of channels it offers 
for their application, is a function of the characteristics of the economic actors its hosts, 
including their size and the industry in which they operate as well as the competitive 
context in which they exist. Rodríguez-Pose (2001), in fact, posits that a region’s 
capacity to mobilise its innovative efforts may be most directly influenced, at least in 
the European context, by its economic structure. More specifically, he asserts that “the 
absence of a dense network of companies, the predominance of small and very small 
enterprises, lack of competition and the lack of entrepreneurship, curtail the capacity 
of [an] economic environment to transform innovation into economic activity” 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2001:292).  
 
The second is the availability of skills and the composition of the regional 
workforce. Demand for knowledge and innovation is not sufficient, in and of itself, to 
ensure that either will be applied in a growth-enhancing way. Regions must also have 
the “capability” to do so (Crescenzi, 2005:483). This capability is shaped by the 
availability of skills. Skilled human capital ‘screens’ different types and sources of 
knowledge and innovation and determines how to channel them in appropriate and 
productive ways. 
 
The final, albeit less tangible, factor relates to density and maturity of the 
institutions – both formal and informal – that shape behaviours and mediate 
interactions in a region. Capello and Lenzi (2014:188) reiterate the importance of both 
“interaction, synergy and cooperation” and of various types of inter-actor engagements 
to the genesis of innovation before extrapolating this relevance to the relationship 
between knowledge, innovation and economic growth. Informal institutions, as the 
underpinnings of trust and ‘social capital’, serve as regulators of these relations 
(Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 2000; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006; Rodríguez-Pose, 
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2013). Formal institutions, on the other hand, provide the more tangible framework 
within which they occur (e.g. North, 1990). Well-developed institutions are therefore 
thought to support, and may even be prerequisites for, the process by which knowledge 
and innovation are transformed into economic growth. Conversely, the absence of 
suitably mature institutional infrastructures could inhibit such a transformation. 
 
Bearing all of this in mind, it becomes inevitable that different types of regions 
have different facilities for the mobilisation of knowledge and innovation. More 
specifically, lagging regions will not only be less innovative than their more 
economically developed counterparts, they are also likely to be less able to translate 
their innovative efforts into economic growth and dynamism. Lagging regions tend to 
be marked by lower levels of investment in the generation of new knowledge and, 
consequently, by minimal innovative capacities; by weaker economic fabrics; and by 
insufficiently deep pools of skilled human capital, as well as by poorer functioning 
and less efficient institutions (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 2001; Rodríguez-Pose and Di 
Cataldo, 2015).  
 
The underinvestment in R&D that is characteristic of Europe’s lagging regions 
– and of low-income ones (Section 3.3) in particular – curtails their capacity to 
generate the types of knowledge that serve not only as catalysts for innovation but also 
as facilitators of its productive application. The inadequacy of these regions’ financial 
commitments to knowledge generation constrains their ability to absorb and exploit 
knowledge spillovers emanating from neighbouring areas as well. Similar 
consequences may be attributed to the skills shortages that are readily apparent in 
Europe’s lesser-developed areas. Likewise, the weaker economic fabrics that 
characterise Europe’s lagging regions – products of the types of firms, industries and 
activities they host – render them both less receptive to existing knowledge and 
innovation and less able to introduce it themselves. Moreover, the inefficiency of these 
regions’ formal institutions and the underdevelopment of their informal ones increase 
uncertainly with the effect of discouraging both investment in and the more general 
pursuit of technological progress, whilst also limiting the interactions and other 
interactive processes that underpin the performance and mobilisation of knowledge-
intensive activities. 
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In short, one, or some combination of the aforementioned deficiencies will, 
according to the prevailing discourse, impair the capacity of Europe’s lagging regions 
to realise economic benefit from whatever knowledge they have generated and 
innovations they have cultivated.  Lagging regions are, however, heterogeneous 
entities. They may very well share broad similarities that are both cause and 
consequence of their classification as ‘lagging’. Any similarities are, however, likely 
matched by equally important socioeconomic and institutional differences. This 
implies that while it is perhaps reasonable to expect that Europe’s economically 
disadvantaged regions will, on balance, be less able to mobilise innovative efforts than 
their more economically developed counterparts, one cannot presume that all lagging 
regions will be similarly capable – or incapable – of doing so, and that the triadic 
relationship between knowledge, innovation and growth will manifest itself in the 
same away across them. 
 
It is this hypothesis that motivates the research. 
 
3.3. Europe’s lagging regions: The ‘low-growth/low-income’ distinction 
 
How different are the European Union’s lagging regions? The European 
Commission, since its 6th Cohesion Report (2014), distinguishes between ‘low-
income’ and ‘low-growth’ regions. This distinction was motivated principally by the 
realisation that the development challenges faced by lagging regions are profoundly 
different and, moreover, that suitability differentiated policy responses will be needed 
to overcome them.  
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Figure 3.1. The geography of Europe’s lagging regions 
Author’s elaboration 
Assignment to one of the two categories of lagging regions is based, mainly, 
on a set of GDP-oriented criteria. The low-income regions category is composed of all 
European regions “with a GDP per head in PPS below 50% of the EU average in 
2013” (DG Regio, 2015:1).  Low-growth regions, on the other hand, are “less 
developed and transition regions that did not converge to the EU average between the 
years 2000 and 2013 in Member States with a GDP per head in PPS below the EU 
average in 2013” (DG Regio, 2015:1).  
 
19 of Europe’s 276 NUTS2 regions are classified as low-income. These 
regions are spread across four of the countries that make up Europe’s eastern periphery 
-  Bulgaria (5 regions), Hungary (4), Poland (5) and Romania (5). Europe’s 28 low-
growth regions are scattered across the continent’s southern periphery; 11 are situated 
in Greece, five in Spain, eight in Italy and four in Portugal. 
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3.4. Assessing the heterogeneity of Europe’s low-income and low-growth 
regions 
 
There are two questions that must be addressed prior to proceeding with the 
econometric analysis: (i) how do Europe’s low-income regions differ from their low-
growth counterparts; and (ii) are the differences that emerge pronounced enough to 
justify the employment of the aforementioned distinction be it for analytical or policy-
making purposes? 
 
3.4.1. Comparing the economic performance and growth trajectories of Europe’s 
low-income and low-growth regions 
 
A suitable starting point for this taxonomic exercise is a comparison of the 
economic growth trajectories of the two types of lagging regions. 
 
Figure 3.2. Average GDP per capita of Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions, 
relative to EU average, 2000-2011 
 
Author’s elaboration 
Figure 3.2 depicts the average GDP per capita of Europe’s low-income and 
low-growth regions relative to the EU average. While Europe’s low-growth regions 
are more economically developed than their low-income counterparts, the average 
GDP per capita of both types of regions fell below the European average throughout 
the period of analysis. Interestingly, the gap between the two types of regions did 
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narrow towards the end of the timeframe. This convergence has, however, been modest 
and the gulf between them remains sizeable.  
  
The aforementioned inferences are supplemented by those revealed by Figure 
3.3 which summarises the average annual change in GDP per capita (as a percentage 
of the previous year’s GDP per capita) for low-growth and low-income regions, 
respectively. Prior to 2008, the GDP per capita of both types of regions were, on 
average, increasing annually. In 2008, however, the average annual change in GDP 
per capita for low-growth regions dropped close to zero and, in 2009, this figure turned 
negative for both types of lagging regions. It was then that a not inconsequential 
divergence occurred. In 2010, growth resumed in low-income regions – the average 
annual change in GDP per capita for low-income regions re-entered positive territory. 
The same cannot be said for low-growth regions. The average annual change in GDP 
per capita for low-growth regions stayed negative in 2010 and 2011.  
 
Figure 3.3. Average annual change in regional GDP per capita, 2000-2011 
 
Author’s elaboration 
Taken together, the gap between the average GDP per capita of Europe’s low-
income and low-growth regions (Figure 3.2) and the divergence in their growth 
trajectories (Figure 3.3) confirm that the economic fortunes of, and the challenges 
faced by, these two types of regions are distinctly different in spite of their shared 
status as ‘lagging’. That is, the challenge with which low-income regions are faced is 
not necessarily related to catalysing growth, but rather to ensuring that that which is 
already occurring is socioeconomically and temporally sustainable, and that their GDP 
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per capita continue to converge to those of other European regions. For low-growth 
regions, on the other hand, the challenge centres on the reversal of economic stagnation 
and the re-ignition of growth. 
 
Herein lies the motivation for employing the European Commission’s 
taxonomy of lagging regions. The European Union’s low-income and low-growth 
regions exemplify the heterogeneity of economically disadvantaged areas; the two 
types of regions are on markedly different development trajectories and, as a 
consequence, are facing different barriers, obstacles and challenges. This renders them 
the perfect subsample of lagging regions for an exploration of this nature. Moreover, 
because the European Union has declared the development of these regions a priority, 
they are likely to be the focus of an array of policies and strategies designed to mitigate 
and rectify the aforementioned challenges. By focusing on these two types of regions 
with the explicit aim of understanding the differences between them, this research will 
yield inferences and insights that are immediately relevant to policy-makers. More 
specifically, its conclusions can be used to inform the design of the contextually 
tailored innovation and development policies are likely to be pursued in these regions.  
 
The analysis is guided by two specific research questions: First, and most 
importantly, are low-growth and low-income regions equally capable of transforming 
locally and extra-locally generated knowledge and innovation into economic growth? 
Second, and more generally, are processes of economic growth in low-income and 
low-growth regions, respectively, governed by the same set of more broadly-defined 
socioeconomic and institutional forces? 
 
3.4.2. Exploring the socioeconomic and institutional fabrics of Europe’s lagging 
regions 
 
While their divergent economic fortunes may represent the most pronounced 
difference between Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions, the consideration 
of a series of socioeconomic and institutional indicators reveals that the differences 
between them are not confined to their contrasting growth trajectories.     
The examination of two barometers of regional innovative capacity – R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP and patent applications to the European Patent 
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Office – confirms that the heterogeneity of low-income and low-growth regions is 
reflected in their financial commitments to the generation of new knowledge and their 
capacity to introduce applied, more tangible innovations. 
 
Figure 3.4. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
Author’s elaboration 
Europe’s low-growth regions are, on balance, more innovative – in terms of 
both inputs (R&D) and outputs (patent applications) – than their low-income 
counterparts (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). Regional R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
relative to GDP per capita is summarised by Figure 3.4. Figure 3.5 depicts regional 
patenting propensity, again with reference to GDP per head. Taken together, the 
figures provide an indication that even among Europe’s most economically 
disadvantaged regions, higher levels of economic development are associated with 
greater investment in knowledge generating functions and better developed innovative 
capacities. 
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Figure 3.5. Patent applications to the EPO per million inhabitants 
 
Author’s elaboration 
Further evidence of the heterogeneity of these lagging regions is found in a 
cursory comparison of their sectoral compositions. The negative correlation between 
GDP per capita and industrial employment revealed in Figure 3.6 indicates that a 
greater share of workers is employed in ‘industrial activities’ in Europe’s low-income 
regions than in their low-growth counterparts. Lower levels of industrial employment 
in Europe’s low-growth regions are not indicative, in this case, of a less mature 
economic structure, but rather are part and parcel with the more robust service sectors 
these regions play host too. The service sector in Europe’s low-income regions is 
relatively underdeveloped (50.66% of total employment in 2011) while agricultural- 
and natural resource-based activities (20.01%) and manufacturing (19.34%) account 
for a large share of total employment. In low-growth regions, an overwhelming 
majority of workers are employed in the service sector (65.93%). 
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Figure 3.6. Employment in industry 
 
Author’s elaboration 
Figure 3.7. Quality of government 
 
Author’s elaboration 
 Another point of divergence between Europe’s low-income and low-growth 
regions relates to the efficiency and functioning of their formal institutions. Figure 
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3.7, which plots quality of government against GDP per capita, indicates that Europe’s 
low-growth regions feature, on balance, more mature, favourable institutional 
environments than their low-income counterparts. It should be noted that the gulf 
between the institutional qualities of the two types of lagging regions is less 
pronounced than say that which exists between their respective innovative capacities 
(Figures 3.4 and 3.5). That said, Figure 3.7 leaves little doubt that there are differences 
between the quality of institutions in Europe’s low-growth and low-income regions, 
respectively.      
 
Figure 3.8. Educational attainment 
 
Author’s elaboration 
 Interestingly, neither low-income nor low-growth regions suffer from a 
debilitating shortage of highly skilled workers. Europe’s lagging regions are endowed 
with comparable stocks of workers with a tertiary education (Figure 3.8a). This is 
perhaps the most marked similarly between them. In 2011, for example, an average of 
17.5% and 18.2% of workers in low-income and low-growth regions, respectively, had 
completed a tertiary education. Low-income regions do, however, benefit from more 
robustly developed stocks of ‘semi-skilled’ labour (Figure 3.8b). In 2011, an average 
of 60.25% of working-age individuals in low-income regions had completed either an 
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upper secondary degree or some form of non-tertiary, post-secondary education. In 
low-growth regions, this figure was 31.29%.  
 
3.4.3. Putting it all together 
 
 Low-income regions are marked most immediately by the rate and resilience 
of the growth they have achieved in recent years. They are endowed with reasonably 
highly skilled workforces but feature sectoral profiles in which less technologically 
sophisticated activities are prevalent and suffer from especially weak innovative 
capacities that are reflected in both their financial commitments to R&D and 
propensities to introduce patents. The latter two observations coupled with that that 
the institutions underpinning economic activity in Europe’s low-income regions are of 
a lesser quality than those of their low-growth counterparts raise concerns about the 
extent to which these regions will be capable of translating knowledge and innovation 
into economic growth; it is anticipated that they will, on balance, struggle to do so.  
 
The economic performance of Europe’s low-growth regions throughout the 
period of analysis, and the slowdown and stagnation from which they suffered in the 
latter part of the 2000s, is what sets them apart from their low-income neighbours. 
This is not, however, the only point of divergence. Low-growth regions, while not 
especially innovative by European standards, invest more in the generation of 
knowledge and are certainly more innovative than their low-income counterparts. 
Their services-oriented sectoral profiles are also anticipated to be more conducive to 
knowledge-intensive activity than those of Europe’s low-income regions. Their 
institutions are more – albeit marginally – effective, efficient and developed than those 
of their low-income peers as well. Finally, while highly skilled labour is not in overly 
short supply in Europe’s low-growth regions, they do suffer from a dearth of the semi-
skilled labour that is more abundant in the continent’s low-income areas. 
 
These observations, when taken together, give rise to a hypothesis about the 
relationship between innovative activity and economic growth in low-growth regions 
that is the opposite to that which was formulated for low-income ones.  More 
specifically, low-growth regions benefit from reasonably mature pools of highly 
skilled workers that should afford them some capacity to internalise and exploit 
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knowledge and innovation; from economic structures that, relative to those of their 
low-income counterparts, seem more receptive to technologically sophisticated 
activities; and from institutions that, again relative to those of their low-income 
cousins, are more amenable to all manner of economic activity. It is therefore 
anticipated that low-growth regions will display some facility for the conversion of 
knowledge and innovation, locally generated or otherwise, into economic growth. 
 
3.5. Methodology 
 
3.5.1. The model 
 
The research questions are explored using a basic econometric model within 
which a region’s economic performance is a function of its investment in R&D; its 
innovative capacity; its exposure to ‘spillovers’; its human capital endowment; its 
economic structure; the quality and efficiency of its institutions; and a vector of 
structural factors. 
 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
DlnGDPpci,t = b1R&Di,t + b2WR&Di,t + b3Patentsi,t + b4WPatentsi,t 
+j1HumanKi,t +j2EconStructurei,t + j3Institutionsi,t + Xi,t¢q  
+ d1lnGDPpci,t-1  + ft + li + ei,t 
 
  
 158 
Where: 
 
DlnGDPpc represents economic growth proxied by annual changes in 
GDP per capita; 
R&D represents regional R&D expenditure; 
WR&D represents the average R&D expenditure of neighbouring 
regions; 
Patents represents regional innovative capacity; 
WPatents Represents the average regional innovative capacity of 
neighbouring regions; 
HumanK represents the availability of skilled human capital26; 
EconStructure represents the proportion of workers employed in 
industrial activities; 
Institutions is a measure of the quality of regional institutions; 
X is a vector of other structural variables; 
lnGDPpct-1   represents the level of regional GDP per capita in time 
period t-1; 
i,t represent region and time, respectively 
 
3.5.2. The variables 
 
3.5.2.1. The dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is a measure of regional economic performance: the 
annual change of the logarithmic transformation of regional GDP per capita. The 
‘dynamic’ nature of the dependent variable necessitates the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation. Accordingly, regional GDP 
per capita in time period ‘t – 1’ is included. 
 
  
                                               
26 The proxies for the availability of skilled human capital have been logarithmically transformed to address an 
issue of multicollinearity stemming from the inclusion of the Quality of Government index. 
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3.5.2.2. Measures of knowledge and innovation 
 
Six related independent variables are included to assess the extent to which 
Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions are capable of translating knowledge 
and innovation from different sources in economic dynamism: 
 
 First is regional R&D expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP. R&D 
expenditure is employed as a proxy for investment in the generation of economically 
useful knowledge. The inclusion of this variable permits the formulation of inferences 
relating to the extent to which Europe’s lagging regions are capable of translating 
locally generated knowledge into economic performance.  
 
 The second independent variable of interest is a proxy for regional 
innovativeness: patent applications to the European Patent Office per million 
inhabitants. Patent statistics are by no means a perfect proxy for regional innovative 
capacity.27 That said, they are a reliable and consistent measure of the introduction of 
commercially viable, applied innovation. Regional patent intensity is therefore 
included to assess the relationship between the generation of more tangible, applied 
innovation and economic growth.   
 
The remainder of the independent variables of interest are spatially-lagged 
ones. Regions can draw upon knowledge and innovations generated elsewhere to 
bolster their own innovative capacity (e.g. Bathelt et al., 2004; Feldman and Kogler, 
2010). Exposure to externally generated knowledge and innovation may, in fact, be 
especially important for economically disadvantaged regions. An emerging body of 
empirical literature has provided evidence to suggest that exposure to externally 
generated knowledge and innovation can compensate for a lack of local knowledge 
and innovative dynamism (e.g. Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; 2016; Tödtling et al., 
2012; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015). Suffice to say, the relationship between exposure 
to extra-local innovative activities and economic growth cannot be overlooked. Table 
                                               
27 The limitations of patent applications are well understood (e.g. Desrochers, 1998). The fact that many innovations 
are, for any number of reasons, are not patentable or are not patented has led many to assert that patent statistics 
paint an overly simplistic and perhaps biased picture of regional innovativeness. That said, patent statistics remain 
something of a standard proxy for research of this nature in large part because they are, as noted by Trajtenberg 
(1990:183), “the only observable manifestation of inventive activity with a well-grounded claim for universality”. 
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3.1 outlines the four spatially-lagged variables developed with the specific intention 
of capturing this relationship. 
 
Table 3.1. Spatially-lagged measures of knowledge and innovation 
Variable: Proxy for: 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st-order 
contiguity) 
Exposure to the knowledge flows/spillovers 
emanating from a region’s immediate neighbours 
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse distance) Exposure to the knowledge flows/spillovers 
emanating from across Europe 
Spatially-lagged patent intensity (1st-
order contiguity) 
Exposure to innovation occurring in and the 
innovation flows/spillovers emanating from a 
region’s immediate neighbours 
Spatially-lagged patent intensity (inverse 
distance) 
Exposure to innovation occurring in and the 
innovation flows/spillovers emanating from across 
Europe 
 
The inclusion of these spatially-lagged variables adds an important dimension 
to the analysis; it ensures that the scope of the research is not confined simply to the 
extent to which Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions are able to translate 
their own knowledge resources and innovations into economic growth. With these 
spatially-lagged variables, I can assess the way in which the economic performance of 
Europe’s lagging regions is affected by processes transpiring beyond their immediate 
borders and, more specifically, by the innovative efforts of their European neighbours. 
 
3.5.2.3. Socioeconomic and institutional variables 
 
As indicated in Section 3.2, there are a multitude of structural, socioeconomic 
and institutional factors, characteristics and conditions that mediate the translation of 
innovative efforts into economic dynamism. A series of variables are incorporated into 
the analysis to control for these influences and explore their relevance in the 
geographic contexts with which this research is concerned.  
 
Section 3.2 posited that there are three factors that that stand out as especially 
relevant to the relationship between knowledge, innovation and economic 
performance: (i) the availability of skills; (ii) the industrial composition of a region’s 
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economy and (iii) the functioning of their institutions. These fundamental factors are 
explored in the analysis via the inclusion of five variables.   
 
Two measures educational attainment28 – (1) tertiary educational attainment 
and (2) upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary educational attainment – are 
employed to probe the link between the availability of human capital and regional 
economic performance. Regional unemployment rates are included alongside the 
educational attainment variables to capture the relationship between the “productive 
employment” (Crescenzi et al., 2007:684) of that human capital and economic 
dynamism. The influence of industrial compositions and the structure of a region’s 
economy is explored via the inclusion of an employment in industry as a percentage 
of total employment variable. Finally, the importance of the quality of regions’ 
institutions is examined via the incorporation of the Quality of Government index to 
the model. 
 
A handful of other variables are included to control for relevant structural 
influences. The importance of agglomeration – and of the knowledge-related 
externalities with which it is associated – to the achievement of economic growth is 
assessed via the inclusion of regional population density. A spatially-lagged GDP 
variable is employed, as is customary in comparable literature (e.g. Blonigen et al., 
2007), as a measure of market accessibility. It is incorporated into the analysis to 
determine whether geographic peripherality serves as a boon or a barrier to growth and 
dynamism. Finally, the percentage of the population aged 15-24 is included to control 
for regions’ respective demographic structures. 
 
3.6. Results and analysis 
 
The model is estimated using a panel data approach with time and region fixed-
effects. Robust standard errors are employed. The explanatory variables of interest – 
the measures of knowledge and innovation (Section 3.5.2.2) – are fitted with two-year 
                                               
28 The inclusion of two related measures of educational attainment is motivated by the desire to capture the role 
played by different types of human capital. Tertiary educational attainment is a proxy for the availability of highly 
skilled human capital while upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary educational attainment is indicative 
of the availability of semi-skilled labour.  
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lags to reflect the assumption that the transformation of knowledge and innovation into 
economic growth is not instantaneous, and also to minimise issues of simultaneity. 
The analysis focuses on Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions for the period 
between 2000 and 2011. A list of the regions considered in the analysis is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
 
 The section is structured as follows: Section 3.6.1 summarises a set of 
specifications that consider low-income and low-growth regions together under the 
umbrella of ‘lagging regions’. Sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 separate low-income from low-
growth regions and provide simple summaries of the estimation results. Section 3.6.4 
compares the two types of regions and provides a substantive interpretation of 
results.29 
 
3.6.1. Lagging regions 
 
Before exploring the growth dynamics of Europe’s low-growth and low-
income regions independently, the two types of lagging regions are considered 
together to ascertain insights that will serve as points of reference for the comparative 
analysis that follows in Section 3.6.4.  
 
Table 3.2 summarises the estimation results for Europe’s lagging regions.30
                                               
29 This research is exploratory in nature. I am therefore concerned, most immediately, with the direction and 
significance of the coefficients. 
 
30 The regional GDP per capita in ‘t-1’ variable is included out of necessity (Section 3.5) and will therefore not be 
addressed in detail. That its coefficient is negative and significant across all specifications of the model for lagging, 
low-income and low-growth regions alike does, however, provide evidence of convergence among lagging (Table 
3.2, Specifications 1-10), low-income (Table 3.3, Specifications 1-10) and low-growth (Table 3 4, Specifications 
1-10) regions, respectively. 
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Table 3.2. Europe’s lagging regions 
 All 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PCT patents applications per 
million inhabitants 
0.000327 0.000261 0.000298 0.000248 0.000310 
(0.000724) (0.000703) (0.000712) (0.000698) (0.000724) 
R&D expenditure 
0.0133 0.0103 0.0109 0.00927 0.0127 
(0.0225) (0.0178) (0.0214) (0.0174) (0.0232) 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st order 
contiguity) 
  0.0178 0.00880  
  (0.0186) (0.0127)  
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse 
distance) 
    0.0378 
    (0.131) 
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (1st order contiguity) 
     
     
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (inverse distance) 
     
     
Tertiary educational attainment 
-0.0132  -0.0153  -0.0139 
(0.0176)  (0.0180)  (0.0179) 
Upper secondary and NON-
tertiary educational attainment 
 0.0554*  0.0517*  
 (0.0324)  (0.0303)  
Unemployment rate 
-0.00303*** -0.00325*** -0.00310*** -0.00327*** -0.00307*** 
(0.000674) (0.000701) (0.000678) (0.000708) (0.000701) 
Percentage of the population 
aged 15-24 
0.00553 0.00695 0.00529 0.00677 0.00539 
(0.00656) (0.00604) (0.00652) (0.00603) (0.00665) 
Employment in industry 
0.000978 0.00105 0.00104 0.00110 0.000984 
(0.00176) (0.00182) (0.00173) (0.00181) (0.00176) 
Population density 
0.00166** 0.00184** 0.00176** 0.00189** 0.00166** 
(0.000744) (0.000717) (0.000778) (0.000751) (0.000752) 
Market access 
0.0422*** 0.0453*** 0.0428*** 0.0454*** 0.0422*** 
(0.00890) (0.00963) (0.00890) (0.00960) (0.00880) 
Quality of government  
0.0704*** 0.0709*** 0.0692*** 0.0701*** 0.0699*** 
(0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0141) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 
-0.231*** -0.225*** -0.230*** -0.224*** -0.230*** 
(0.0242) (0.0248) (0.0241) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
Constant 
1.691*** 1.347*** 1.665*** 1.346*** 1.643*** 
(0.248) (0.221) (0.241) (0.222) (0.269) 
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 
R-squared 0.601 0.604 0.602 0.604 0.601 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.2. (Continued) 
 All 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PCT patents applications per 
million inhabitants 
0.000283 0.000286 0.000223 0.000229 0.000167 
(0.000711) (0.000727) (0.000706) (0.000706) (0.000689) 
R&D expenditure 
0.0109 0.0125 0.00971 0.0123 0.00946 
(0.0189) (0.0222) (0.0176) (0.0221) (0.0170) 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st order 
contiguity) 
     
     
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse 
distance) 
-0.0590     
(0.115)     
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (1st order contiguity) 
 0.000985* 0.000879*   
 (0.000514) (0.000474)   
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (inverse distance) 
   0.00477* 0.00415* 
   (0.00249) (0.00227) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
 -0.0150  -0.0199  
 (0.0174)  (0.0181)  
Upper secondary and NON-
tertiary educational attainment 
0.0617*  0.0529  0.0550* 
(0.0341)  (0.0323)  (0.0313) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.00321*** -0.00302*** -0.00323*** -0.00292*** -0.00315*** 
(0.000721) (0.000665) (0.000695) (0.000675) (0.000703) 
Percentage of the population 
aged 15-24 
0.00728 0.00642 0.00771 0.00595 0.00742 
(0.00601) (0.00654) (0.00607) (0.00628) (0.00581) 
Employment in industry 
0.00101 0.00106 0.00115 0.00112 0.00125 
(0.00182) (0.00176) (0.00183) (0.00171) (0.00179) 
Population density 
0.00186*** 0.00170** 0.00187** 0.00135* 0.00159** 
(0.000689) (0.000749) (0.000726) (0.000753) (0.000729) 
Market access 
0.0459*** 0.0402*** 0.0433*** 0.0353*** 0.0390*** 
(0.00945) (0.00874) (0.00949) (0.0100) (0.0106) 
Quality of government  
0.0721*** 0.0713*** 0.0715*** 0.0735*** 0.0729*** 
(0.0135) (0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0134) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 
-0.226*** -0.226*** -0.220*** -0.225*** -0.218*** 
(0.0249) (0.0243) (0.0250) (0.0239) (0.0250) 
Constant 
1.398*** 1.650*** 1.313*** 1.395*** 1.059*** 
(0.260) (0.248) (0.224) (0.297) (0.277) 
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 
R-squared 0.604 0.603 0.606 0.604 0.606 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The most suitable point of departure for the analysis is an examination of the 
relationships between regional economic performance and the six measures of 
knowledge and innovation. Neither regional investment in R&D nor patent intensity 
are found to be significantly related to the economic performance of Europe’s lagging 
regions. This implies that these regions are, on balance, incapable of converting any 
knowledge they generate or innovations they cultivate into economic growth 
(Specifications 1-10).  
 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that these regions may have some 
facility for the mobilisation of innovation spillovers emanating from both the their 
immediate and more distant European neighbours; the coefficients of both spatially-
lagged patenting variables are statistically significant (Specifications 7-10). This 
facility is not, as evidenced by the absence of significant relationships between 
economic growth and the spatially-lagged R&D variables, matched by a comparable 
one for the absorption and exploitation of R&D spillovers (Specifications 3-6). 
 
The inference drawn from the emergence of a positive relationship between 
regional economic performance and exposure to innovation spillovers – and from the 
insignificance of the coefficients of the other variables of interest –  is that the 
economic performance of Europe’s lagging regions seems to be mediated more by 
innovative activities transpiring beyond their borders than by those occurring within 
them. A logical extension of this inference is that the strategic efforts these regions 
have undertaken to catalyse and support innovative activity are yet to yield returns in 
the form of growth. 
 
 The results also provide an indication of the way in which the economic 
performance of Europe’s lagging regions is governed by other socioeconomic, 
institutional and structural influences. The quality of these regions’ institutions is, for 
one, revealed as a preeminent determinant of their dynamism. The coefficient of the 
quality of government variable is positive and strongly significant across all 
specifications (Specifications 1-10). Positive and significant relationships between the 
economic performance of Europe’s lagging regions and their physical proximity to 
other regions and the markets they host (Specifications 1-10); the availability of semi-
skilled human capital (Specifications 2, 4, 6, 10); and the agglomeration of economic 
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activity (Specifications 1-10) emerge as well. There is also evidence of a significant 
association between a lagging region’s capacity to mobilise its human capital, proxied 
by the unemployment rate, and its economic performance (Specifications 1-10). 
 
The dynamism of these regions does not, on the other hand, appear to be 
influenced by the structure of their respective economies or by the availability of 
highly skilled human capital; the coefficients of the tertiary educational attainment and 
industrial employment variables are statistically insignificant across all specifications 
of the model (Specifications 1-10). 
 
Taken together the specifications summarised in Table 3.2 would seem to shed 
a great deal of light on the factors that condition the economic dynamism of Europe’s 
lagging regions. The question that remains to be addressed, however, relates to 
whether the aggregation of low-income and low-growth regions is masking 
fundamental differences between the factors, forces and features that drive and shape 
processes of economic growth and change in them. There is good reason to think that 
it may. The differences between Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions are 
numerous and manifest themselves across a number of axes (Section 3.4). The body 
of literature within which this research is situated (Section 3.2) suggests that it is 
unlikely that regions as heterogeneous as these are drawing on and mobilising the same 
resources, or are facing the same obstacles and impediments, in their pursuit of 
economic growth. 
 
3.6.2. Low-income regions 
 
Table 3.3 summarises the estimation results for Europe’s low-income regions. 
 
Once again, I begin the analysis, this time of Europe’s low-income regions, 
with the six variables of primary interest (Section 3.5.2.2). Regional R&D expenditure, 
as a proxy for investment in the generation and subsequent availability of knowledge, 
is not significantly linked to their economic dynamism (Specifications 1-10). There is, 
however, evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
regional patent intensity and economic growth (Specifications 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10). It 
should be highlighted that the coefficients of the patent intensity variable are only 
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significant in model specifications that control for tertiary educational attainment.31 
This suggests that the process by which innovation is translated into economic 
performance in Europe’s low-income regions could be undermined by an absence of 
suitability skilled human capital. 
 
Similarly, the coefficients of the spatially-lagged measures of knowledge and 
innovation imply that the economic performance of Europe’s low-income regions is 
not free from external influence. That is, while exposure to shorter-distance knowledge 
and innovation spillovers is unrelated to their economic dynamism (Specifications 3, 
4, 7, 8), the results suggest that the economic performance of these territories is 
negatively and significantly associated with exposure to longer-distance knowledge 
and innovation flows alike (Specifications 5, 6, 9, 10). 
 
The results also indicate that the economic performance of Europe’s low-
income regions is mediated, more generally, by their economic structures, their 
demographic compositions, externalities associated with the agglomeration of 
economic activity and by the quality, functioning and efficiency of their institutions. 
Employment in industry is positively and significantly related to economic growth 
across all specifications of the model, as are the quality of government, the population 
density, and the percentage of the population aged 15-24 variables (Specifications 1-
10).  
 
Market accessibility, educational attainment and levels of unemployment are, 
on the other hand, not robustly linked to the economic performance of these regions 
(Specifications 1-10). 
  
                                               
31 Specification 10 is the only outlier. 
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Table 3.3. Europe’s low-income regions 
 Low-income regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PCT patents applications per 
million inhabitants 
0.00178* 0.00143 0.00175* 0.00141 0.00201* 
(0.000847) (0.000890) (0.000907) (0.000940) (0.000963) 
R&D expenditure 
0.00822 0.00558 0.0129 0.00837 0.00911 
(0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0261) (0.0254) (0.0247) 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st order 
contiguity) 
  -0.0270 -0.0163  
  (0.0643) (0.0665)  
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse 
distance) 
    -0.555** 
    (0.215) 
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (1st order contiguity) 
     
     
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (inverse distance) 
     
     
Tertiary educational attainment 
-0.0285  -0.0295  -0.0298 
(0.0401)  (0.0406)  (0.0405) 
Upper secondary and NON-
tertiary educational attainment 
 -0.0940  -0.0908  
 (0.114)  (0.120)  
Unemployment rate 
0.000691 0.000711 0.000691 0.000709 0.00107 
(0.000954) (0.000905) (0.000960) (0.000909) (0.000935) 
Percentage of the population 
aged 15-24 
0.0278*** 0.0218** 0.0288*** 0.0225** 0.0275*** 
(0.00912) (0.00935) (0.00966) (0.0105) (0.00891) 
Employment in industry 
0.00568*** 0.00585*** 0.00559*** 0.00580*** 0.00544*** 
(0.00162) (0.00165) (0.00171) (0.00173) (0.00161) 
Population density 
0.00996*** 0.00625** 0.0103*** 0.00647* 0.00998*** 
(0.00317) (0.00280) (0.00333) (0.00314) (0.00303) 
Market access 
-0.0173 -0.0254 -0.0169 -0.0251 -0.00752 
(0.0231) (0.0247) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0203) 
Quality of government  
0.112*** 0.0998*** 0.114*** 0.101*** 0.107*** 
(0.0289) (0.0268) (0.0307) (0.0294) (0.0289) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 
-0.265*** -0.272*** -0.263*** -0.271*** -0.252*** 
(0.0504) (0.0651) (0.0497) (0.0663) (0.0467) 
Constant 
1.349* 2.165 1.303* 2.115 1.776** 
(0.666) (1.296) (0.670) (1.377) (0.754) 
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 190 190 190 190 190 
R-squared 0.663 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.669 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3. (Continued) 
  Low-income regions 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PCT patents applications per 
million inhabitants 
0.00165 0.00175* 0.00142 0.00246* 0.00235* 
(0.00104) (0.000866) (0.000910) (0.00124) (0.00130) 
R&D expenditure 
0.00638 0.00614 0.00496 0.0235 0.0253 
(0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0225) (0.0258) (0.0255) 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st order 
contiguity) 
     
     
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse 
distance) 
-0.527**     
(0.210)     
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (1st order contiguity) 
 0.000851 0.000226   
 (0.00357) (0.00395)   
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (inverse distance) 
   -0.0145* -0.0170* 
   (0.00733) (0.00831) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
 -0.0317  -0.00404  
 (0.0335)  (0.0254)  
Upper secondary and NON-
tertiary educational attainment 
-0.0815  -0.0939  -0.177* 
(0.112)  (0.113)  (0.0970) 
Unemployment rate 
0.00106 0.000642 0.000697 0.00107 0.00123 
(0.000897) (0.00106) (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00104) 
Percentage of the population 
aged 15-24 
0.0220** 0.0285*** 0.0220** 0.0286*** 0.0214** 
(0.00915) (0.00942) (0.00953) (0.00853) (0.00826) 
Employment in industry 
0.00563*** 0.00557*** 0.00583*** 0.00579*** 0.00587*** 
(0.00163) (0.00166) (0.00170) (0.00172) (0.00180) 
Population density 
0.00645** 0.00993*** 0.00619* 0.0127*** 0.00954** 
(0.00262) (0.00322) (0.00325) (0.00386) (0.00351) 
Market access 
-0.0156 -0.0186 -0.0258 -0.00927 -0.0167 
(0.0221) (0.0269) (0.0304) (0.0207) (0.0217) 
Quality of government  
0.0955*** 0.112*** 0.0995*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 
(0.0265) (0.0298) (0.0283) (0.0311) (0.0279) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 
-0.258*** -0.261*** -0.271*** -0.334*** -0.362*** 
(0.0621) (0.0463) (0.0575) (0.0396) (0.0517) 
Constant 
2.481* 1.321** 2.159 2.601*** 4.145*** 
(1.330) (0.616) (1.254) (0.570) (1.102) 
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 190 190 190 190 190 
R-squared 0.669 0.664 0.664 0.678 0.684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6.3. Low-growth regions 
 
Table 3.4 summarises the estimation results for Europe’s low-growth regions. 
 
The analysis of Europe’s low-growth regions begins, yet again, with an 
examination of the extent to which these regions are capable of translating the 
knowledge-intensive and innovative activities they host, and are exposed to, into 
economic growth. Neither patent intensity nor regional investment in R&D is 
statistically significantly related to their economic dynamism (Specifications 1-10). 
Their economic performance is, however, affected by the knowledge-intensive and 
innovative activities occurring beyond their borders. The analysis reveals positive and 
significant relationships between regional economic performance and exposure to 
short- and long-distance knowledge and innovation flows alike (Specifications 3-5, 7-
10). Interestingly, the statistical significance of these relationships is greater in 
specifications that control for levels of tertiary educational attainment (Specifications 
1, 3, 5, 7, 9). 
 
The availability of skills is also found to be a preeminent determinant of the 
economic performance of Europe’s low-growth regions. The coefficients of the upper 
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary educational attainment variable are positive 
and significant in all specifications of the model in which they are included 
(Specifications 2, 4, 6, 8, 10). It is perhaps not surprising then that the results reveal a 
significant relationship between levels of unemployment – as a proxy for a region’s 
capacity to mobilise its human capital – and economic dynamism (Specifications 1-
10). The coefficients of the tertiary educational attainment variable are not, however, 
statistically significant (Specifications 1, 3, 5, 7, 9). Significant relationships also 
emerge between the economic performance of Europe’s low growth regions and both 
the population density and market access variables (Specifications 1-10). Evidence to 
suggest that their dynamism is conditioned by the quality and functioning of the 
institutions that underpin them is found as well (Specifications 1-10).  
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Table 3.4. Europe’s low-growth regions 
 Low-growth regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PCT patents applications per 
million inhabitants 
7.37e-05 -9.80e-05 1.91e-06 -0.000129 -2.93e-05 
(0.000792) (0.000765) (0.000761) (0.000756) (0.000767) 
R&D expenditure 
0.0124 0.00267 0.00703 0.000135 0.00761 
(0.0299) (0.0177) (0.0256) (0.0157) (0.0256) 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st order 
contiguity) 
  0.0444* 0.0259*  
  (0.0227) (0.0131)  
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse 
distance) 
    0.388*** 
    (0.138) 
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (1st order contiguity) 
     
     
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (inverse distance) 
     
     
Tertiary educational attainment 
0.0284  0.0255  0.0169 
(0.0281)  (0.0276)  (0.0278) 
Upper secondary and NON-
tertiary educational attainment 
 0.167***  0.157***  
 (0.0395)  (0.0357)  
Unemployment rate 
-0.00424*** -0.00468*** -0.00448*** -0.00480*** -0.00420*** 
(0.000657) (0.000650) (0.000683) (0.000681) (0.000659) 
Percentage of the population 
aged 15-24 
-0.00753 -0.00360 -0.00766 -0.00391 -0.00563 
(0.00993) (0.00879) (0.00961) (0.00893) (0.00954) 
Employment in industry 
-0.000486 -0.000688 -0.000519 -0.000695 -0.000452 
(0.00255) (0.00197) (0.00237) (0.00196) (0.00235) 
Population density 
0.00310*** 0.00312*** 0.00342*** 0.00330*** 0.00294*** 
(0.000823) (0.000673) (0.000871) (0.000748) (0.000838) 
Market access 
0.0711*** 0.0743*** 0.0667*** 0.0715*** 0.0617*** 
(0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0114) 
Quality of government  
0.0750*** 0.0654*** 0.0645*** 0.0599*** 0.0466*** 
(0.0169) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0131) (0.0158) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 
-0.345*** -0.414*** -0.358*** -0.417*** -0.368*** 
(0.0372) (0.0489) (0.0371) (0.0515) (0.0346) 
Constant 
2.593*** 2.729*** 2.704*** 2.785*** 2.433*** 
(0.377) (0.446) (0.369) (0.460) (0.342) 
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 
R-squared 0.693 0.725 0.701 0.727 0.705 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4. (Continued) 
 Low-growth regions 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PCT patents applications per 
million inhabitants 
-0.000129 9.32e-05 -8.16e-05 0.000118 -5.50e-05 
(0.000759) (0.000804) (0.000774) (0.000817) (0.000780) 
R&D expenditure 
0.00132 0.0114 0.00231 0.0105 0.00198 
(0.0166) (0.0293) (0.0177) (0.0282) (0.0171) 
Spatially-lagged R&D (1st order 
contiguity) 
     
     
Spatially-lagged R&D (inverse 
distance) 
0.197     
(0.127)     
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (1st order contiguity) 
 0.00130** 0.000882*   
 (0.000593) (0.000506)   
Spatially-lagged patent 
applications (inverse distance) 
   0.0107** 0.00736* 
   (0.00441) (0.00420) 
Tertiary educational attainment 
 0.0310  0.0232  
 (0.0280)  (0.0270)  
Upper secondary and NON-
tertiary educational attainment 
0.149***  0.162***  0.157*** 
(0.0394)  (0.0397)  (0.0390) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.00462*** -0.00423*** -0.00467*** -0.00408*** -0.00455*** 
(0.000629) (0.000628) (0.000641) (0.000591) (0.000589) 
Percentage of the population 
aged 15-24 
-0.00302 -0.00706 -0.00345 -0.00808 -0.00419 
(0.00895) (0.00968) (0.00874) (0.00920) (0.00861) 
Employment in industry 
-0.000618 -0.000293 -0.000579 -0.000582 -0.000721 
(0.00199) (0.00249) (0.00200) (0.00240) (0.00204) 
Population density 
0.00306*** 0.00319*** 0.00316*** 0.00242*** 0.00267*** 
(0.000679) (0.000817) (0.000672) (0.000835) (0.000654) 
Market access 
0.0692*** 0.0671*** 0.0714*** 0.0510*** 0.0603*** 
(0.0121) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0104) 
Quality of government  
0.0518*** 0.0754*** 0.0662*** 0.0862*** 0.0735*** 
(0.0137) (0.0169) (0.0137) (0.0176) (0.0143) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 
-0.418*** -0.347*** -0.413*** -0.367*** -0.425*** 
(0.0490) (0.0372) (0.0492) (0.0383) (0.0524) 
Constant 
2.621*** 2.611*** 2.748*** 2.282*** 2.499*** 
(0.468) (0.363) (0.439) (0.359) (0.427) 
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 
R-squared 0.728 0.698 0.727 0.702 0.729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The economic performance of these regions is not, on the other hand, 
significantly connected to their industrial compositions or demographic profiles 
(Specifications 1-10). 
 
3.6.4. Comparing Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions 
 
When considered together, the economic performance of Europe’s low-income 
and low-growth regions appears to be influenced less by the intensity of their 
respective innovative efforts and more by five institutionally-, socioeconomically- and 
structurally-related factors. Europe’s lagging regions seem to benefit, first, from being 
physically proximate to other markets and the activities and firms they host. The co-
location of economic actors and activities and, more specifically, the externalities with 
which agglomeration is associated appear to support processes of economic growth 
and change in them as well. The availability of not necessarily highly skilled labour, 
but rather of semi-skilled human capital is also linked to the economic dynamism of 
these regions, as is their capacity to mobilise it. The economic performance of 
Europe’s lagging regions is, finally, mediated by the quality and functioning of their 
institutions; those that are endowed with efficient and effective institutions are 
anticipated to outperform those that are not. 
 
It would, however, be unwise to formulate definitive conclusions about the 
economic performance of, and, more specifically, about the relationship between 
knowledge, innovation and economic performance in, Europe’s lagging regions 
without separating the continent’s low-income regions from their low-growth 
counterparts. 
 
The disaggregation of low-growth and low-income regions affirms that an 
inability to mobilise the knowledge generated by locally hosted R&D activities is 
pervasive. That the economic performances of low-growth and low-income regions 
alike seems to be detached from the scale of the R&D efforts transpiring within them 
is not particularly surprising; it has long been postulated that economically 
disadvantaged regions will be less capable of mobilising the knowledge they generate 
than their more developed, generally more innovative counterparts.  
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The aforementioned finding is, in that respect, consistent with theoretically-
founded expectation. This inability to mobilise local R&D efforts is explicable by any 
number of socioeconomic or institutional influences. It is not unreasonable to propose 
that the intensity, or lack thereof, of R&D investment in the two types of lagging 
regions may be chief among them. The Schumpeterian perspective posits that 
investment in R&D will only deliver benefits, in this case in the form of growth, once 
it exceeds a certain, contextually-contingent ‘threshold’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2001). It 
may be the case, then, that these regions’, and especially the low-income ones’, meagre 
financial commitments to generation of knowledge are impeding the translation of 
their R&D efforts into economic dynamism.  
 
That said, one would be remiss to overlook broader socioeconomic and 
institutional influences. Low-growth and low-income regions are burdened, albeit to 
varying degrees, by less-efficient and less-well-functioning institutions and by 
relatively technologically unsophisticated economic fabrics. Both of these deficiencies 
are anticipated, for reasons outlined in Section 3.2, to serve as impediments to the 
process by which knowledge is translated into dynamism. These, and other, 
socioeconomic and institutional shortcomings appear to be pronounced enough to 
curtail these lagging regions’ respective capacities to mobilise R&D and are 
contributing factors to their inability translate knowledge into economic performance. 
 
While an inability to mobilise local R&D activities and the knowledge they 
yield does seem pervasive, the separation of Europe’s low-income regions from their 
low-growth counterparts reveals that the same cannot be said about their respective 
facilities for the transformation of innovation into economic dynamism. Europe’s low-
income regions, unlike their low-growth neighbours, are able to translate at least some 
of the innovative activity they have managed to cultivate into economic growth. The 
innovative capacities of these regions are, however, relatively weak; they are 
considerably less innovative than both their low-growth counterparts and their more 
developed European neighbours in general. This implies that any facility these regions 
have for the mobilisation of innovative activity goes under-exploited.  
 
The differences between the two types of regions in terms of their respective 
abilities to exploit different types and sources of knowledge and innovation do not stop 
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there. Europe’s low-growth regions, despite suffering from an inability to mobilise the 
innovative efforts they host, display a facility for the productive exploitation of 
knowledge and innovation flows emanating from both their immediate and their more 
geographically distant neighbours. Their low-income counterparts do not. In fact, the 
negative relationships between the economic performance of Europe’s low-income 
regions and their exposure to longer-distance knowledge and innovation spillovers 
suggest that regions in the European ‘core’ may be drawing resources, knowledge and 
innovations away from these lagging territories. Their prospects for future dynamism 
and development may, in that respect, be suffering at the hand of their more developed 
neighbours.  
 
There are two explanations for the differences between low-income and low-
growth regions’ respective facilities for the exploitation of spillovers generated by 
knowledge-intensive and innovative activities transpiring beyond their borders. The 
first is socioeconomically and institutionally-related. Neither low-growth nor low-
income regions offer contextual conditions that are particularly conducive or amenable 
to technologically sophisticated activity, or to its conversion into growth. The severity 
of the deficiencies by which the two types of regions are plagued does, however, vary.  
 
In the case of Europe’s low-income regions, said deficiencies seem to be 
pronounced enough to render these regions all but completely incapable of identifying 
and absorbing interregional spillovers. They may even be hampering their capacity to 
embed and retain locally generated knowledge and innovation. Low-growth regions, 
on the other hand, invest more in R&D and display a greater overall innovative 
capacity. They benefit from levels of institutional efficiency that exceed those of their 
less developed neighbours and from economic fabrics that, while not particularly 
‘innovation prone’, are more mature and technologically sophisticated. Low-growth 
regions even have a marginal edge in the availability of highly skilled human capital. 
None of these advantages are, in and of themselves, quantitatively massive. It would 
appear, however, that together, these slight advantages work synergistically to afford 
Europe’s low-growth regions some measure of ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Griffith et al., 2004) that, at the very least, exceeds that of their low-
income peers. It is, in fact, evidently sufficient to facilitate the translation of 
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knowledge and innovation flows emanating from other regions, and from the more 
geographically distant European core in particular, into economic dynamism.  
 
The second factor relates to the overall innovative capacity – or lack thereof – 
of Europe’s low-growth regions. Levels of R&D expenditure in these regions do 
exceed those of their low-income neighbours. They may even be, as addressed, 
sufficient to facilitate the absorption of knowledge and innovation flows from abroad. 
They are not, however, remotely close to those of the vast majority of their European 
peers. It is therefore not unreasonable to propose that the inadequacy of low-growth 
regions’ innovative efforts – and the lack of technological dynamism to which it has 
contributed – has given rise to a reliance on externally generated knowledge and 
innovation that is, in fact, characteristic of economically peripheral environments 
(Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; 2016; Tödtling et al., 2012; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 
2015). This reliance has likely bred the capacity to mobilise extra-local sources of 
knowledge and innovation that is reflected in the econometric analysis. 
 
Suffice to say, low-income and low-growth regions are marked by different 
facilities for the exploitation of different types and sources of knowledge and 
innovation. The econometric analysis does, however, reveal a key similarity between 
them: both Europe’s low-income regions’ facilities for the mobilisation of locally 
generated knowledge, and their low-growth counterparts’ abilities to exploit extra-
local knowledge and innovation seem to be conditional, at least to a degree, on the 
availability of highly skilled human capital. That is, the coefficient for the patent 
intensity variable in the low-income region regressions is only significant in 
specifications in which tertiary educational attainment is controlled for. Similarly, the 
significance of the coefficients for the spatially-lagged R&D and innovation variables 
is greater in the low-growth regions specifications to which tertiary educational 
attainment is added.  
 
Regional skills endowments are therefore not entirely unrelated to the 
economic dynamism of Europe’s lagging regions, as the insignificance of the tertiary 
educational attainment variable would otherwise suggest. Rather, highly skilled, well-
educated human capital seems to serve as a mediator or facilitator of the process by 
which knowledge and/or innovation is transformed into economic growth.  
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While the aforementioned points of divergence may be the most prominent 
ones revealed by the separation of Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions, the 
differences between them extend to the socioeconomic, structural and institutional 
factors that govern their respective economic performances. 
 
The disaggregation reveals, first, that among Europe’s low-income regions, it 
is those that unlock or are endowed with externalities associated with the 
agglomeration of economic activity; youthful demographic compositions; more 
industrially-biased economic structures; and sound institutions that are anticipated to 
be the most dynamic. The economic performance of Europe’s low-growth regions is 
found to be mediated by a different set of influences. Yes, institutional quality and 
agglomeration externalities are linked to the economic dynamism of low-income and 
low-growth regions alike. There are, however, other factors to which the economic 
performance of the latter is also attributed. Geographically-peripheral low-growth 
regions are, for example, outperformed by those that are less physically isolated and, 
in turn, more favourably positioned to reap the benefits of ready-access and exposure 
to extra-local markets. The dynamism of these regions is very much influenced by the 
depth of their pools of semi-skilled human capital as well. 
 
The panorama that emerges when Europe’s low-income regions are separated 
from their low-growth counterparts is markedly different to that revealed when their 
heterogeneity is overlooked and they are analysed together as ‘lagging regions’. What 
the aggregation of the two types of regions has in fact done is mask, or misrepresent, 
fundamentally important differences between the dynamics of growth in the two 
contexts. Variation in their respective abilities to mobilise different types and sources 
of knowledge and innovation is the most consequential difference washed away by 
their aggregation. That said, the profound importance of semi-skilled human capital to 
the economic performance of Europe’s low-growth regions, and, alternatively, the 
relevance of regional industrial and demographic compositions to the dynamism of its 
low-income ones is lost in aggregation as well. A failure to separate low-income 
regions from their low-growth cousins also leads to the decidedly incorrect inference 
that Europe’s low-income regions garner benefit from access to extra-local markets. 
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Stated simply, the factors, forces and influences that govern processes of 
economic growth and change in Europe’s low-income regions differ tremendously 
from those at play in their low-growth counterparts. Not only do the two types of 
regions display different facilities for the productive exploitation of knowledge and 
innovation, their respective economic performances are influenced in different ways 
by their structural, socioeconomic, and institutional fabrics. The aggregation of low-
income and low-growth regions under the umbrella of ‘lagging regions’ inhibits the 
identification and assessment of this heterogeneity. It is not unreasonable to expect 
that a failure to account for the sorts of differences documented in the preceding 
section could result in the formulation of inaccurate – or at least incomplete – 
inferences about the economic realities in Europe’s lagging regions. This would seem 
sufficient cause, in and of itself, for the separation of low-income and low-growth 
regions for both analytical purposes and for the design of any policies, strategies or 
initiatives that are to be implemented in them. 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
 
This research sought to identify and examine the drivers and determinants of 
the economic performance of a sample of Europe’s most economically disadvantaged 
regions. Its primary focus was on the role for, and importance of, knowledge and 
innovation. A comparative econometric investigation of what the European 
Commission has termed ‘low-income’ and ‘low-growth’ regions was employed to (a) 
determine whether these two types of lagging regions are similarly capable of 
transforming knowledge and innovation into economic growth and dynamism and (b) 
formulate more general inferences relating to the factors that mediate processes of 
economic growth in them.  
 
The empirical analysis revealed, on the one hand, that while knowledge may 
go un-mobilised in Europe’s low-income regions, innovation does not; Europe’s most 
underdeveloped regions are capable of translating locally generated innovation into 
economic growth. The same cannot be said about extra-local knowledge and 
innovation. These regions are unable to realise any benefit from spillovers emanating 
from the innovative activities occurring in neighbouring territories. The analysis also 
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indicated that agglomeration externalities affect their economic performance as do 
their demographic profiles, economic structures and institutions. 
 
Europe’s low-growth regions, on the other hand, while unable to capitalise on 
local innovative efforts, are reasonably adept at mobilising extra-locally generated 
knowledge and innovation. That is, these regions have some facility for the absorption 
and eventual conversion of the knowledge and innovation flows that emanate from 
both their more immediate and their more geographically distant neighbours into 
economic performance. The availability of semi-skilled human capital emerged as a 
factor affecting their dynamism as well. These regions also benefit from agglomeration 
externalities, exposure and access to extra-regional markets, and from efficient, well-
functioning institutions. 
 
Taken together, the empirical analysis provided cause to assert not only that 
the economic performances of Europe’s low-income and low-growth regions, 
respectively, are mediated by very different sets of socioeconomic factors, but also 
that these two types of lagging regions do not display the same facility for the 
translation of different types and sources of knowledge and innovation into economic 
growth.   
 
The policy implications of the preceding analysis are numerous. Most 
generally, it would seem to affirm the necessity of contextually tailored policies in the 
pursuit of economic growth in lagging regions. Policy-makers in low-growth regions, 
for example, would be wise to pursue policies, at least in the short-term, that are 
oriented less towards the upgrading of local innovative efforts and capacities and more 
towards the promotion of extra-local linkages. Fostering extra-local connections with 
a view to exploit these regions’ abilities to mobilise interregional knowledge and 
innovation flows may represent a more efficient way to impel domestic growth than 
attempting to cultivate new knowledge-intensive activities in environments that do not 
seem ex ante especially well-suited to hosting them. 
 
Those tasked with impelling economic growth in low-income environments, 
on the other hand, must be aware that these regions have some facility for the 
mobilisation of knowledge-intensive and innovative activity. They would therefore be 
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wise to channel resources towards the upgrading of regional innovative capacities. 
This statement is, however, accompanied by two caveats. First, simply increasing 
R&D investment will not be sufficient to boost the innovative capacities of Europe’s 
low-income regions – balanced, integrated strategies are required. Second, efforts must 
be made to embed innovative activity to ensure that it, and the more general benefits 
associated with the hosting of technologically sophisticated activities, are not 
appropriated by other regions. 
 
Of course, efforts to catalyse growth must look beyond the role of knowledge 
and innovation; socioeconomic and institutional conditions, characteristics and 
attributes cannot be neglected. Policy-makers must, however, be aware that it will not 
be sufficient to focus on the same set of generic factors in low-income and low-growth 
environments alike. Certain commonalities do exist; there is, for example, scope for 
institutional upgrading in both types of lagging regions. That said, investment in 
human capital, training and skills should feature prominently in the strategic efforts 
pursued in low-growth regions. Relatedly, the importance of industrial compositions, 
and the constraints they could conceivably impose, must be taken into account in the 
design of growth initiatives for Europe’s low-income regions. Similarly, a concerted 
effort should also be made in low-income regions to ensure that their youth populations 
– which are, at present, very much an asset and potential catalyst for growth – are 
provided with sufficient economic opportunity and are not incentivised to emigrate in 
pursuit of opportunity elsewhere. 
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Appendix 1. Low-growth and low-income regions included in the analysis 
 
Low-income regions 
 
Low-growth regions 
BG31: Severozapaden 
 
EL11:  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 
BG32: Severen tsentralen 
 
EL12: Kentriki Makedonia 
BG33: Severoiztochen 
 
EL13: Dytiki Makedonia 
BG34: Yugoiztochen 
 
EL14: Thessalia 
BG42: Yuzhen tsentralen 
 
EL21: Ipeiros 
HU23: Dél-Dunántúl 
 
EL22: Ionia Nisia 
HU31: Észak-Magyarország 
 
EL23: Dytiki Ellada 
HU32: Észak-Alföld 
 
EL24: Sterea Ellada 
HU33: Dél-Alföld 
 
EL25: Peloponnisos 
PL31: Lubelskie 
 
EL43: Kriti 
PL32: Podkarpackie 
 
ES42: Castilla-la Mancha 
PL33: Swietokrzyskie 
 
ES61: Andalucía 
PL34: Podlaskie 
 
ES62: Región de Murcia 
PL62: Warminsko-Mazurskie 
 
ES70: Canarias 
RO11: Nord-Vest 
 
ITF1: Abruzzo 
RO21: Nord-Est 
 
ITF2: Molise 
RO22: Sud-Est 
 
ITF3: Campania 
RO31: Sud-Muntenia 
 
ITF4: Puglia 
RO41: Sud-Vest Oltenia 
 
ITF5: Basilicata 
  
ITF6: Calabria 
  
ITG1: Sicilia 
  
ITG2: Sardegna 
  
PT11: Norte 
  
PT15: Algarve 
  
PT16: Centro 
  
PT18: Alentejo 
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Appendix 2. Variables used in the analysis 
 
Variables   Source 
Economic performance GDP per capita 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
Innovative output 
Patent applications to the European Patent Office, per 
million inhabitants 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
Regional R&D 
Expenditure 
R&D expenditure as % of GDP 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
 
Availability and 
mobilisation of human 
capital 
% of population aged 25-64 with a tertiary education 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
% of population aged 25-64 with upper secondary or 
post-secondary non-tertiary education 
Unemployment rate 
Industrial composition Employment in ‘industry’ as % of employment 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
Agglomeration of 
economic activity 
Population density 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
Demographics % of population aged 15-24 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
Market access Spatially-lagged GDP 
Eurostat, Regional 
statistics by NUTS 
classification database 
Quality of Government Quality of Government Index Charron et al. (2014) 
Note: Missing values for variables were linearly interpolated/extrapolated where appropriate.  
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4. STRATEGIES OF GAIN AND STRATEGIES OF WASTE: WHAT 
DETERMINES THE SUCCESS OF DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION 
 
4.1. Is there a need for territorial development policy in lagging areas? 
 
Much has been made in recent years about interpersonal economic inequality. 
This is not without good reason: levels of interpersonal inequality have increased 
markedly over the course of the last decade. While this interpersonal inequality is, on 
balance, more pronounced in less developed contexts, it is by no means confined to 
them. A number of the world’s most advanced and emerging economies are facing 
levels of interpersonal inequality that are approaching or, in more severe cases, 
actually exceed all-time highs. In the United States, for example, levels of economic 
inequality, as measured by the Gini Coefficient peaked (0.481) in 2016 even though 
considerable progress had been made on both the household income and poverty 
reduction fronts in the same year (Yadoo and Chandra, 2017). The implications of 
pervasive interpersonal inequality are numerous. None, however, is more 
consequential than the adverse effect it can have on economic dynamism and longer-
term prospects for economic growth. Recent econometric analyses commissioned by 
the OECD and the IMF suggest that persistently high and increasing levels of 
interpersonal economic inequality represent a not insignificant barrier to the pursuit of 
economic growth and could, by extension, conceivably undermine the policy actions 
undertaken to drive it (Cingano, 2014; Ostry et al., 2014). 
 
Interpersonal inequality is not, however, the only type of economic inequality 
that matters. Territorial inequality, while less widely and frequently addressed, is 
equally pervasive and, as recent political events would seem to confirm, may be 
associated with equally, if not more, significant consequences. 
 
Economic growth tends not, for a number of generally well understood reasons, 
to transpire at the same rate and with the same intensity across space (World Bank, 
2009). This tendency has produced gulfs between countries’ most economically 
prosperous, often urban, core cities and regions and their lagging, less dynamic ones. 
As in the case of interpersonal inequality, territorial inequality tends to be more
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prevalent in less developed and emerging countries, than in developed ones. This is 
illustrated by Figure 4.1, which depicts levels of territorial inequality in a selection of 
countries. Less developed and emerging countries (in red) exhibit, with few 
exceptions, much higher levels of territorial inequality than their more developed 
counterparts (in blue).  
 
Figure 4.1. Differences in territorial income inequalities, selected countries (Second 
Theil Index) 
 
Authors’ elaboration and calculation. Source: OECD and various national statistical offices; data for 2010 
or the closest year available 
There is, of course, an interpersonal element to territorial inequality. 
Individuals living in core areas, where opportunity (income-generating or otherwise), 
infrastructure and resources (broadly defined) are generally more abundant, tend to 
benefit from merely ‘being there’. The prospects of individuals living in lagging 
regions are, on the other hand, more limited. Some will emigrate to more 
economically prosperous regions, fuelling a brain drain that is associated with 
economic consequences of its own. The livelihoods and wellbeing, however, of those 
that opt not, or are unable to do so will likely be adversely impacted by the lack of 
dynamism and opportunity in the territories where they live. 
  
As is true for interpersonal inequality, territorial imbalances are associated 
with their fair share of ills and implications. One, in particular, has come to the fore of 
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late: sufficiently pronounced and temporally sustained territorial inequalities sow the 
sort of social discontent, tensions and political unrest that can, and, in fact, have fuelled 
the rise of populism and the success of populist movements, leaders and parties 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).  
 
 Populism has long thrived in areas particularly affected by poverty, 
pronounced economic crises and persistent social problems (Roberts, 1995). 
Territorial inequality introduces another variable into this equation. As the gaps 
between ‘have’ and ‘have not’ territories, between areas rife with opportunities and 
those affected by prolonged economic decline, widen, the immediacy and tangibility 
of the social and economic challenges by which lagging and declining regions are 
faced increases for those in them. This, in turn, fosters a sense of neglect and 
disenfranchisement. 
 
 Developing countries, given the pervasiveness of territorial inequalities, are 
most susceptible to ‘inequality-induced populism’. That said, even the most 
economically advanced environments are not immune to it. Now US President, Donald 
Trump, the successful Brexit movement in the UK, France’s Marie Le Pen and her 
nationalist Front National and Germany’s far-right AfD party, among others, have 
drawn support not necessarily from individuals living in economically prosperous, 
core cities and regions – where the poorest of the poor have often in recent times voted 
in line with the economic elites –, but from increasingly frustrated voters in territories 
that have struggled to cope with the pressures associated with globalisation, 
technological change and more general economic progress. This populism, much like 
the proliferation of the inequalities that breed it, is not without economic consequence; 
the social and political uncertainty and instability it gives rise to can, among other 
things, stifle public and private investment, limit personal mobility and migration and 
hamper trade and economic integration, with obvious consequences for productivity, 
employment outcomes, economic dynamism and, ultimately, growth, both in less 
prosperous and declining areas and in the very core areas that have often acted as the 
motors of economies. 
 
All of this begs the question of whether policies are needed to promote growth 
and development in underperforming, lagging areas. The answer, on the basis of the 
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above, would seem to be yes. But, and this is the key caveat, the unidimensional, 
spatially blind and often top-down policies of the past will not be sufficient to affect 
change in lagging or falling-behind regions and reduce the gulf between economically 
core areas and their peripheral counterparts. Policies going forward will need to be 
strongly rooted in theory and in evidence. They will also, however, need to be sensitive 
to conditions in and the uniqueness of different territories and should focus explicitly 
on tapping and realising local potential. Such policies will need to make sure that 
institutional factors and elements are not overlooked in the planning and 
operationalisation of strategic approaches to development and, where necessary, that 
steps are taken to tackle institutional inefficiencies and bottlenecks head-on and within 
the context of the broader strategy.  
 
Policies and strategies that do so can be more efficient than those pursued in 
the past. That they will be is, however, far from a certainty; the risk that a particular 
territorial development intervention evolves into a ‘strategy of waste’ will always 
remain. It is this risk upon which the remainder of the chapter is focused. More 
specifically, the following analysis weighs ‘strategies of waste’ against ‘strategies of 
gain’ to identify and understand they key differences between them with a view to 
ascertain insights into the steps policy-makers can take to maximise the likelihood that 
territorial development policies fulfil their potential and contribute to the reduction of 
territorial disparities in developed and developing contexts alike. 
 
4.1.1. Overview and introduction 
 
Policy-makers in developed, emerging and developing economies have long 
relied on a range of strategic interventions to stimulate economic growth and 
socioeconomic development. The exact strategic approaches that they have turned to 
have been, in their specificities, as heterogeneous as the contexts in which they have 
been pursued. The vast majority of these approaches can, however, be assigned to one 
of four broad categories in accordance with the ‘levers’ they pull to catalyse and 
promote growth. That is, development policies and strategies of late have tended to be 
based on one of the following development axes: (1) infrastructure expansion and 
development; (2) the attraction of inward investment; (3) the promotion of innovation 
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and development of human capital; or (4) the cultivation of agglomeration and 
promotion of physical co-location.  
 
This chapter engages with these four broad policy types with the view to, first, 
assess and comment on the utility of these approaches in different development 
contexts, and, second, provide an indication of what exactly policy-makers should 
prioritise in the design and implementation of these strategic actions. The overarching 
objective is to learn from these policies in order to better understand the steps that need 
be taken to increase the likelihood that development interventions contribute 
substantively to local or regional economic growth and development in what are often 
very heterogeneous contexts across the world. 
 
The lessons drawn from a review of a series of successful and unsuccessful 
development strategies are four-fold. First, development strategies informed not by 
one, but by several complementary development theories, perspectives and schools of 
thought, and, consequently, composed of multiple related and mutually-reinforcing 
actions and interventions across development areas tend to deliver better results. 
Second, strategic approaches for the promotion of economic growth that are solidly 
grounded in robust diagnoses of the advantages, opportunities, challenges and 
weaknesses of a city or region – and are tailored and targeted accordingly – are 
generally more successful. Third, awareness of where exactly a territory is situated on 
the development spectrum is crucial, as its level of development and, more precisely, 
its proximity to infrastructure, human capital and technology frontiers will determine 
whether there are returns to be realised from investment in or attention to these 
development axes. Fourth, and finally, the institutional dimension cannot be left un- 
or even under-addressed in the design and implementation of policy interventions. 
Oftentimes, the environments in which territorial development policies or strategies 
are most direly needed are also those plagued by the greatest institutional deficiencies. 
These shortcomings and inefficiencies manifest themselves in any number of ways 
and can seriously undermine the effectiveness of even the most robustly and carefully 
designed territorial development policies. This does not, however, mean that territorial 
development strategies should not be pursued in institutionally unfavourable 
environments. Rather, an awareness of institutional barriers and deficiencies will 
reinforce the returns of development strategies, making it imperative – anywhere, but 
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all the more in areas with poor institutions – that capacity building efforts, technical 
development exercises and institutional reforms be integrated directly into territorial 
development strategies. This will help ensure that the potential effectiveness of 
development approaches is not compromised by institutional inadequacies.  
 
These four lessons are supplemented later in the chapter with more general 
guidance relating not to where each of the four policy types of interest can, or should, 
be employed, but rather to how territorial approaches to development – irrespective of 
the development axis or axes to which they are oriented – should be designed for 
territories at different points in their development trajectories. We propose that that the 
strategic approaches employed by differentially developed territories should differ in 
terms of their relative complexity – conceptualised as a function of the number and 
diversity of individual interventions by which they are composed – and the breadth of 
their strategic scopes – understood as the narrowness of the development outcomes or 
objectives by which they are guided – in ways that reflect the nature of the most 
immediate development challenges with which the territories are faced. We assert that: 
(i) the most economically disadvantaged of territories should pursue approaches that 
are simple in nature and narrow in strategic scope; (ii) that less economically 
developed territories should opt for simple, but more broadly-oriented strategies; (iii) 
that emerging territories should rely on broad-based approaches that are, on the other 
hand, more complex and integrated in nature; and (iv) more developed areas will need 
to design strategies that are, again, complex but are narrowly and precisely targeted to 
affect change.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a 
brief introduction to the four broad types of development policies, and to the various 
theories of economic growth and development from which they have been derived. 
Section 4.3 reviews a number of the development policies and strategies that have been 
pursued by a mix of developed, emerging and developing countries in an effort to 
identify, on a case-by-case basis, the factors to which the success (Section 4.3.2) or 
failure (Section 4.3.1) of each is most readily attributable. It will consider, among other 
things, how the design of the policy/strategy, its implementation or execution, and the 
socioeconomic and institutional context within which it was pursued mediated or 
shaped its outcomes. Section 4.4 compares the ‘strategies of waste’ to the ‘strategies 
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of gain’ presented in the section that precedes it to derive and provide a series of policy 
implications. Section 4.5 contemplates the nature of the development challenges by 
which different types of territories are faced and proposes a taxonomy of development 
strategies that features four broad categories of interventions each of which is more 
(or less) contextually suitable for territories at different points on the development 
spectrum.  Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Theories of economic growth and development and the evolution of 
development policy 
 
4.2.1. Infrastructure-driven development and the neoclassical growth theory 
 
Few development strategies have been as ubiquitously employed as 
infrastructure-oriented development policies.32 Infrastructure-oriented approaches to 
development find their conceptual underpinning in the hitherto dominant neoclassical 
growth theory (e.g. Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). In a neoclassical framework, economic growth is understood to 
be governed by the relative availability of different factors of production: technology, 
physical capital, and labour. However, technology and labour are considered 
exogenous factors, meaning that growth is fundamentally achieved by increasing 
physical capital, often proxied by infrastructure. Infrastructure is conceptualised either 
as a factor of production itself (i.e. as ‘public capital’) or an influence on the 
productivity of other factors of production (e.g. Romp and de Haan, 2007). Investing 
in and increasing a region’s stock of infrastructure is therefore thought to impel 
economic growth directly (i.e. as an input to processes of economic growth) or 
indirectly, by facilitating the more efficient exploitation of other factors of production 
via the reduction of transaction and other costs (Servén, 2010:1).33 
 
                                               
32 Dillinger (2007:29), for example, refers to infrastructure-led initiatives as “time-honoured [approaches] to 
regional development”. Similarly, Barca et al. (2012:137) assert that “development policies have until now 
generally remained instruments for the provision of infrastructure – roads, railways, sanitation, water and the like 
– and state aid”.  
 
33 See Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) or Straub (2007) for a more nuanced and developed discussion. 
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Guided by the perception that a sufficiently developed network of physical – 
transportation, power, telecommunications, among other types – infrastructure is a 
prerequisite for development (e.g. Calderón and Servén, 2004) and by the expectation 
that infrastructure impinges on factor mobility and productivity, policy-makers have 
resorted to devising and implementing strategies that rely on the provision and 
upgrading of various types of physical infrastructure in the pursuit of economic 
growth. 
 
4.2.2. Inward investment strategies and growth pole theory  
 
A second category of development strategies includes the inward investment-
oriented strategies borne out of the ‘growth pole theories’ most readily associated with 
the work of Perroux (1950; 1955) and Hirschman (1958). 34 Both Perroux and 
Hirschman observed that economic growth is not evenly distributed across space and 
that it occurs in and, in turn, diffuses out from a relatively small number of locations 
– ‘growth poles’. This observation has led policy-makers to believe that the 
channelling of resources to existing or newly established agglomerations of economic 
actors may be the most efficient way to promote economic growth and development 
in lagging regions. Growth pole-type approaches entail targeting the specific areas – 
within a broader, oftentimes lagging territory –  that are endowed with the greatest 
economic potential and whose individual success could and, in time, would yield more 
geographically widespread benefits (Parr, 1999). Working off of the assumption that 
the dynamism of these so-called ‘poles’ or ‘points’ tends to be most readily attributable 
to the hosting of a leading or ‘propulsive’ (Perroux, 1955) industry or set of industries, 
inward investment and growth pole policies have been active in pursuing the attraction 
of large, often more productive and technologically advanced firms (and by extension 
the industries to which they belong) to less developed regions with a view to lay the 
foundation for the emergence of a growth pole capable of catalysing and supporting 
region-wide economic success and dynamism (Parr, 1999).  
 
Special economic zones, industrial parks and science and technology parks are 
perhaps the most notable of the more specific interventions that fall under the umbrella 
                                               
34 See Parr (1999) for a comprehensive review of the origins and development of growth pole-type strategies. 
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of ‘inward investment-oriented strategies’. At the heart of any inward investment-
oriented initiative, however, irrespective of the guise in which it exists, is the 
expectation that large, especially dynamic firms operating in ‘propulsive’, high-
potential industries can be catalysts for development and, moreover, that the attraction 
of one or more of these firms to a lagging region, via the provision of fiscal and other 
incentives, will be sufficient to reverse its economic fortunes and ignite self-
reinforcing processes of economic growth. 
 
4.2.3. Human capital, knowledge, innovation and the endogenous growth theory 
 
 The development of the endogenous growth theory gave rise to a set of policies 
and strategies that are markedly different from the infrastructure and inward 
investment-oriented approaches that preceded them (e.g. Romer, 1986; 1990; Lucas, 
1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). The endogenous 
growth theory, by endogenising technology and human capital, brought human 
resources, education and skills (Lucas, 1988) and knowledge, technological change 
and innovation (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 
1994) to the fore in development thinking. Policy-makers, following suit, became 
increasingly concerned with the promotion of innovation and the provision of 
education and training with the expectation that knowledge-intensive, innovative 
activities and an able labour force could function as catalysts for economic growth and 
facilitate the reversal of lagging territories’ economic fortunes.  
 
 Within this framework, efforts involving the setting of regional R&D 
expenditure targets and other initiatives geared towards increasing public and private 
R&D investment to stimulate the generation of knowledge have been favoured 
strategic approaches for the promotion of innovation (World Bank, 2010). More 
holistic, systems-of-innovation-type policies that match more traditional policy 
instruments with a focus on the encouragement of interactions, cooperation and 
collaboration between economic actors to achieve these ends have also become 
increasingly common in recent years (e.g. Tödtling and Trippl, 2005; World Bank, 
2010; OECD, 2012). Similarly, policy-makers have relied mainly on general 
investment in all levels of education, and on a range of more narrowly targeted skills-
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development initiatives, vocational schemes, lifelong-learning initiatives, and other 
training programmes to promote human capital development (e.g. OECD, 2015). 
 
4.2.4. Cluster-based intervention and new economic geography and urban 
economics 
 
 The final type of policy intervention considered here emerged from several 
theoretical perspectives that explore and, in turn, underscore the importance of the co-
location of economic actors and activities for innovation, productivity and, ultimately, 
economic growth: cluster theory, new economic geography and urban economics. 
Despite considerable differences between the three strands, a central premise of all of 
them is that the agglomeration of economic activities – and, consequently, a high 
density of economic actors in any particular place – gives rise to a host of productivity-
enhancing externalities from which co-located actors benefit (e.g. Porter, 1990; 
Krugman 1991; Fujita et al., 2000; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Duranton and Puga, 2004; 
Storper and Venables, 2004; Glaeser, 2010). Co-location is understood as a facilitator 
of interactions, cooperation and collaborations between physically-proximate 
economic actors. It enables, inter alia, the sharing of resources, the establishment of 
efficient input-output linkages, and the realization of economies of scale and scope. 
Co-location also supports the transfer and exchange of knowledge, information and 
ideas within (i.e. Marshall-Arrow-Romer spillovers) and between (i.e. Jacobian 
spillovers) sectors and industries – and, by extension, the economic actors that 
compose them – that is thought to foster and support the innovation and technological 
progress that, in turn, spur growth. 
 
Development policies following these strands have tended to either pay 
particular attention to the generation and/or consolidation of different types of clusters 
– including related types of interventions such as science and technology parks, 
innovation parks/hubs, industrial parks/clusters and the like – or have sought to 
promote the more dynamic urban centres within specific countries, which often 
coincide with larger and more dense agglomerations. Cluster-based and new economic 
geography and urban economics-related policies assume any number of forms. They 
do tend, however, to involve, in different guises, the development of infrastructure, the 
provision of incentives to encourage and facilitate the co-location of economic activity 
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and actions to promote intra-cluster interactions and the emergence of networks. 
Different types of cluster-based policies and the promotion of agglomeration, more 
generally, have become popular with policy-makers as viable ways to spur economic 
growth and development (e.g. Melachroinos and Spence, 2001; Martin and Sunley, 
2003).35 
 
4.3. Comparing ‘strategies of waste’ and ‘strategies of gain’ 
 
Development strategies the world over, and in developing and emerging 
countries in particular, are frequently the children of different economic growth and 
development theories. Normally one of the aforementioned strands informs and 
structures the development intervention, leading to policies that put the emphasis, 
depending on the dominant strand, on infrastructure building, growth poles, skills and 
innovation, or clusters and agglomeration. However, most development interventions 
remain firmly embedded in one approach and rarely combine elements from different 
theories, or, in the rare instances when they do so, subjugate other types of intervention 
to the main development axis promoted by the chosen theory. The resultant policies 
and interventions tend to feature an overt, unsustainable focus on or prioritisation of 
one development axis over all others. 
 
In this section, we will use specific examples to explore these policies at work. 
We will underscore how an excessive focus on one development axis often results, 
depending on local conditions, in development interventions that leave the treated 
territory, in the medium- to long-term, in a similar or worse condition than before the 
intervention, despite sometimes having short-term positive effects. These are referred 
to as ‘strategies of waste’. We will also argue that, by contrast, interventions that 
combine different development strands and are tailored to the characteristics and needs 
of the territory in which they are to be pursued are more likely to yield economic 
outcomes that are, in in the medium- to long-term, more significant and sustainable. 
These are what we call ‘strategies of gain'. 
                                               
35 Martin and Sunley (2003:23), for example, assert that “few other ideas can begin to rival the current popularity 
of the clusters notion amongst economic practitioners and national and regional policy communities”. Similarly, 
Melachroinos and Spence (2001:1701), observe that “conventional wisdom is that [the reduction of technological 
and, in turn, productivity inequalities] is best promulgated via networks and clusters focusing on small and medium-
sized enterprises promoting the use and practical implementation of new technology”. 
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4.3.1. Strategies of waste 
 
The growth and development policies and strategies highlighted in Section 4.2 
have been implemented in a diversity of contexts. Some have found success and served 
as catalysts for meaningful economic growth and development. Many others, however, 
have not. These are referred to as ‘strategies of waste’. Stated simply, strategies of 
waste are, for the purposes of this chapter, development approaches that achieved little 
in the way of economic development and, ultimately, amounted to not much more than 
a waste of scarce resources.  Strategies of waste, as the subsections that follow confirm, 
exist in any number of forms and are by no means confined to one particular theoretical 
approach, geography, or context. 
 
The limited returns to transportation infrastructure investment in the European Union 
 
The sorts of infrastructure-oriented development strategies that emerged from 
neoclassical theories of economic growth and development have been pursued with 
particular vigour in developed and developing countries alike. Few policy-making 
bodies, however, have displayed a greater, more sustained commitment to, and belief 
in, infrastructure investment as a means to impel economic growth and development 
than the European Union.  
 
Adhering to the notion that “efficient and sustainable transport services and 
infrastructure are vital to exploiting the strengths of all EU regions and supporting the 
internal market thereby facilitating economic and social cohesion” (European 
Commission, 2014:3), authorities have prioritised investment in infrastructure and 
have channelled significant amounts of resources towards a wide array of intra- and 
inter-regional transportation infrastructure-oriented projects. In the 2014-2020 funding 
period alone, the European Regional Development Fund and the European Union 
Cohesion fund are set to spend €71.5bn on “a range of investment priorities to promote 
sustainable transport and remove bottlenecks in key network infrastructures”.36 
Another €24.05bn will be spent on a series of projects to develop and expand the 
                                               
36 Network infrastructure in transport and energy: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/themes/7 
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continent’s inter-regional transportation infrastructure network via the Connecting 
Europe Facility, a funding vehicle that operates principally at the European level.37 
 
Increases, especially of this magnitude, in transportation infrastructure 
expenditure should according to the neoclassical growth theory augment regional 
capital-to-labour ratios and lead to proportional improvements in productivity that are 
anticipated to drive economic growth and enhance economic dynamism.  
 
Such predictions do not, however, seem to have to come to fruition (e.g. 
Cappelen et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012). Considerable investment in transport infrastructure in the less developed 
regions of the European Union is yet to yield its expected results. In a cross-regional 
macroeconomic investigation into the relationship between regional economic 
performance and regional transportation infrastructure endowments, Crescenzi and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2012) find little evidence of a significant link between regional 
infrastructure endowments and economic performance (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012:489), suggesting that the European Union’s infrastructure-centric approach 
to development may be more akin to a strategy of waste than to one of significant gain. 
This, coupled with evidence of significant relationships between economic dynamism 
and host of other socioeconomic factors and influences, has raised doubts about the 
sensibility of the European Union’s singular concern for transportation infrastructure. 
Some voices have even advocated for a revaluation of the privileged position that has 
traditionally been assigned to infrastructure expansion in the European Union’s 
strategic efforts to promote economic growth and cohesion (e.g. Crescenzi and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). 
 
There are a multitude of factors to which the limited returns to infrastructure 
spending in the European Union may be attributed. Chief among them, however, is 
likely that infrastructure investment is subject to diminishing returns and moreover 
that there is a ‘threshold’ – evidently exceeded by the European Union – beyond which 
investment in infrastructure is unlikely to yield much in the way of economic 
development (e.g. Canning and Pedroni, 2004; de la Fuente, 2010; Crescenzi and 
                                               
37 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Transport: https://ec.europa.eu/inea/connecting-europe-facility/cef-transport 
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Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). While well-targeted expenditure that alleviates bottlenecks or 
addresses specific inadequacies can generate economic returns – even in environments 
with well-developed infrastructure endowments –, once a territory’s most fundamental 
infrastructure needs are met, as is the case in the majority of the regions of the 
European Union (less developed areas included) indiscriminate expenditure on the 
expansion of its infrastructure network is more likely to result in duplications and 
redundancies than in increases in productivity and economic dynamism.  
 
Relatively poor institutional quality, especially in many of the European 
Union’s less developed regions, is also to blame for the limited returns to 
transportation infrastructure expenditure (Crescenzi et al., 2016). Self-interested 
politicians and decision-makers operating in weaker institutional contexts may 
respond to perverse incentives and elect to channel resources towards projects that 
might give way to immediate private or electoral returns but are ultimately not 
sustainable nor likely to produce lasting benefits in the medium- or longer-term. Many 
of the ‘white elephant’ projects that are scattered across the European Union are, in 
part, attributable to this phenomenon (Crescenzi et al. 2016:559).  
 
The Ciudad Real Airport in Spain is a prototypical example of a ‘white 
elephant’. The airport, which opened in 2008, was supposed to provide a much-needed 
boost to the local economy in the form of 6,000 direct jobs.38 Built at a cost in excess 
of €1bn, the airport, however, sat largely idle until 2012 when bankruptcy forced its 
closure.39 The Toledo-Albacete-Cuenca high-speed rail connection represents a 
similarly misguided expenditure of resources on infrastructure development. The 
establishment of a high-speed rail line linking the Spanish cities of Toledo, Albacete 
and Cuenca – with a combined population of 310,000 – managed to reduce travel times 
between Toledo and Albacete from two hours and 28 minutes to two hours and five 
minutes and was seen as way to increase the connectedness and, in turn, the economic 
dynamism of the three provincial capitals. The line opened in December of 2010, but 
concerns about its financial sustainability led to its closure just seven months later, in 
                                               
38 The white elephants that dragged Spain into the red: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18855961 
  
39 Spain’s Ciudad Airport sold at auction for €10,000: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33578949 
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July 2011. The reason: the service was used by an average of nine people per day but 
cost €18,000 a day to operate.40  
  
These two cases, and other similar ‘white elephants’ exemplify both the notion 
of limited returns to infrastructure spending beyond a certain minimum threshold – 
particularly in weak institutional conditions – and the dangers associated with pursuing 
projects with little more than their most immediate impact in mind. Neither project 
addressed or targeted a particular bottleneck nor debilitating infrastructure shortage; if 
anything, they provided duplications of pre-existing and not congested services.41 It is 
difficult, for example, to comprehend why a provincial capital with a population, at 
the time, of 75,000 would need an airport with a four-kilometre runway and the 
capacity to host 10 million passengers a year, especially when Madrid’s Barajas 
International Airport was less than 190 kilometres away. Similarly, a time saving of 
23 minutes on a route that was ultimately used by less than 10 passengers per day does 
not seem overly consequential. Neither project was sufficiently informed or guided by 
even the most basic background research that could have, in theory, justified their 
existence, meaning that a substantive contribution to economic growth and 
development was just a pipedream. The projects were justified by little more than the 
short-term electoral gains they could have conceivably generated. They may have even 
represented efforts to reap the fruits of corruption (Crescenzi et al., 2016). 
 
Inward investment strategies in the emerging world: Special economic zones in Peru42 
 
The perception that the formation of a single, especially dynamic 
agglomeration of economic actors and activity – a ‘growth pole’ – is sufficient to 
trigger economic growth and development across the entirety of even the most 
underdeveloped regions has led to the proliferation of a variety of inward investment-
oriented strategies across the developing and emerging world (e.g. World Bank, 2008; 
2016a; Rodríguez-Pose and Hardy, 2014). The track record of these inward 
                                               
40 Spain cuts high speed ‘ghost train: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/8603392/Spain-
cuts-high-speed-ghost-train.html 
 
41 Albalate et al. (2015) provide a detailed discussion of the oversupply of infrastructure in the Spanish context. 
 
42 The proceeding discussion is based on a World Bank (2016b) review of Peru’s experience with special economic 
zones.  
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investment-oriented approaches – most of which have assumed the form of special 
economic zones or industrial zones or parks – has, however, been mixed (Farole and 
Akini, 2011:4). Recent empirical investigation has, in fact, provided a clear indication 
that many of the special economic zones that have been established in emerging 
contexts have failed as catalysts for more widespread economic growth and 
development (World Bank, 2016a). This has, in turn, bred concerns about the general 
effectiveness of the special economic zone programmes that have been pursued with 
particular enthusiasm across the developing and emerging world and, in turn, about 
the sensibility of the continued pursuit of investment-oriented strategies in such 
environments (World Bank, 2016a). 
 
Peru is but one of the many countries that have attempted to establish ‘growth 
poles’ in its less developed areas in hopes that their expected dynamism and success 
would eventually spread to other lagging territories in the country. Peru’s engagement 
with special economic zones is a reasonably long, but unfortunately not particularly 
successful one. The passing of Law 28519 in 1996 led to the establishment of three 
special economic zones in the cities of Ilo, Matarani and Tacna, respectively. 
Envisioned by authorities as vehicles for the promotion of export-led growth and 
economic competitiveness and as “economic growth poles in their host communities” 
(World Bank, 2016b:23), four more zones have since been proposed and ‘designated’. 
Of the country’s seven designated zones, however, only four are operational, and 
moreover, only one of these can lay any claim to have been mildly successful in 
achieving its economic development goals (Figure 4.2). Paita CETICOS, which is the 
largest (940ha) and also, because of its proximity to a port, the most favourably 
geographically situated zone in Peru, is considered by Peruvian authorities “to be the 
most successful of the country’s zones from an economic standpoint” (World Bank, 
2016b:36). The zone has led to the creation of 1,200 jobs and has supported an increase 
in trade and exporting, much of which is attributable to SMEs. The development 
impacts of the other three zones range from modest (Tacna Free Zone) to virtually 
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non-existent. (Matarani CETICOS and Ilo CETICOS).43 Why have the outcomes of 
and returns to the Peruvian zone programme fallen so far short of expectation? While 
each of the country’s zones have suffered from contextually unique challenges and 
obstacles, the underperformance of the programme as a whole is attributed to a number 
of factors, shortcomings and inefficiencies that fall into one of three broadly-defined 
categories: (1) planning failures; (2) institutional failures or (3) failures in execution.  
 
The planning failures were twofold. First, it was concluded that the country’s 
zones were established in the ‘wrong areas’. That is, because the zones were conceived 
and envisioned as catalysts for regional economic development, they were established 
– without sufficient concern for ex ante local conditions, characteristics and attributes 
– in lagging regions. This “ad hoc” (World Bank, 2016b:45) selection process led to 
the establishment of zones in less economically dynamic territories with 
underdeveloped socioeconomic fabrics. This inhibited their capacity to (i) attract and 
sustain economic activity and to (ii) capitalise on that activity and push region-wide 
socioeconomic development. Moreover, because the programme focused exclusively 
on lagging regions and relied on a wholly inadequate selection process, zones were 
not established in “more promising” intermediate or even more economically 
advanced areas where the development impacts of a zone might have been greater 
(World Bank, 2016b:43).  
 
Second, insufficient attention was paid to the “country’s comparative 
advantages, strategic opportunities and development opportunities” (World Bank, 
2016b:11) when establishing the zones’ sectoral foci. This resulted in mismatches 
between the activities that were actually prioritised by authorities and the endowments, 
advantages, and opportunities by which the zones, and the regions in which they are 
situated, are characterised. Overall, there was a general failure to pursue “the most 
                                               
43 The development impacts of Tacna Free Zone, which is situated near the Chilean border in the southern part of 
the country, have been more on the more modest end of the spectrum. There is evidence to suggest that the zone 
has provided a boost to the tourism and hospitality sectors in Tacna (World Bank, 2016b:33). The zone has, 
however, suffered from a number of logistical, institutional, infrastructural and other challenges. Moreover, the 
zone remains domestically-oriented and has not served as a facilitator of trade and export-growth nor has it served 
as a particularly powerful engine for employment creation. The development impacts of the Matarani CETICOS 
have been even more underwhelming. The World Bank (2016b:39) maintains that “with its limited number of 
investors and a lack of focus on the real potential investment opportunities, it cannot be said that the [Matarani 
CETICOS] has truly had any significant impact on the development of its host region”. 
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promising economic activities” (World Bank, 2016b:48) that could have perhaps 
offered greater development potential. 
 
The programme’s 
institutional failings are also 
twofold. First, Peru’s special 
economic zone programme is 
composed of two discrete, but 
markedly similar, legal ‘regimes’ 
(stemming from two separate 
laws that were passed to facilitate 
the development of the country’s 
special economic zone strategy). 
The CETICOS zones exist under 
the first regime. The second 
regime is associated exclusively 
with the Tacna Free Zone. The 
consequences of this are 
numerous. Firms, investors and 
other economic actors may be 
deterred by the unnecessarily high 
degrees of administrative and bureaucratic complexity that stem from the need to 
understand and navigate the two regimes (World Bank, 2016b:49). The co-existence 
and consequent need to monitor and enforce what are “from a legal and administrative 
perspective [similar regimes]” (World Bank, 2016b:50) also likely results in an 
inefficient deployment of scarce financial and human resources. 
 
Second, responsibility for the regulation of the zones is shared, almost 
exclusively, across several subnational authorities; “[little] regulatory authority is 
exercised at the national level” (World Bank, 2016:53). This highly fragmented 
regulatory framework not only compromises the cohesion and effectiveness of the 
overall regulatory and governance regime, it can also increase the compliance costs 
incurred by firms. Fragmented frameworks like these tend to be prone to inefficiencies, 
duplications and forgone synergies as well. 
Figure 4.2. Special economic zones sites in Peru  
Authors' elaboration 
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The failures that fall into the final category relate to the way in which the 
programme has been pursued and operationalised. The private sector, for one, has been 
insufficiently engaged in the programme as a whole. The underperformance of the 
zones, and the related infrastructural deficiencies by which they are plagued, are 
attributable, at least in part, to the development, management and operation of these 
zones almost exclusively by public sector bodies. These bodies tend to be less efficient 
and experienced than, and often lack the same incentives as, their private sector 
counterparts.44 Infrastructural shortages here are a sign of public sector failure and are 
viewed as a “significant constraint to [the] growth”, dynamism and overall 
performance of the zones (World Bank, 2016b:68).  
 
Additionally, insufficient attention has been paid to ensuring that stocks of 
skilled labour were and are sufficiently developed so as to meet the needs of the zones 
and the firms that occupy them; the shortages of skilled human capital by which Peru 
is characterised act as yet another deterrent to productive activity and investment 
(World Bank, 2016b:72).  
 
Finally, it appears that the financial instruments and tools that authorities 
elected to employ and the measures they rely on to incentivise firms, while generous 
(i.e. income and other tax exemptions), have not necessarily mitigated the specific 
issues that deter investment or hamper firm (and, by extension, zone) performance 
(World Bank, 2016b). Simply stated, there was and is an insufficient degree of 
coherence between the issues that need to be addressed and the tools that policy-
makers employ to do so. 
 
R&D-oriented innovation policy in the European Union 
 
Knowledge, technological development and innovation are, according to the 
endogenous growth theory, preeminent drivers of economic growth and dynamism. 
Promoting innovative activity is increasingly perceived as a way to lay the foundations 
                                               
44 A related consequence of the failure to engage the private sector in the operation of the zones themselves has 
been that that public bodies assume responsibility not only for their management and operation, but also for their 
regulation and oversight. This has resulted in: (i) authorities being overburdened by tasks that in some cases they 
did not/do not have the competencies to perform and (ii) considerable scope for conflicts of interest arising from a 
failure to separate responsibility for operation from that for regulation (World Bank, 2016b:58). 
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for the increases in productivity that are effectively prerequisite to economic growth, 
especially in more advanced economies. The shoring up of the innovative capacities 
of European regions, and of those of the continent’s lagging areas in particular, has, 
accordingly, long been one of the European Union’s chief priorities. 
 
The most concerted effort made thus far by the European Union in this 
direction has involved the establishment and pursuit of R&D expenditure targets 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017a). Shortly after the release of the Lisbon Strategy 
(2000-2010), which detailed how the European Union would evolve into “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (European 
Commission, 2010:21), an ‘action plan’ was released in which it was established that 
all member states would aim to increase levels of R&D investment to 3% of GDP by 
201045 – a target that has since been readopted in the European Union’s Europe 2020 
economic growth and development plan. There is little question that the establishment 
of this target has given way to greater expenditure on R&D activities across the 
European Union. That said, there is still considerable progress to be made if the 3% 
target is to be achieved.46 
 
R&D-oriented innovation and growth strategies, the European Union’s 
included, are the direct by-product of more traditional, linear conceptualisations of the 
innovative process (e.g. Maclaurin, 1953; Grilliches, 1979) in which innovation is 
understood as a direct consequence of investment in, and the generation of, new 
knowledge. Socioeconomic and institutional factors tend not to feature in these ‘linear 
models of innovation’, which simply predict that greater R&D investment will result 
in increases in innovative output irrespective of where, and under what conditions the 
process transpires. A neglect of, and a related failure to integrate complementary 
strategic interventions to address contextual conditions, features and characteristics, is 
an important reason why policy approaches inspired and guided singularly by linear 
conceptualisations of innovation have often, and continue to fail to stimulate 
                                               
45 The 3% objective: brief history. Investing in European Research – Towards 3% of GDP. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/action/history_en.htm 
 
46 Average R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP for European Union Member States in 2015 was 1.65%. 
European Aggregate R&D expenditure as a percentage of Europe’s Aggregate GDP was 2.03% in the same year 
(Eurostat Statistics on Research and Development, obtained on March 7, 2017). 
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innovation and innovative-driven economic performance in ‘innovation averse’ 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 1999), economically disadvantaged territories. 
 
Figure 4.3. R&D expenditure in the European Union 
 
Authors’ elaboration 
Europe’s lagging regions display, on balance, a relatively weak facility for the 
translation of R&D expenditure and knowledge into innovation and economic 
performance (e.g. Oughton et al., 2002; Sterlacchini, 2008; Aristonvik, 2012; Charlot 
et al., 2012). Moreover, recent quantitative analysis has indicated that the recent 
increases in the R&D effort of Europe’s less developed areas have not delivered the 
expected returns (Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017a). The Lisbon Strategy-inspired 
increases in R&D expenditure have been associated with a modest increase in the 
generation of innovative output, though closer examination reveals that this positive 
correlation is driven entirely by the private sector’s knowledge generating efforts. In 
many of Europe’s less developed regions, innovative capacities are all but completely 
detached from the public R&D expenditure that constitutes a large share of their total 
R&D commitments. The concerted R&D efforts of Europe’s lagging regions have not 
necessarily been linked to improvements in regional economic performance or 
decreases in unemployment.  
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The exact factors to which the underperformance of this unidimensional policy 
approach is attributed are numerous. Many, if not all, however, relate to the fact that 
R&D expenditure has been prioritised indiscriminately across the entirety of the 
European Union with little if any, consideration for the way in which the 
characteristics, attributes and conditions of its heterogeneous regions might affect their 
capacity to mobilise and productively exploit it (Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017a).  
 
A neglect of the aforementioned characteristics, attributes and conditions 
represents a failure to consider the very factors that are understood to condition a 
region’s capacity to absorb, mobilise and ultimately exploit R&D expenditure and 
knowledge. That is, empirical analyses of the European context have revealed that the 
process by which knowledge is transformed into economic performance is strongly 
mediated by the socioeconomic and institutional characteristics of the region in which 
it takes place (e.g. Bilbao-Osorio and Rodríguez-Pose, 2004; Crescenzi, 2005; Charlot 
et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). A key implication of this is that 
any weaknesses in a region’s socioeconomic or institutional fabric are anticipated to 
erode its capacity to capitalise on R&D investment or activity. Such weaknesses have 
adversely affected the capacity of many of Europe’s lagging regions to efficiently 
mobilise pre-crisis increases in R&D investment and activity and translate the 
knowledge they were anticipated to generate into innovation and, in turn, into 
economic dynamism and development.  
 
In short, the overall ineffectiveness of the recent R&D drive is a function of 
the insufficient attention paid by policy-makers to other factors that condition the 
relationships between knowledge and innovation and, relatedly, innovation and 
economic performance. 
 
Supply-side approaches for human capital development: Learning from the Filipino 
experience 
 
The human capital development initiatives and strategies pursued by 
developing and emerging countries, especially in the latter part of the 20th century, 
displayed a marked focus on the provision and supply of skills and training (e.g. di 
Gropello, 2006; ELLA, 2013; Phan and Coxhead, 2014). Actions in this direction were 
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viewed, in accordance with the prevailing endogenous theories of economic growth 
(e.g. Lucas, 1988), as viable ways to increase the skills and capabilities, and, in turn, 
the productivity of individuals and the regions in which they lived. There was, 
however, an equally ubiquitous tendency to disregard the way and extent to which 
educated and/or skilled persons would be absorbed by the labour market. Herein lies 
the problem. Skilled individuals contribute to economic growth via their engagement 
in productive activity. The absence of a concerted effort to ensure opportunity existed 
for them to do so is what would ultimately prove to be the undoing of these 
insufficiently integrated, unidimensional supply-oriented policies. The Filipino 
experience is, in that respect, a cautionary tale; it exemplifies the dangers associated 
with, and the challenges that can arise from, ill-conceived and insufficiently integrated 
supply-side human capital development strategies (Phan and Coxhead, 2014). 
 
As of 2010, the Philippines had 470 nursing training programmes (Dimaya et 
al., 2012:4) that, in 2006, were already producing an average of 20,000 nurses a year 
(Lorenzo et al., 2007:1409). A robust training system, like the one described, should 
have been sufficient to address the healthcare needs of the large Filipino population. 
However, despite having trained a large number of nurses over a considerable amount 
of time, the Philippines still suffers from pronounced shortages of nurses that are 
attributable to the large scale, almost systematic emigration of Filipino-trained nurses 
who struggle to find opportunity at home. 
 
This ‘brain-drain’ phenomenon, which dates back to the early 1970s (Alburo 
and Abella, 2002), is by no means confined the healthcare sector; it affects a diversity 
of sectors and industries and has transformed the Philippines into one the world’s 
“leading labour exporting [countries]” (Dimaya et al., 2012). In the case of nurses,47 
brain-drain-induced shortages contributed to the complete closure of 200 hospitals and 
the partial closure of 800 more between 2003 and 2005 alone (Lorenzo et al., 
2007:1414). They have been linked to the marked increases in patient-to-nurse ratios 
that have been observed in recent years as well (Lorenzo et al., 2007). The emigration 
of more experienced and qualified nurses also offers part of the explanation for why 
                                               
47 Lorenzo et al. (2007:1408), for example, note that nurses [constitute] the largest group of professional workers 
abroad”. Similarly, Finch (2013:E557) highlights that “between 2004 and 2010, nearly 72,000 nurses were newly 
employed or rehired abroad”. 
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higher numbers of nursing positions have been filled by younger, less-experienced 
nurses (Dimaya, 2012:4).   
 
Qualitative research has revealed that the brain-drain is driven by a host of 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that motivate Filipino nurses to actively seek employment 
opportunities abroad. Many of these factors, however, relate to, or stem from, an 
undersupply of employment opportunities of a quality that is comparable to those 
available to Filipino-trained nurses elsewhere in the world.48 The brain-drain is, in 
effect, a demand-driven, or at least demand-related, problem (e.g. Phan and Coxhead, 
2014).  
 
Nurse shortages in the Philippines are attributable not to an unavailability of 
training or, relatedly, an inability on the behalf of the country’s education and training 
system to meet the demands of the healthcare sector, but rather to adverse demand-
side conditions. The failure by successive Filipino governments and the private sector 
alike to address the lack of local opportunity has driven Filipino-trained nurses to 
pursue better paid, higher quality employment opportunities elsewhere, giving rise to 
a situation where any benefits that could have conceivably arisen from a what would 
seem a reasonably mature and well-developed education system are essentially 
forgone.  
 
Science and technology parks in Greece: Clustering for the cultivation of innovation49 
 
 Regions the world over have, often hoping to cultivate the next Silicon Valley, 
Bangalore or Hsinchu, turned to cluster-based development policies and strategies. 
Few, however, have managed to do so. Instances of failure are more ubiquitous than 
the success stories that seem the ‘exception to the norm’ (Lerner, 2009; Gaisford et al., 
2010).  
                                               
48 The ‘push’ factors identified by Lorenzo et al. (2007:1412) include: “low [salaries] at home, no overtime or 
hazard pay, poor health insurance coverage; work overload or stressful working [environments], slow promotion, 
limited opportunities for employment [and] decreased health budget”. The ‘pull’ factors highlighted include: 
“higher income, better benefits and compensation packages [abroad]; lower nurse to patient ratios, more options in 
working hours, [and] chances to upgrade nursing skills” (Lorenzo et al., 2007:1412). Dimaya et al. (2012:3) identify 
a similar set of factors; they also note that an abundance of “job vacancies [abroad] due to local shortages” and a 
consequent greater ease finding gainful employment often entice them to emigrate. 
 
49 This section draws on the work of Tsamis (2009). 
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Greece is among the many countries whose cluster policies, initiatives and 
efforts have yielded outcomes that have fallen short of expectation. Cluster-based 
development initiatives in the Greek context have, in recent years, assumed the form, 
as they have in countless other contexts, of science and technology parks (e.g. 
Rodríguez-Pose and Hardy, 2014). Strategic actions in this direction represent 
concerted efforts to fabricate environments that support and facilitate the sort of 
interactions, collaborations and relationships that underpin knowledge-intensive, 
innovative processes. The eventual dissemination of the ideas, knowledge and 
innovations generated by these processes to actors both within and outside of the park 
is anticipated to contribute to the upgrading of the innovative system as a whole and, 
in turn, foster local economic dynamism.  
 
Paradoxically, identifying and analysing cluster policy failures has proven 
difficult; Gaisford et al. (2010:317) note that “researchers appear to have been more 
interested in pursuing insights from successful clusters rather than chronicling failures 
[and] communities with unsuccessful clusters are hardly likely to publicise the fact 
because of the damage it may do to their future development prospects.” Tsamis’ 
(2009) exploration of the evolution of two Greek science and technology parks – 
Thessaloniki Technology Park (TTP) and the Science and Technology Park of Crete 
(STEP-C) – and of the factors behind their limited success relative to expectations 
represents one of the few exceptions to this trend. 
  
The establishment of TTP and STEP-C were motivated by similar sets of 
objectives. Both parks sought to: promote the emergence and growth of innovative 
firms; foster entrepreneurship; facilitate the sharing, dissemination and transfer of 
knowledge, technology and innovation; and, above all else, catalyse local economic 
growth and development (Tsamis, 2009:152).  
 
The environments in which the parks were constructed were not especially 
conducive or well-suited to innovative activity. Neither region displayed a significant, 
if any, measureable innovative capacity; levels of R&D expenditure in both contexts 
lagged well behind European average as did their respective propensities to generate 
innovative output (Tsamis, 2009:158, 159). Moreover, the public sector was, as it still 
is in many of Europe’s less developed regions, overrepresented in what little 
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innovative activity these regions hosted – the lion’s share of R&D investment in both 
Central Macedonia and Crete was undertaken by public sector actors. The respective 
economic fabrics of the two territories were relatively technologically unsophisticated 
as well; Thessaloniki, and the broader Central Macedonia region within which it is 
situated, specialised in more traditional, less knowledge-intensive activities and 
sectors, while Crete suffered from a dearth of both high-technology manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive services (Tsamis, 2009:157). These socioeconomic 
shortcomings were compounded by a number of institutional deficiencies that 
distorted markets, discouraged investment in innovative activity, hampered 
entrepreneurship and deterred FDI (Tsamis, 2009:166). 
 
 The two parks relied upon what might be considered fairly standard 
interventions and instruments to attract and, in turn, support firms and entrepreneurs. 
Occupants of the parks were provided with access to both basic and more 
technologically-oriented infrastructure (e.g. labs, testing facilities) and to a variety of 
business support services (e.g. accountancy and various consultancy and/or 
technology transfer services) (Tsamis, 2009:184, 190). Incubators designed to lend 
support to nascent, high-potential firms served as cornerstones of both TTP and STEP-
C as well.  Interestingly, neither park elected to design or implement formalised 
networking programmes or services to promote inter- and intra-cluster linkages, 
connectivity or interaction (Tsamis, 2009:230).  
 
 Neither TTP nor STEP-C have, since their respective inceptions in the mid-
1990s, fulfilled their primary objectives or made substantive contributions to regional 
economic growth or development; while STEP-C was perhaps marginally more 
successful than TTP, the impact of the parks on their respective broader regional 
contexts is best described as “very weak” (Tsamis, 2009:230).  
 
The more direct contributions of the parks to local economic output and 
employment have been limited. In 2004, TTP accounted for less than 0.1% and 0.05% 
of Central Macedonia’s GDP and total employment, respectively (Tsamis, 2009:223). 
STEP-C’s contributions were larger, but still underwhelming: 0.45-0.5% of Crete’s 
regional GDP and 0.38% of total employment. The two parks did, however, account 
for significant shares of the total R&D expenditure undertaken by their host regions: 
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TTP and STEP-C hosted 9.7% and 35% of Central Macedonia’s and Crete’s total 
investment in R&D, respectively (Tsamis, 2009:223). That the two parks undertook 
such significant amounts of R&D but did not contribute in an equivalent manner to 
regional economic output is indicative of the pervasive difficulties park tenants faced 
in mobilising and applying knowledge. The parks also suffered from by an inability to 
attract foreign firms, investment and partnerships to their host regions (Tsamis, 
2009:224). 
 
The indirect impacts of TTP and STEP-C on the innovative capacities and 
innovation systems of their host regions have been negligible as well. Tsamis 
(2009:230) notes that “the research activity [undertaken by the parks] remains 
disconnected from the local economy with no indication of a role in the development 
of high-tech clusters or collective learning processes”. Even more generally, there is 
little in the way of evidence to suggest that either park has contributed substantively 
to the reorientation of their host economies towards more technologically 
sophisticated, innovative and, ultimately, higher-value added activities or sectors 
(Tsamis, 2009:226).  
 
The performances of TTP and STEP-C were undoubtedly constrained by a 
number of factors. Their failure, however, to contribute to economic growth is a 
function primarily of two factors. The first is that the parks were “largely disconnected 
from the regional economy” (Tsamis. 2009:227). That is, there was an insufficient 
degree of connectivity between the activities that were occurring in the parks and the 
economic actors and activities that existed and transpired beyond them. This stifled 
any potential diffusion of knowledge and innovation to local firms; precluded the 
establishment of forward and backward linkages and relationships; and, most 
generally, hampered the capacity of the parks to contribute to the upgrading of the 
broader regional innovation systems of which they were theoretically a part. This first 
factor was compounded by a second, more fundamental one: the parks were 
established in innovation averse environments that were plagued by a host of 
deficiencies and, were consequently incapable of sustaining, let alone benefitting from, 
knowledge-intensive activity and innovation. While the parks were envisioned as 
means to address the challenges and the limited economic dynamism of the regions in 
which they were built, in the end, both TTP and STEP-C fell victim to and could not 
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overcome the pronounced socioeconomic and institutional constraints imposed by 
their respective regions (Tsamis, 2009:227, 230).  
 
What leads to strategies of waste? 
 
Although the five cases presented represent very different examples in scope, 
dimension and orientation, a number of common features emerge when trying to 
explain why what, by all means, have been considerable development efforts have not 
only failed to deliver on their stated goals, but have also resulted in significant 
opportunity costs that have left many of the regions where the interventions have been 
operationalised in similar, if not worse, condition than if no development strategy had 
been conducted. 
 
First and foremost is the unbalanced nature of most of the interventions. Each 
of the five aforementioned strategies leaned strongly on one development axis linked 
to a particular dominant theory. Whether it was transport infrastructure in the case of 
the European Union, special economic zones in Peru, skills provision and training in 
the Philippines, or science parks in Greece, too much faith was put on the supply of 
one development factor as a trigger for future economic development. The neglect of 
other development axes and disregard for the interplay between different dimensions 
of development intervention represented, in all cases, a serious hurdle for the success 
of the strategies. 
 
Second, most of the strategies described above paid too little attention to local 
conditions. The application of simple, theory-linked approaches has been and is guided 
by the belief that intervention can overcome what were often harsh realities on the 
ground. However, additional investment in R&D and training, new kilometres of 
motorways, or growth pole and cluster-type interventions in environments with serious 
shortcomings in basic endowments have yielded limited results. An excessive focus 
on the physical development of the zones and ignorance towards sectoral structures, 
local infrastructure needs, and skills availability in Peru has condemned the zones to 
almost economic irrelevance. Neglect of local factors and, especially, of the 
socioeconomic and skill conditions that mediate the returns to R&D investment has 
stifled innovation in the less developed regions of Europe, while a disdain of issues 
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related to job availability and barriers to entry in the labour market have pushed 
Filipino nurses to emigrate.  
 
The most glaring omission, however, has been the limited attention paid to 
local institutional conditions. The promotion of new infrastructure, clusters, or growth 
poles in areas with poor quality of government, without parallel measures to improve 
government capacity, transparency and accountability, and/or reduce corruption, has 
undermined the returns to these development interventions. If anything, the 
involvement of poor quality, often corrupt governments in decision-making processes 
has benefitted the private, short-term economic and political interests of certain local 
stakeholders at the expense of medium- and long-term economic returns. 
 
Development strategies that have relied disproportionately on the potential 
advantages of one type of intervention and been largely disconnected from the realities 
of the territories for which they were designed have, as a direct consequence, 
frequently ended as strategies of waste that have yielded, relative to the actions and 
investments they involved, little in the way of productivity increases, job generation, 
and economic development. 
 
4.3.2. Strategies of gain 
 
The cases presented in the previous section raise understandable concerns 
about the general effectiveness of the various types of development interventions that 
have been pursued with particular enthusiasm the world over and about the sensibility 
of the continued pursuit of these strategies in developing and emerging environments. 
However, not all types of development intervention can be easily dismissed as 
strategies of waste. Soundly-designed and well-executed multidimensional strategies 
– be they based on infrastructural expansion, investment attraction, the upgrading of 
innovative capacities and human capital endowments, or the promotion of co-location 
and positive territorial externalities – can also generate considerable economic returns, 
leading to ‘strategies of gain’. Strategies of gain can be defined as development 
approaches that have proven particularly capable of delivering on their expected 
impacts by fulfilling both their inherent potential and designated objectives. In this 
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section we will highlight a number of strategies of gain, summarising, at the end of 
section, the factors behind their success. 
 
Shoring up ‘infrastructure gaps’ in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 
 
The pursuit of the infrastructure-oriented development strategies inspired by 
and grounded in neoclassical growth theories has, by no means, been confined to the 
European Union or the developed world more broadly. A number of African and Asian 
nations have sought to develop their infrastructure endowments, often with a view to 
rectify basic deficiencies and bottlenecks that serve as fundamental impediments to 
economic performance and ensure that a what is effectively a prerequisite for 
economic growth is fulfilled. 
 
 African nations, and Sub-Saharan ones in particular, have suffered – and still 
do, to a large extent, suffer – from debilitating infrastructure shortages, transportation 
or otherwise. Infrastructure shortages in the African context are viewed by many as 
fundamental – albeit not insurmountable – impediments to economic performance and 
dynamism; these deficiencies are thought to hamper inter- and intra-regional trade, 
discourage domestic and foreign investment, slow or prevent territorial cohesion, 
contribute to the retrenchment of regional disparities and, from a more socioeconomic 
perspective, obstruct access to basic public services thereby compromising efforts to 
reduce and eradicate poverty (Calderon and Servén, 2008; Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010; Mbekeani, 2010; Hartzenberg, 2011, Gutman et al., 2015).  It is for 
this reason that infrastructure investment and development, and the filling of the so-
called Sub-Saharan ‘infrastructure-gap’ have been prioritised by governments and 
international organisations alike. The financial commitments made by the World 
Bank, the African Development Bank and the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee to infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa have, for example, 
increased steadily since 2000, ultimately reaching US$10bn in 2012 (Gutman et al., 
2015:24). At the national level, a number of Sub-Saharan countries are directing 
significant and often increasing amounts of resources to infrastructure development; 
in 2013, Uganda, South Africa and Botswana were among the African countries that 
channelled more than seven percent of their respective GDP towards infrastructure 
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(ICA, 2014:46). The question that must be addressed, once again, is whether this 
expenditure has provided a measurable boost to economic dynamism.  
 
Taken together, the body of empirical literature that assesses the returns to 
infrastructure investment and development in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that 
transportation infrastructure investment has had a considerable growth-boosting 
effect.  Calderón and Servén (2008), for one, examine the link between infrastructure 
development and economic growth and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa between 
1960 and 2005. Relying on indices that capture both the quantity and the quality of the 
infrastructure with which a country is endowed, the study provides “robust evidence 
that infrastructure development has had a positive impact on long-run growth and a 
negative impact on income inequality” in Sub-Saharan Africa (Calderón and Servén, 
2008:29). Kodongo and Ojah (2016) reach a similar conclusion about returns 
specifically to infrastructure spending in the Sub-Saharan context. The econometric 
analysis reveals a positive and statistically significant association between 
infrastructure expenditure and economic growth and, moreover, provides an indication 
that relatively less developed Sub-Saharan African countries can expect to reap greater 
returns from infrastructure investment than their more developed Sub-Saharan 
counterparts. This latter finding implies that infrastructure investment, even in the Sub-
Saharan African context, is subject to diminishing returns. These results are 
corroborated by country-level studies. Kumo (2012), Bosede et al. (2013) and 
Chingoiro and Mbulawa (2016) probe the link between infrastructure expenditure and 
economic performance in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. In each case, 
the authors unearth evidence to suggest that investment in infrastructure has been an 
important driver of economic growth. 
 
In short, the pursuit of infrastructure-oriented policies and strategies and the 
prioritisation of investment in infrastructure development, more generally, in the Sub-
Saharan African context have been justified by the returns they have generated and the 
growth they have brought about. The preeminent explanation for why the returns to 
these investments have been so substantial relates to the fact that infrastructural 
endowments in Sub-Saharan Africa have long fallen – and still today fall – below some 
base-level that is necessary to sustain and support economic activity and dynamism; 
that is, much of Sub-Saharan Africa is situated far from the ‘infrastructure frontier’. 
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Expenditure on infrastructure expansion in environments where this is the case is, 
because of their distance to this frontier, less likely to suffer the sorts of diminishing 
returns that were especially evident in the European context. This implies that as long 
as infrastructural deficiencies exist, well-targeted and well-executed investments in 
the expansion and upgrading of infrastructure will continue to generate economic 
growth. 
 
The realisation of returns from infrastructure development projects should not, 
however, be viewed as inevitable, even in environments characterised by the most 
severe infrastructural deficiencies. Botswana’s Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project serves, 
in that respect, as something of a cautionary tale that underscores the importance of 
strategic planning, thorough diagnoses of local challenges and conditions and the 
execution of complementary actions and investments.50 
 
The overarching aims of the Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project were to “reduce 
transport costs, enhance social and economic integration of South-Western Part of 
Botswana and facilitate economic integration with Namibia” (African Development 
Bank, 2011:7). The project centred on the construction of a 221km of bitumen 
‘highway’ to replace what was previously an unpaved stretch of road between Sekoma 
and the Namibia-Botswana border crossing at Mamuno. Construction of the highway 
was completed and the road opened in 1998. With time, however, it became clear that 
the road was underutilized and that traffic volumes were well below those envisioned 
in the early stages of the project. Concern that the highway “could potentially develop 
into a ‘white elephant’” (African Development Bank, 2011:18) inspired authorities to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the project in hopes of developing some 
understanding of why the project’s anticipated outcomes had not yet materialised.  The 
review revealed that the underutilisation was attributable, at least in part, to “non-
physical barriers to the cross-border movement of people and goods” (African 
Development Bank, 2011:19), none of which were considered or factored into the 
planning process. That is, even though the road was designed as a facilitator of 
economic integration between Namibia and Botswana, authorities failed to recognise 
that the cross-border movement of people and goods was inhibited as much by 
                                               
50 The proceeding discussion is based on a Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) prepared by the African 
Development Bank for the AfDB-funded Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project (African Development Bank, 2011). 
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institutional barriers – including, for example, customs or unnecessarily complex 
transit procedures – as it was by the previous lack of physical connectivity. As a result, 
the project did not include measures to increase the ease with which goods and people 
could cross the border between Botswana and Namibia; this shortcoming would prove 
particularly consequential. It was only after a series of complementary investments 
were made and initiatives undertaken (including both physical measures such as the 
establishment of  trade-facilitating ‘one-stop border posts’ and less tangible ones, 
including institutional reforms and the establishment of bodies – the Trans-Kalahari 
Corridor Management Committee – to oversee and manage the corridor) to transform 
the highway into a “transit corridor” that the project began to impel and increase 
interregional cooperation and integration, promote trade, and yield broader 
development outcomes (African Development Bank, 2011:19, 21).   
 
Infrastructure-oriented development approaches have found success in a 
diversity of Asian contexts as well. Deficiencies in infrastructure are, as they are in 
much of Sub-Saharan Africa, ubiquitous across many of Asia’s less developed regions. 
The Rural Transport Improvement Project51 and Central Yunnan Roads Development 
Project52 pursued in Bangladesh and China, respectively, serve not only to confirm 
that targeted infrastructural investments that address specific deficiencies or 
bottlenecks can contribute to both economic growth and socioeconomic development 
in less developed contexts, but also as ‘best practices’ from which lessons can 
undoubtedly be drawn. 
 
Bangladesh’s rural areas have long been plagued by a host of infrastructural 
deficiencies. While the implications of these shortages are numerous, one stands out 
as especially consequential: infrastructure shortages or inadequacies can compromise 
the capacity of impoverished people living in these rural areas to access and engage in 
income generating activities. Recognising this, the Government of Bangladesh 
embarked on a World Bank-supported initiative – the Rural Transport Improvement 
Project (RTIP) – the principal socioeconomic objective of which was to support 
                                               
51 The proceeding discussion is based on a Project Performance Assessment Report prepared by the World Bank 
Group’s Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank, 2016d). 
 
52 The proceeding discussion is based on a Validation Report prepared by the Asian Development Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Department (Asian Development Bank, 2016). 
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poverty alleviation and foster economic growth in rural areas by increasing the 
physical accessibility of social services and economic opportunity (World Bank, 
2016d:2). 
 
The project was implemented and overseen by the government’s Local 
Government Engineering Department and featured eight complementary components 
that spanned several development axes. The first six were of a more physical nature. 
They related primarily to the maintenance and upgrading of rural roads, bridges and 
culverts, rural markets and river jetties; to the acquisition of land needed for this 
construction; and to the implementation of resettlement and other land/environmental 
management plans. The final two components centred on the provision of technical 
assistance and consultancy services, capacity building, human capital upgrading, and 
institutional development. 
 
The prioritisation of institutional development in this particular project was due 
to two factors. First, the project’s primary socioeconomic objective was accompanied 
by a second, more institutionally-oriented goal: “to enhance the capacity of relevant 
government institutions to better manage rural transport infrastructure” (World Bank, 
2016d:2). Second, projects like these can be derailed by various capacity constraints 
and other institutional deficiencies. The shoring up of capacities and capabilities was 
therefore seen as necessary to facilitate the efficient execution and longer-term 
sustainability of this, and other, policy initiatives. 
 
While the project was not executed without its share of challenges,53 at closure 
in 2012, the project had successfully constructed, rehabilitated or upgraded 1638km 
of ‘upazila’ roads (feeder roads); 15,965 meters of missing bridges/culverts; 123 rural 
markets and 32 river jetties (World Bank, 2016d:7). More importantly, however, there 
is ample evidence to suggest that the project had profoundly positive economic and 
social impacts. Average monthly income and expenditure, for example increased in 
project areas by 73.4% (compared to 14.9% in non-project areas) and 55.8% (33.9% 
in non-project areas) (World Bank, 2016d:8). The improvements to the infrastructure 
                                               
53 The most notable among them were, first, that the earliest stages of project were plagued by minor delays 
attributable to “challenges associated with land acquisition and compensation and poor contract management” 
(World Bank, 2016d:4); and, second, that “the capacity building objective only partially achieved its training 
objectives” (World Bank, 2016d:1). 
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networks and the increased connectivity they facilitated have also been linked to 
increases in agricultural and non-agricultural production and trade, though ex-post 
evaluation has not yet been able to determine the extent to which increases in the latter 
are directly attributable to the project (World Bank, 2016d:8).  
 
There are also indications that the intervention delivered other 
socioeconomically-related benefits to rural residents in project areas in the form of 
improved access to both education and healthcare. Total school enrolment and the total 
number of healthcare services recipients increased by 12.2% and 32%, respectively, 
in project areas (World Bank, 2016d:9). These increases materialised in the face of 
decreases of 60% and 20%, respectively, in non-project areas (World Bank, 2016d:9). 
 
Yunnan province in Southwestern China is among the country’s least 
economically developed regions. A lack of accessibility and infrastructural deficits are 
thought to be two of the factors to which this underdevelopment and the 
ineffectiveness of previous poverty alleviation and developments efforts are most 
readily attributable (Asian Development Bank, 2016:2). The upgrading of intra- and 
interregional transportation infrastructure has therefore come to be seen as a 
prerequisite to the achievement of economic growth and the eradication of 
interregional inequality. 
 
 It was this perception that led to the formulation and implementation of the 
Asian Development Bank-supported Central Yunnan Roads Project. The overarching 
objective of the project was to establish “a well-functioning integrated road transport 
system in Yunnan Province and [connect] the rest of the Greater Mekong Subregion” 
(Asian Development Bank, 2016:2) with the view to catalyse economic growth and 
promote poverty alleviation in Yunnan. Achieving higher levels of trade between 
Yunnan and the remainder of the country, and with its more economically developed 
eastern/coastal regions in particular, was an important secondary goal. 
 
The project was guided by four specific, mutually-reinforcing objectives each 
of which pertained to a different aspect of the region’s infrastructure system. It set out 
to: (1) construct a Wuding-Kunming expressway; (2) upgrade 190km of local roads; 
(3) improve road and traffic safety; and (4) develop the technical capacities of parties 
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responsible for the design and implementation of the project (Asian Development 
Bank, 2016:3). 
 
Figure 4.4. Central Yunnan Roads Project area 
 
Authors’ elaboration 
It was operationalised at the subnational level by two implementing agencies, 
each of which were responsible for two of the aforementioned objectives. The Yunnan 
Provincial Department of Transport oversaw road upgrading and safety improvement 
efforts. The Wukun Expressway Company Limited was tasked with the construction 
of the highway and the execution of the capacity building and institutional 
development initiatives. 
 
The targets associated with the project’s four guiding objectives were 
achieved: (1) the 63.6km Wuding-Kunming expressway opened in October of 2013; 
(2) 190km of local roads were rehabilitated over the course of the project; (3) efforts 
to improve road safety resulted in a decrease in ‘road accident fatalities per 10,000 
vehicles’ of 30% in 2013; and, finally, (4) staff of both the Yunnan Provincial 
Department of Transport and the Wukun Expressway Company Limited were 
provided with 63 person-months of international training (Asian Development Bank, 
2016:7).  
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Upon review, it became clear that considerable progress had also been made 
towards the project’s underlying objectives across the project area (Figure 4.4).54 Ex-
post assessment confirmed that the project made substantial contributions to both 
poverty reduction and economic development in Fumin County, Kunming City, 
Wuding County and Chuxiong Prefecture (Figure 4.4). GDP per capita in the project 
area increased, for example, by an average of 18.3% between 2008 and 2013. The per 
capita incomes of farmers in Fumin County (128%), Wuding County (122%) and 
Chuxiong Prefecture (104%) also increased between 2008 as did the disposable 
incomes of individuals living Kunming City (96%). The project, and the construction 
of the expressway in particular, resulted in the creation of 3,930 temporary jobs and 
268 permanent jobs as well. Relatedly, the project’s contributions to poverty 
alleviation were also significant; between 2011 and 2013, the number of ‘poor people’ 
living the project area decreased by close to 40%, from 204,800 to 124,300. 
 
Attracting investment to the Dominican Republic: The importance and effectiveness of 
special economic zones55 
 
Peru’s engagement with special economic zones serves, without a question, as 
a cautionary tale. Special economic zone programmes have not, however, been 
universally ineffective; experiences like that of the Dominican Republic provide an 
indication that inward investment-oriented approaches can, under the right 
circumstances and if appropriately operationalised and overseen, attract and 
concentrate economic actors, activity and investment and, in time, give birth to 
‘growth poles’ whose success and dynamism pays dividends in the form of regional 
economic development. 
 
Special economic zones have, in the Dominican context, proven to be 
“powerful [engines] for job generation, exports and productive diversification”, means 
to attract foreign investment and effective instruments for the pursuit and achievement 
of economic growth (World Bank, 2016c:8). The country’s special economic zones, 
                                               
54 The socioeconomic impacts of the project are detailed on page 9 of the Validation Report (Asian Development 
Bank, 2016). 
 
55 The proceeding discussion is based on a World Bank (2016c) review of the Dominican Republic’s experience 
with special economic zones. 
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the first of which was established in 1969, focused initially on textiles and clothing 
manufacturing, benefitting from the Multi-Fibre Agreement and the import quotas 
with which it was associated (World Bank, 2016c:7). The end of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement in 2005, while a challenge for the country’s zones, also served as the 
impetus for a shift that saw the Dominican Republic’s special economic zones become 
increasingly engaged in more capital-intensive, higher-value added activities in the 
services, textiles, medical instruments, tobacco and agroindustry sectors (World Bank, 
2016c:8). As of 2014, the country’s zones, which rely on a mix of incentives in the 
form of tariff exemptions and a range of fiscal instruments to attract firms and 
encourage investment, hosted, on average, 11 firms and accounted for 140,000 jobs 
(World Bank, 2016c:8). By 2015, 65 special economic zones had been established, 47 
of which were privately owned and operated (World Bank, 2016c:9). These zones, 
irrespective of whether they are privately or publically managed, are very much 
‘outward-oriented’, prioritising both the attraction of foreign direct investment as well 
export promotion and the cultivation of domestic exporters (World Bank, 2016c:9).56 
 
The success of the Dominican Republic’s zones is attributable to four key 
factors. First is the Dominican Republic’s relationship with the United States. The 
country’s physical proximity to the United States coupled, first, with the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement and, later, with the Dominican Republic Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) – both of which granted/grant preferential market access to 
Dominican exports – increase the appeal of the Dominican Republic’s special 
economic zones to foreign firms as sites for their offshore production activities.  
                                               
56 The Dominican Republic’s experience with special economic zones, while generally regarded as positive, has 
not been free of challenges and obstacles. There are concerns, for example, that the potential of these zones as 
sources of permanent employment creation may be waning as the firms they host become increasingly engaged in 
more technologically sophisticated and higher-value added but also less labour intense activities and industries 
(World Bank 2016c:13, 14). Movements like these, ‘up the value chain’, are indicative of a maturation of the zone 
programme and of the Dominican economy more generally. They also, however, are associated with “important 
labour implications” that policy-makers must recognise and take steps to address and manage (World Bank, 
2016c:13). A second, and perhaps more immediate set of concerns, relates to the emergence of “a duality in [the 
country’s] production structure” and the performance and viability of non-SEZ firms more generally (World Bank 
2016c:10). That is, the country’s SEZ firms tend to be engaged in sectors and industries that are increasingly 
different to those within which their non-SEZ counterparts are participating and are, as result becoming increasingly 
disconnected from them (World Bank 2016c:10). SEZ firms are, for example, still largely dependent on imported 
inputs (World Bank, 2016c:18, 19). Simply stated, non-SEZ firms are struggling to cultivate relationships with, 
benefit from and keep pace with the SEZ firms. This inevitably raises questions about the extent to which zones in 
the Dominican Republic can become a catalyst for more geographically widespread economic growth and 
development (World Bank, 2016c). This, however, has not gone unnoticed by policy-makers who have since 
operationalised programmes designed to rectify it (see Footnote 57). 
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Second, the private sector features prominently in the country’s special 
economic zone regime. Not only are the vast majority of the country’s zones owned 
by private bodies that can leverage capabilities, capacities and experience that likely 
exceed those of their public sector counterparts to efficiently manage and operate the 
zones, the private sector is also a contributor to the policy dialogue via an “association 
of SEZ entrepreneurs (ADOZONA)” and representation on the committee that is 
responsible for the oversight and regulation of the country’s special economic zones 
(World Bank, 2016c:9). It is, as a consequence, immediately engaged in the 
development of the country’s special economic zones programme. This engagement 
is anticipated to help ensure that the policies and initiatives that are linked to the 
programme are, and continue to be, sufficiently attuned to the needs and priorities of 
the stakeholders they target.  
 
Third, the country’s special economic zone programme is overseen by a single 
and effective regulatory body – the Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas Especiales 
(CNZFE). Streamlined regulatory systems impose lower transactions and 
administrative costs on firms and contribute to the creation of contexts that are 
conducive to investment and economic activity; the assignment of oversight 
responsibilities to a single actor, as is the case here, reduces the potential for 
coordination challenges and minimises the complexities associated with navigating the 
country’s special economic zone regulatory regime. The CNZFE also assumes 
responsibility for efforts and initiatives to attract foreign firms and investment, 
effectively doubling as an inward investment agency. It has in recent years, 
“established a Statistical Department, an Economic Analysis and Competitiveness 
division and a Promotion department” all of which have contributed to the 
programme’s success “attracting investors from a number of emerging industries” 
(World Bank, 2016c:9). 
 
Fourth, the Dominican Republic’s special economic zones programme has 
been actively managed. More specifically, policy-makers have successfully navigated 
a series of profound challenges via the reformation of domestic regulations and 
policies (World Bank, 2016c:9). They introduced a number of changes to special 
economic zones legislation to ensure not only that the country’s special economic 
zones are compliant with WTO rules, but also that the zones remain as attractive and 
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competitive as possible and can, in turn, continue to serve as catalysts for export and 
economic growth (World Bank, 2016c:22).  
 
Relatedly, policy-makers have also recently acknowledged and taken steps to 
rectify a pronounced weakness of the zone programme: the zones are becoming 
increasingly detached from the remainder of the economy. Recognising that greater 
connectivity between the zones and the territories in which they are situated must be 
fostered if the zones are to contribute to more geographically widespread, inclusive 
socioeconomic development, authorities have pursed initiatives to promote greater 
interaction between firms situated inside the country’s zones and those that are not. 
Most notably, they have established a ‘match-making programme’57 to promote the 
establishment of inter-firm linkages (World Bank, 2016c:21). 
 
Market-oriented education and training: Vietnam’s Vocational and Technical 
Education Project58 
 
The stock of suitably skilled human capital with which a region is endowed 
does, as postulated by the endogenous growth theories, influence its economic 
performance. Consequently, actions geared towards its expansion could contribute to 
the achievement of economic growth.  If not mobilised and engaged in productive 
activity, however, skilled individuals cannot contribute to economic growth and 
development. It is for this reason that education and training-oriented initiatives must, 
as they were in the Vietnamese Vocational and Technical Education Project, be 
aligned with the needs of firms and the demands of the labour market more generally. 
Moreover, training schemes should be integrated into broader development strategies 
that balance supply-side efforts with actions that address demand-side conditions.  
                                               
57 ‘Match-making’ efforts thus far have involved the facilitation of “business-to-business meetings”. The ultimate 
aims of these meetings are to expose SEZ firms to local, non-SEZ firms (and vice-versa) and, ideally, lay the 
foundation for the establishment of more formal, mutually beneficial relationships between them (World Bank, 
2016c:21). In 2015, for example, the CNZFE piloted a “match making round in which more than 60 business-to-
business meetings took place” (World Bank, 2016c:21). It was the intention of the CNZFE to, in subsequent 
iterations, expand and open participation in these ‘rounds’ to a variety of other actors, stakeholders and institutions, 
including “national associations of exporters, representatives of chambers of commerce, and other industry 
representatives” (paraphrasing World Bank, 2016c:21). It should also be noted that these concerted match-making 
efforts are supplemented by the provision of training to domestic firms – again by the CNZFE – to ensure, that 
local suppliers are aware of the “quality certifications needed to become suppliers of SEZ firms” and, importantly, 
in a position to meet, if not exceed them (World Bank, 2016c:21).  
    
58 The proceeding discussion is based on a Performance Evaluation Report for Vietnam’s Vocational and Technical 
Education Project prepared by the Asian Development Bank (2013). 
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Shortages of skilled labour have long been identified as a preeminent 
development challenge for Vietnam. In 1998, for example, “about 80% of the labour 
force was unskilled…and only 10% had formal training” (Asian Development Bank, 
2013:4). This shortage of skills was mostly attributable to a weak supply-side-oriented 
vocational and technical education system that was neither robust enough to cope with 
the country’s increasingly large and expanding labour force nor capable of catering to 
and fulfilling the shifting needs of the its labour market and industries (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013:4). Reformation of this system was therefore seen as means 
to overcome the pronounced skills deficit facing the country. The Asian Development 
Bank-supported Vocational and Technical Education Project represented an effort to 
do just that.  
 
The project was motivated in equal measure by an awareness of the various 
inadequacies of the country’s vocational and technical education system and by the 
more general perception that the provision of training and the expansion of the 
country’s skilled labour pool were crucial to achieving both the aims of Vietnam’s 
market-oriented industrialisation policy (Asian Development Bank, 2013:1) and 
economic growth and development, more broadly (Asian Development Bank, 
2013:11). Overseen by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs and 
implemented by the government’s General Department of Vocational Training, the 
project was guided by three specific objectives (Asian Development Bank, 2013:1): 
(1) improve the market-orientation of the country’s vocational and technical education 
system; (2) improve the efficiency of the vocational and technical education 
programmes offered by ‘key schools’; and (3) strengthen the institutional capacity of 
the General Department of Vocational Training to facilitate both the implementation 
of the project and provide the government with the capacity to undertake future 
reforms. 
 
The project featured three discrete but inevitably interrelated components, each 
of which corresponded to the one of its three main objectives. The first component was 
composed of initiatives to increase the market-orientation of the vocational and 
technical education system and increase its coherence with the skills requirements and 
priorities of employers. These included the development of a ‘labour market 
information system’ and other enterprise surveys to facilitate the “systematic 
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assessment of the demands of enterprises and employers” (Asian Development Bank, 
2013:6); efforts to increase the ‘career guidance’ available to students; and the 
development of new curriculums, and corresponding teaching guides and learning 
materials, that are more closely aligned with the “skills requirements of employers” 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013:6). The second component centred on the 
construction and/or renovation of, the installation of new equipment and technologies 
in, and the overall upgrading of the 15 key schools that were the focus of the project 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013:7). The third, capacity-oriented component featured 
actions to establish unified qualification and assessment systems and frameworks for 
monitoring and certification purposes; increase the accessibility of vocational and 
technical education to women, minorities and other disadvantaged groups; and provide 
training to and, in turn, improve the technical capacities of teachers and policy-makers 
alike. 
 
The more immediate outcomes of the project were numerous. With regards to 
its first objective, the project resulted in the implementation of 48 new curricula and 
the establishment of a market-oriented, stakeholder-driven process for the design of 
curricula that reflect labour market demands and the skills requirements of employers 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013:18). The second objective was fulfilled by upgrading 
the facilities and equipment at the 15 key schools to the benefit of both students and 
the schools themselves (Asian Development Bank, 2013:18). From the perspective of 
students, the upgrading of the schools, equipment and resources improved their overall 
learning experience and afforded students the opportunity to become familiar with the 
technologies, tools and equipment relied on by their to-be employers. The reputations 
of the 15 target schools were enhanced by the upgrading as well. This, in turn, 
increased their capacity to attract students. Some progress was also made towards the 
achievement of the third, institutionally-oriented objective, though this is the front on 
which work remains. Curricula development training was, for example, provided to 
4,900 teachers and administrators. The success of the project on other fronts also 
implies that any capacity building initiatives undertaken with the view to facilitate 
project execution were at least somewhat effective. Accreditation, certification and 
qualification frameworks and systems were, however, not established to the expected 
extent (Asian Development Bank, 2013:20). Similarly, efforts to increase the 
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participation of women, minorities and other disadvantaged groups were not as 
successful as envisioned (Asian Development Bank, 2013:20). 
 
The project’s more general labour market impacts were sizeable as well. The 
project expanded the country’s stock of skilled and vocationally trained labour. 
Between 2001 and 2007, the 15 key schools graduated 210,600 people, many of whom 
participated in, and benefitted directly from, one of the newly devised, market-tailored 
curricula (Asian Development Bank, 2013:27). Similarly, the majority of the targeted 
schools’ graduates encountered little difficulty obtaining employment. A follow-up 
assessment revealed that only 4.1-6.2% of graduates were unemployed two to three 
years after the completion of training (Asian Development Bank, 2013:28).  Graduates 
also tended to earn higher and faster rising incomes than non-graduates (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013:29).  
 
The most significant labour-market impact of the project may, however, also 
be its least quantifiable. The ex post performance review indicated that the project 
“helped to orient [the overarching] vocational and technical education system toward 
a market-driven approach” (Asian Development Bank, 2013:27). That is to say, the 
project had a profound effect on attitudes towards, and policy-thinking about, the way 
in which vocational and technical education systems should be structured and, 
relatedly, the necessity of adopting market-oriented approaches that integrate demand-
side factors and concerns into supply-side policies and initiatives.  Overall, it impelled 
a shift away from the supply-driven policies of the past towards more flexible and 
sustainable integrated, demand-driven policies that yield benefits for employees and 
employers alike.  
 
Promoting interaction and connectivity in Brazilian clusters: Brazil’s APL policy59 
 
Cluster-oriented development policies have, as alluded to in the previous 
section, encountered their share of difficulties and challenges. Far too often, policy-
makers have sought to establish clusters in economically disadvantaged regions 
without sufficient concern for the capacity of those regions to sustain and, in turn, 
                                               
59 This section draws on Garone et al.’s (2015) econometric investigation into the effectiveness of Brazil’s APL 
policies in two of its provinces. 
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benefit from them. Similarly, insufficient attention has been paid to the promotion of 
linkages and connections between the cluster and its host territory, or to the 
encouragement of interactions, cooperation and collaborations within the cluster. The 
neglect of these considerations explains the underperformance of many of the world’s 
cluster policies. Brazil’s Arranjos Productivos Locais (APL) policy, however, serves 
as a reminder that carefully designed, contextually tailored cluster-based development 
strategies can have profound, positive impacts on the economic fortunes of the places 
in which they are pursued.  
 
Quantitative impact analysis of cluster policies, in the emerging world in 
particular, are few and far between (Garone et al., 2015). This absence of evidence 
impairs our capacity to form robust conclusions about the more tangible outcomes 
associated with, and overall effectiveness of, cluster-based development strategies. 
Garone et al. (2015) address this barrier by exploring the employment generation, 
value creation and export-propensity outcomes associated with Brazil’s APL policies 
for a selection of the country’s clusters. In doing so, they provide, in their own words, 
“the first rigorous impact evaluation of a cluster development policy in Latin America” 
(Garone et al., 2015:926).  
 
APLs are defined as “clusters of firms within the same administrative area (e.g. 
municipalities) that share a particular economic specialisation” (Garone et al., 
2015:929). Operation in close physical and sectoral proximity is not, however, the 
main characteristic of these clusters; Garone et al. (2015:929) are careful to stress that 
it is the interaction, collaboration and cooperation among co-located parties that set 
APLs apart from mere agglomerations of economic actors and activity.  
 
Prior to 2004, APLs were established and supported by various, unconnected 
public and private SME-promotion agencies. In 2004, however, recognising the 
inherent potential of these APLs as tools for the promotion of local economic 
development, Brazil introduced an official APL policy. The overarching aims of the 
policy are to support job creation and bolster the competiveness of firms, and the 
regions they occupy, via interventions designed to increase efficiency of, and 
interaction and cooperation between, co-located firms (Garone et al., 2015:929). The 
APL policy programme, which is now manged and overseen by a purpose built ‘APL 
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Permanent Working Group’ within the Federal Government’s Ministry of 
Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade,60 has since become a prominent feature of 
the country’s industrial policy.  
 
 APL interventions have not been pursued indiscriminately. Authorities rely on 
a rigorous assessment process to determine if and where policy efforts will be 
implemented (Garone et al., 2015:929). The primary reason for doing this diligence is 
to ensure that scarce resources are channelled to support clusters that, on the one hand, 
are sufficiently developed to actually benefit from the policy but, on the other, still 
face challenges and obstacles that hamper their performance and warrant policy 
intervention. Interventions are therefore, in effect, targeted, at clusters characterised 
simultaneously by “certain levels of SME concentration and specialisation (often 
defined as existing or potential APL)” (Garone et al., 2015:929) and “credible 
development potential” (Garone et al., 2015: 930). The extent to which a particular 
cluster could contribute to processes of local economic development is also integrated 
into the selection process (Garone et al., 2015:931). The implication of the 
employment of a rigorous selection process is that APL policy interventions are not 
guided by the objective of physically creating clusters, but rather by the aim of 
transforming a group of co-located firms into a ‘prototypical’ cluster in which 
interaction, cooperation and collaboration are ubiquitous (Garone et al., 2015:930).  
 
 Brazil’s APL policy interventions are composed of two distinct stages. The 
first stage centres on the development of a ‘strategic development plan’ that is 
informed by both comprehensive diagnostic analyses and by the involvement and 
insights of private and public sector stakeholders. It is at this stage that institutional 
strengthening and capacity building-type activities are also undertaken. This first 
planning stage, and APL interventions more generally, are bottom-up and participatory 
in nature; Garone et al. (2015:929) highlight that the key foci in the policy elaboration 
phase include the fostering of cooperation within the targeted APL; the promotion of 
interactions between its main agents; and the identification of the local leaders who 
will be responsible for the implementation of policy interventions.  
                                               
60 While the APL Permanent Working Group is responsible for the oversight and coordination of APL policies, the 
interventions themselves are implemented at the local level often by the Brazilian Service to Support Micro and 
Small Enterprises (SEBRAE) (Garone et al., 2015).  
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The second stage of the process involves the actual operationalisation of the 
development plan and the implementation of the specific actions it envisions. The sets 
of tools and instruments relied upon by different APLs will vary in accordance with 
their respective development plans and the challenges they face. That said, 
interventions, irrespective of where they are pursued, tend not to target individual 
firms; they more often focus on cluster-level actions and on promotion intra-cluster 
networks, cooperation and interaction (Garone et al., 2015:929, 930). 
 
APL interventions have been pursed across Brazil. They have, accordingly, 
targeted agglomerations that specialise in any number of industries. Garone et al. 
(2015), however, focus their empirical analysis on a handful of APL policies 
implemented by the Brazilian Service to Support Micro and Small Enterprises 
(SEBRAE) in São Paulo and Minas Gerais. 
 
The picture that emerges from this econometric exercise is a favourable one. 
The study provides evidence to suggest that the APL policy interventions have 
contributed to job creation and value generation in, and increased the export propensity 
of, the clusters in which they were pursued (Garone et al., 2015:936). Moreover, the 
employment- and export-related outcomes are interpreted as evidence that APL 
policies, and the interventions by which they are composed, have augmented the 
overall productivity of the firms that compose clusters targeted by these strategic 
actions. The authors assert that “the simultaneous effects of employment and export 
measures [would] hardly be achievable without a significant increase in firms’ 
productivity” and, consequently, that “the efficiency enhancing activities put in place 
by the APL policy…were actually effective” (Garone et al., 2015:936). The analysis 
also indicates that firms that were not explicitly targeted by the APL interventions but 
were physically proximate to those that were benefitted over the medium-to-long term 
from spillovers (Garone et al., 2015:336). The inference to be drawn here is that APL 
policies have contributed to more than just efficiency and productivity gains for 
targeted firms; they have served as instruments for the pursuit of more widespread 
local economic development (Garone et al., 2015:942). 
 
  
 234 
Putting together strategies of gain 
 
What are the main differences between the aforementioned strategies of gain 
and strategies of waste? The line by which they are separated is a fine one. The success 
of a development strategy appears, on the basis of the above, to be predicated on the 
consideration and employment of a series of basic principles – during both the policy 
design and policy implementation phases – in a nuanced, thoughtful and holistic way. 
 
The first principle relates to the need to pay attention to local conditions, 
regardless of the theory that informs the strategy. Awareness of the local context has 
been and is paramount to the success of the special economic zones in the Dominican 
Republic and plays a key role in the dynamism of Brazilian APL clusters. The 
Dominican government has gone the extra mile to actually explicitly link the economic 
activity generated inside the zones to the rest of the Dominican economy. In Vietnam 
– and in contrast to countless other human development and skill building strategies 
that have been operationalised in the emerging world – vocational training was 
carefully aligned with the needs of local firms. It was this attention to context and, 
more specifically, solid diagnoses of local conditions, bottlenecks and potential, that 
explain, at least in part, the relative success of the intervention. 
 
This awareness of local context needs to be accompanied by the skilful 
integration of interventions into broader development strategies. Road building 
projects in Bangladesh fulfilled their goals because there were complemented by the 
provision of technical assistance and consultancy services, and by the concurrent 
pursuit of capacity building schemes and other measures aimed at improving local 
institutional conditions and human resource endowments. The Vietnam vocational 
training scheme was similarly integrated into a broader industrialisation-based 
economic development strategy. 
 
Finally, distance to so-called ‘frontiers’ may have been a factor in the success 
of certain schemes. Infrastructure endowments in sub-Saharan Africa and in 
Bangladesh and Yunnan province are still sufficiently underdeveloped such that 
investments in their upgrading are not yet subject to diminishing returns. This means 
that additional investment in infrastructure is unlikely to be associated with high 
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opportunity costs and can, importantly, conceivably continue to impel economic 
growth. 
 
4.4. Separating strategies of gain from those of waste 
 
Taken together, the cases presented in the preceding section provide an 
indication of the potential of territorially-targeted development interventions as means 
to impel sustainable and locally embedded economic growth. They also, however, 
serve as reminders, in the first instance, that the pursuit of these approaches can be 
fraught with challenges and, moreover, that great care, contextual awareness and a 
cognisance of the pitfalls to which these strategies often fall victim must be employed 
in both their design and implementation. The question that must therefore be addressed 
is, quite simply: what separates the strategies of gain from those of waste? The 
proceeding sections expose and address four points of divergence between the two 
classes of approaches. It is from these differences that a series of policy implications 
are gleaned. 
 
4.4.1. The importance of multidimensionality, integration and balance 
 
 Each of the strategies of waste was guided by a different overarching objective 
ranging from, inter alia, the expansion of regional infrastructure endowments, to the 
attraction of non-local investment and enterprises, to the fostering of co-location and 
the unlocking of the productivity-enhancing externalities with which it is associated. 
These interventions were clearly embedded in the extant theoretical approaches to 
growth and development, but generally fished in one particular theoretical pond, 
ignoring the benefits of alternative approaches; they were effectively informed and 
underpinned by a single, different theoretical perspective and were, as a result, 
‘unidimensional’ in nature.  
 
Accordingly, the strategies of waste presented share one especially prominent 
similarity: they focused exclusively on one ‘development axis’. That is, each 
intervention concentrated excessively on the rectification of one particular deficiency 
through one type of policy instrument or intervention. As a consequence, they 
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neglected the way and extent to which other, not-immediately-related factors affect 
and can actually compromise the overall efficacy of interventions. 
 
 In the European Union, the neoclassical growth theory-inspired perception that 
increasing a region’s stock of infrastructure would, directly and indirectly, augment 
regional productivity and, in turn, spur growth, has led to the channelling of significant 
resources to the expansion of what is a reasonably mature transport infrastructure 
network. A failure, however, to consider how exactly the establishment of new 
infrastructure would complement or unlock a region’s assets of capabilities – or, 
relatedly, could be rendered ineffective by a lack thereof – has resulted in the 
indiscriminate allocation of scarce financial resources to actions that have, at best, 
failed to alleviate or rectify infrastructural deficiencies that inhibit productivity and 
stifle economic growth and, at worst, merely provided duplications of existing 
infrastructure or services. In Peru and Greece, special economic zones and science and 
technology parks, respectively, were simply imposed, without complementary or 
supportive policy actions, on regions by policy-makers that did not, or were unable to, 
integrate them into the economic fabrics by which they were underpinned. This failure 
undermined the theoretical potential of these interventions to serve as growth poles 
that leverage external investment and, in the case the science and technology parks, 
the externalities associated with co-location, to catalyse the growth of the broader 
geographic regions in which they are situated. The Filipino education system displayed 
a similar, equally problematic ‘unidimensionality’. The country’s robust medical 
training system that churns out the skilled human capital that should, according to 
endogenous theories of growth, drive economic growth, has been rendered ineffective 
by an absence of efforts to match a focus on the supply of skills and education with 
initiatives to create sufficiently high-quality employment opportunities through which 
educated persons could exploit their skills and contribute to economic growth. The 
innovation-oriented, endogenous growth theory-guided efforts undertaken by the 
European Union to foster economic dynamism via investment in knowledge 
generation have been ineffective, again, in large part because of the omission of 
strategic interventions to ensure that the regions to which more and more R&D 
resources have been channelled had, or were able to develop, the capacity and 
capabilities to mobilise and exploit them. 
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 The strategies of gain were not, on the other hand, characterised by this 
‘unidimensionality’. They were marked both by a distinct multidimensionality and by 
an integrative, balanced nature. In both China and Bangladesh, infrastructure-oriented 
development projects were composed of several complementary components – that 
were also supplemented by institutionally-oriented reforms – that together promoted 
both the alleviation of specific bottlenecks and the general upgrading of the 
infrastructure networks of the targeted environments. Similarly, concerted efforts, in 
the form of network and linkage-promotion interventions and regulatory reforms, have 
been made an integral part of the Dominican Republic’s special economic zone 
programme to embed the zones in their host regions. The inclusion of these efforts was 
motivated by the need to ensure, first, that local firms – and the regional economies 
they compose – can tap into and realize benefits from the zones to which they are 
proximate and, second, that the zones do not become entirely disconnected from the 
environments in which they were established. In Vietnam, the strategic efforts to 
reform the country’s vocational and technical education system were, unlike many of 
those pursued elsewhere in the emerging world, devised with full awareness of the 
skills demands of local firms and the opportunities that existed in the labour market. 
The reforms were also envisioned as a vitally important part of, and were integrated 
into, the country’s broader market-oriented industrialization effort. Finally, Brazil’s 
APL cluster policies rely on an array of mutually-reinforcing interventions and 
instruments that both provide support to the individual firms that compose the cluster 
and promote interactions and relationship-building between them. Together, these 
actions enhance the overall dynamism of the cluster to the benefit of the region in 
which it is situated and, via feedback mechanisms, the clustered firms themselves. 
 
 Unidimensional approaches to development, including the aforementioned 
strategies of waste, that operate along one development axis are informed by a very 
narrow understanding of the factors that condition and shape processes of economic 
growth and change. That is, they adhere, unfailingly, to the policy prescriptions that 
emerge from a single development theory (e.g. Barca et al., 2012:137). As a 
consequence, these approaches tend not to account for the facts, first, as the evolution 
of growth and development theories would seem to confirm, that the economic 
performance and dynamism of any given region is governed and mediated by any 
number of contextually specific factors, characteristics and attributes and, second, that 
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economic underperformance tends not to be attributable to one particular deficiency, 
but rather to several, inevitably interconnected ones (e.g. Dosi et al., 1994; Adelman, 
1999; Dang and Pheng, 2015; Pike et al., 2017).  
 
Certain deficiencies may very well be, in some environments, more 
pronounced than others which may, in turn, lead development strategies to be oriented 
more squarely in one direction over another. Moreover, contextual conditions in 
certain environments may, for any number of reasons, be more receptive or amenable 
to certain types of policy interventions than others.  
 
Infrastructure investment can, for example, because of the diminishing returns 
to which it is subject and the expectation of limited returns beyond a certain threshold, 
be a suitable cornerstone for development strategies pursued in less developed 
territories plagued by infrastructural deficiencies that stifle economic activity, trade, 
processes of territorial integration and/or individual mobility. Similarly, certain 
territories with burgeoning industrial or sectoral specialisations, and the competitive 
advantages and socioeconomic and institutional conditions to sustain it, may be in 
position where the inflow of foreign capital and firms could lead to the rapid and 
sustainable expansion of that sector. Policy-makers in such territories should consider 
awarding inward investment-oriented actions a privileged position in the development 
strategies they devise and pursue.61 In a similar vein, the sorts of human capital or 
knowledge-oriented initiatives prescribed by the endogenous growth theory may be 
more viable in more economically advanced environments where other, perhaps more 
fundamental, socioeconomic or structural deficiencies have been addressed and 
conditions are such that skills, knowledge and innovation can be mobilised and 
                                               
61 It is critically important to note that the existence of ‘favourable’ socioeconomic conditions is not, in and of 
itself, sufficient justification for the pursuit of an inward investment-oriented approach designed to attract a 
particular sector or industry to a territory that has no pre-existing familiarity with, or competencies of relevance to 
it. Inward investment-oriented strategies will only succeed in first, attracting, and second, embedding (to the benefit 
of the host economy), the inward investment activities if there is a relevant foundation upon which they can draw. 
The reasons for this are two-fold. First, firms, increasingly guided by knowledge or competency acquisition 
intentions, are not attracted to environments from which they cannot benefit in one way or another. Second, a host 
economy will only benefit from the attraction of foreign firms and investment if it is capable of embedding it/them. 
Integration of this nature is not possible if local firms lack the skills, competencies and knowledge bases needed to 
engage, interact and develop relationships that will allow them to acquire knowledge from extra-local firms, and 
similarly, if workers lack the relevant skills and training needed to work for or provide services to the imported 
firms. Simply stated, the attraction of inward investment in a particular sector or industry to a region that is ex-ante 
not specifically suited to it will either be immediately ineffective or not sustainable. Trying to establish a new 
industry from scratch focusing only on the attraction of foreign firms is more likely than not going to end up as a 
strategy of waste. 
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productively exploited. There is perhaps even scope for the establishment of economic 
growth strategies underpinned by cluster-based actions or initiatives in territories 
where dynamic economic actors are already located in close physical proximity and, 
consequently, the focus of initiatives need not be on fostering physical co-location but 
rather on the promotion of cooperation, collaboration and general interaction within 
the pre-existing agglomerations, and, by extension, on the establishment of linkages 
between the cluster and the territory that hosts it.    
 
All of this does not, however, imply that other, perhaps less pronounced, 
shortcomings by which a region is plagued or its more general characteristics and 
attributes can be overlooked or that a wholly unidimensional approach will ever be 
appropriate. Development strategies need to consider the complexity of the factors that 
hinder development and involve a series of complementary structurally-, 
socioeconomically- and institutionally-oriented actions and initiatives.  
 
The reason for this is simple: local or regional economies are complex systems 
that feature and are characterised by any number of co-dependent relationships (Pike 
et al., 2017). The success of any given development action or intervention will 
therefore, almost inevitably, be a function of, and critically dependent on, several 
factors. Individual interventions along different development axes that together 
compose an integrated, multifaceted development strategy will, if designed 
appropriately with reference to local contextual conditions, work in a synergistic and 
mutually reinforcing manner to address all relevant deficiencies and produce outcomes 
that will exceed those of the unidimensional approaches rendered ineffective by the 
very factors and conditions they neglect. 
 
4.4.2. Understanding and responding to local characteristics and conditions with 
precisely targeted interventions 
 
The strategies of waste presented in Section 4.3.1 were plagued by a second 
weakness: the tailoring and targeting of the interventions by which the strategic 
approaches were composed were generally guided by theoretical tenets and did not 
take into consideration the conditions of the local economy. This was not the case in 
the strategies of gain.  
 240 
 The returns to the European Union’s efforts to expand its transportation 
infrastructure endowment have been limited in large part because of their 
indiscriminate and imprecise nature. That is, resources that were earmarked for 
infrastructure development have been spent not on projects that alleviate particular 
bottlenecks or address deficiencies in the continent’s transportation infrastructure 
network, but rather – and often because of aforementioned institutional failures – on 
larger scale, higher visibility projects in environments with little concern for their 
social and economic suitability. Infrastructure expenditure is subject to diminishing 
returns. Precise and efficiently targeted investments in environments that suffer from 
productivity-hampering infrastructure bottlenecks, deficiencies and shortages are 
therefore anticipated to yield considerably higher returns than those made in 
environments that are closer to or beyond the infrastructure frontier, as many of the 
European regions in which the infrastructure funds have been spent, in fact, are. The 
continent’s R&D drive has been, to the detriment of the development outcomes it was 
anticipated to give rise to, pursed in a similarly indiscriminate and imprecise way. 
European regions, because of the inevitably heterogeneity by which they are 
characterised, have different facilities for the transformation of R&D activities, and 
the knowledge they yield, into innovation and, in turn, economic growth. R&D 
expenditure has, however, been prioritized universally: it has not been geared towards 
or targeted at the European Union’s more developed, innovation prone regions, nor 
has the innovation drive considered or accounted in any way for the characteristics or 
attributes of the continent’s lagging regions that could conceivably compromise their 
capacity to realise benefit from it. The returns to this strategic approach in the 
European Union’s innovation averse, less developed territories have, therefore, been 
meagre. In the Filipino case, the targeting failure is manifested in a complete neglect 
of the preeminent factor to which the limited returns to the country’s robust medical 
education and training system – and the well-developed stock of skilled human capital 
it has cultivated – are attributable. Policy-makers have failed to target and, in turn, 
develop interventions to address the demand-side weaknesses (i.e. a dearth of higher-
quality employment opportunities) that prevent skilled workers from engaging in 
productive activity and contributing to economic growth. The Peruvian special 
economic zone programme and the Greek science and technology park initiative have 
suffered from a related targeting failure. In both cases, policy-makers pursued these 
interventions in environments that were ex ante incapable – because of a multitude of 
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structural, socioeconomic and institutional deficiencies – of benefitting from them. 
Because both the zones and the parks were conceived exactly as instruments to 
promote growth and development, the primary criterion considered in the targeting 
process was a region’s level of development. The very fact that the inadequacy of their 
underlying socioeconomic, institutional or structural fabrics could undermine the 
success of activities within the zones or parks was overlooked. The initiatives where 
therefore pursued exclusively in less developed regions that, at the time of 
implementation, not positioned to benefit from them. 
 
 Conversely, the strategies of gain examined have been particularly impactful, 
in part, because of the way and extent to which they either targeted and mitigated the 
exact deficiencies that hamper local and regional economic performance or, similarly, 
targeted and leveraged the advantages with which a region was, or is, endowed. The 
infrastructure development initiatives and actions undertaken in across Africa and in 
China and Bangladesh were, for example, geared exactly, in the former, to rectifying 
large-scale infrastructure shortages and, in the latter, to addressing and correcting 
bottlenecks and deficiencies in regional infrastructure networks. The environments in 
which these efforts were pursued featured insufficiently developed infrastructure 
endowments meaning that any expenditure channelled towards their upgrading and 
expansion, that would otherwise be subject to diminishing returns, could yield returns 
in the form of economic growth. In the Dominican Republic, authorities recognised 
the advantages afforded to the country’s economy by its physical and institutional 
proximity to the United States and, in turn, devised what would prove to be an 
especially successful special economic zone programme. The programme explicitly 
targets and contains measures to leverage and capitalise on this particular strength. 
Similarly, efforts to reform the Vietnamese vocational and technical education system 
sought to address a pronounced flaw that plagued it: prior to the execution of these 
initiatives, the country’s vocational and technical education system was all but 
completely detached from the labour market. Policy-makers engaged the private sector 
to correct for this and foster a greater matching between the education system and the 
skills requirements of firms to the benefit of newly educated individuals, local firms 
and the economy more broadly. Brazil’s APL policies rely, to a greater extent than any 
of the other policies and strategies considered here, on formalised processes that 
facilitate the efficient and effective targeting of the interventions by which they are 
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composed. Great care and thorough analysis are exercised and employed when 
selecting the clusters that will be subject to policy actions. The consequence of this is 
that APL policies are only operationalised in environments where there is a reasonable, 
objectively informed expectation that they can catalyse local economic growth and 
development. 
 
 Ensuring that policy interventions are both tailored to the geographies in which 
they are to be pursued and are targeted towards either specific challenges or 
weaknesses by which they are faced or particular comparative or competitive 
advantages with which they are endowed should therefore be seen as essential if the 
scarce resources that are allocated to efforts to promote economic growth and 
development are to be deployed in an effective manner. Efficient policy ‘tailoring’ and 
‘targeting’ akin to that exemplified by the aforementioned strategies of gain is 
facilitated by robust diagnoses of local conditions and the performance of 
comprehensive situational analyses.  
 
Different regions are characterised by distinctly different strengths and 
opportunities and, conversely, challenges and vulnerabilities that are all products of 
local contextual conditions. Analyses of these conditions shed light not only on where 
viable opportunities for sustainable economic growth lie and what they might be, but 
also on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that the strategy must mitigate. These 
diagnostic processes function, in that respect, as means to cultivate and collect the 
insights that constitute the foundation of economic development strategies that 
respond and are tailored to local conditions and the opportunities they offer (e.g. Cities 
Alliance, 2007).  
 
4.4.3. Understanding frontiers and diminishing returns  
 
 The literature on economic growth has, for decades, emphasised the 
importance of the position of a territory on the development spectrum as a factor 
determining the expected returns of any type of intervention (Rostow, 1960; 
Gerschenkron, 1962). How close a territory is to a specific frontier can determine what 
type of investment is required to maximise the returns of intervention. It has often been 
argued that being far from a frontier allows countries and regions to pursue basic 
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investment and factor-endowment promotion strategies more freely than in those cases 
where a specific territory is closer to its respective frontier – as indicated by Acemoglu 
et al. (2006:68) when referring to the technological frontier. The closer a country or 
region gets to a specific frontier, the greater the likelihood that any intervention on a 
particular development axis will be subject to diminishing returns. 
 
This seems to be confirmed by the cases reported in the preceding sections. 
Countries and regions at earlier stages of development are able to address shortages in 
basic development factors without their actions being subject to diminishing returns. 
In the cases of Sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh or Yunnan province in China, 
considerable investments in infrastructure have yielded considerable economic 
growth. This is far less true for less developed regions in the European Union. Greater 
distances to the infrastructure frontiers in Sub-Saharan Africa and the two Asian 
examples explain this outcome. Pronounced infrastructural shortages in Sub-Saharan 
Africa meant that additional kilometres of road have contributed to addressing a 
fundamental shortcoming of the local economy and facilitated further development. 
Basic infrastructure shortages in Europe’s’ less developed regions, on the other hand, 
did not and do not prevent them from engaging in basic economic activities. They were 
and are closer to the infrastructure frontier than countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Hence, additional investments in road infrastructure will only bring about significant 
economic returns if specifically targeted to addressing well-identified, profound 
development bottlenecks. The indiscriminate nature of most infrastructure investment 
in the periphery of the European Union – frequently geared towards increasing the 
number of airports, ports or kilometres of motorways and high-speed rail – implies, 
however, that this condition has not been fulfilled. The economic returns to additional 
investment have, as a result, been and likely will continue to be meagre.  
 
The diminishing returns of additional investment are, moreover, affected by 
deficiencies in other development axes. Poorly targeted infrastructure investments in 
the European Union have been, to a considerable extent, a consequence of low 
government quality. Feeble governments and local decision-makers have often put 
short-term private and political gains before medium- and long-term sustainable 
socioeconomic outcomes (Crescenzi et al., 2016). Similarly, low quality institutions 
have dented the returns to R&D investment in the economic periphery of Europe 
 244 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015) or to the Greek science and technology parks 
initiative. The territories in which these strategies of waste have been pursued are far 
closer to the technology frontier than the areas where the more successful Brazilian 
APL clusters or the Dominican Republic’s special economic zones have been 
operationalised. 
 
Simply stated, the farther a territory is from a given frontier, the greater the 
likelihood that investments targeting basic deficiencies in infrastructure, human 
capital, and/or technological endowments will succeed in delivering meaningful 
growth. Once the very basic needs for development to take off are fulfilled – that is, 
the closer a country or region comes to the infrastructure, human resources or 
technological frontier – the diminishing returns that undermine the potential of 
additional investment become more likely. As territories approach these frontiers, a 
‘switch’ involving the careful consideration of other factors influencing development 
is required (Acemoglu et al., 2006); more holistic and integrated development strategy 
need be employed.  
 
4.4.4. Institutions, institutional reform and the pursuit of spatial development 
strategies 
 
 The final lesson to be drawn from the cases presented in Section 4.3 comes less 
from the underperformance of the strategies of waste and more from the successes of 
those of gain, and, more specifically, from a key factor to which their effectiveness is 
attributable: recognition of the ‘institutional dimension’ and of the importance of 
mitigating and minimising the potential for institutionally-related failures. This 
recognition is manifested in one of two ways. 
 
 First, the infrastructure-oriented interventions mobilised in China and 
Bangladesh, the APL cluster policies employed by Brazilian authorities, and 
Vietnam’s efforts to reform its vocational and technical education system all featured 
or feature explicit actions and measures to promote technical development, 
institutional upgrading and capacity building. The function of these actions, in each of 
the approaches but also more generally, is to facilitate the design, operationalisation, 
and ongoing monitoring and maintenance of the strategies themselves. They are, 
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however, also often employed with the view to leave a longer-term, lasting impact on 
the capabilities, efficiency and overall functioning of the institutions and institutional 
actors they target. 
 
 Second, the special economic programme pursued in the Dominican Republic 
is characterised by an ongoing attentiveness to the broader institutional environment. 
Attention has been paid to and efforts have been made to adapt the regulatory and 
governance framework within which the programme is pursued to ensure that the 
zones are and will remain, even in the face of macroeconomic changes and volatility, 
competitive and capable of fulfilling their mandate as catalysts for economic growth 
and development. Moreover, the development and implementation of the programme 
was matched by the establishment of a purpose-built institutional body, whose 
principle function is to regulate and oversee the country’s various zones. This 
awareness of the institutional environment in which the development approach exists 
has served to ensure not only that the interventions are, and will remain, unimpeded 
by regulatory or governance-related inefficiencies or obstacles, but also that the 
broader institutional framework continues to evolve and stays one that supports and is 
conducive to the strategy and its overarching objectives.  
 
 Consequently, cognisance of the ‘institutional dimension’ is a fundamental 
requirement in the design and implementation of spatial development policies. More 
specifically, there is scope, if not an outright need, to incorporate institutional reforms 
and capacity building initiatives into the development approaches themselves, and also 
to employ a general awareness of – and where need be, to take action to address – 
broader institutional conditions and factors (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015).  
 
 Capacity building and technical development-type interventions provide 
authorities and institutional bodies with capabilities, knowledge and resources (e.g. 
Whyte, 2004; World Bank, 2005; OECD, 2006; World Bank Institute, 2009). It should 
never be taken for granted, especially in less developed contexts, that authorities have 
the competencies needed to initiate and enact development strategies. Capacity 
constraints are not uncommon in the developing and emerging world (e.g. World 
Bank, 2005; OECD, 2006; Cardenas, 2010; Sanghvi et al., 2011; Haque et al., 2015). 
Integrating these sorts of actions and instruments into development approaches serves 
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to ensure, or at the very least increase the probability that, the viability, sustainability 
and performance of spatial development policies are not compromised or damaged by 
capacity deficiencies that are navigable and manageable.  
 
 Capacity constraints can exist in any number of forms.  What exactly 
authorities do to address and mitigate institutional deficiencies will greatly depend on 
the nature of the deficiency. The outcomes of any development intervention are, for 
example, shaped by the quality and capabilities of the authorities that are tasked with 
its design, operationalisation and oversight. Technical deficiencies in the form of a 
lack of skills, knowledge, experience or competencies will undermine the execution 
of any exercise, policy or strategy. Capacity building efforts in environments plagued 
by technical shortages should trend in the direction of training initiatives and 
programmes, the establishment of knowledge-sharing programmes and initiatives or 
the use of external resources and expertise (i.e. short-term consultants) to shore up 
these skills deficiencies. Relatedly, certain environments will suffer from other types 
of resources shortages. Policy-makers may, for example, not have access to, or the 
resources (human and/or financial) and infrastructure to collect or cultivate, the data 
and information needed to design, monitor and/or modify suitable development 
interventions. When this is the case, efforts should be pursued to first identify the 
resources shortages before channelling financial resources accordingly. The provision 
of these resources must, where necessary, be accompanied by initiatives (including 
those outlined above) to ensure that the authorities to whom they are provided have 
the competencies and skills needed to make the most of them. There may also be scope 
here for intra- or interregional cooperation and resource sharing to address resource 
deficiencies and ‘stretch’ scarce resources.  Similarly, vertical and horizontal 
coordination failures represent another type of institutional failing that can derail 
development actions. Misaligned incentives or priorities, or even an insufficient 
awareness of what other parties are doing or responsible for will lead, at best, to 
overlaps that result in an inefficient deployment of resources or, worst, oversights and 
failures that will undermine the success and viability of otherwise sound interventions. 
Capacity building actions to address institutional obstacles of this nature will focus on 
the facilitation of communication and dialogue, the promotion of transparency and 
clarity and the clear delineation of responsibility. The identification and appointment 
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of leaders or, relatedly, the establishment of specific bodies or institutions with 
narrowly and explicitly defined mandates represent means to achieve the latter end.  
 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the institutional failings to which 
territories, and underdeveloped ones in particular, fall victim. It is provided merely to 
illustrate that simple solutions for all of the institutional deficiencies to which a 
particular region could conceivably be susceptible may be difficult to devise. With this 
in mind, it becomes clear that the starting point for any effort to address institutional 
bottlenecks is their exact identification. By taking steps to identify and understand the 
nature of the institutional challenges they face, authorities can devise suitable reforms 
to address and overcome them. 
 
 Capacity building efforts should be matched by a general awareness of the 
efficiency, soundness and functioning of the broader institutional environment. With 
the ‘institutional turn’ in economics has come the increasingly widespread consensus 
that the effectiveness of any given development strategy will be mediated in one way 
or another by the institutional environment in which it is pursued (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 
2013). Rodríguez-Pose (2013:1043), in fact, goes so far as to assert that “development 
strategies need to understand and be specifically tailored to the potential of place-
bounded institutions in order to make the most of [other interventions]”. Ignorance of 
institutional factors and conditions could therefore be, in and of itself, sufficient to 
derail what may otherwise be sound development strategies. 
  
These two ‘lessons’, and the first one in particular, should ring especially true 
in devolved contexts. Subnational governments have, via the processes of devolution 
that have and continue to transpire across the emerging world, been afforded both the 
opportunity to implement development interventions that are reflective of local needs, 
preferences, priorities and contextual conditions and the more general capacity to tailor 
expenditure and decision-making in these directions (e.g. Ascani et al., 2013; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017b).  
 
This can, as the Bolivian experience demonstrates, yield profoundly positive 
outcomes. Faguet’s (2004) examination of the post-devolution expenditure patterns of 
Bolivian municipalities reveals that authorities did capitalise on the resources and 
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autonomy entrusted to them and channelled resources towards the provision of public 
goods and services in a manner that was consistent and coherent with the preferences 
of the citizens of, and the contextual conditions in, the jurisdictions for which they are 
responsible. Outcomes like these are, however, far from assured. Empirical analysis 
has, for example, indicated, first, that decentralisation – especially in the face of poor 
local government quality – may not only have little to no effect on economic 
performance but, in some circumstances, can actually undermine it (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Ezcurra, 2011; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013) and, second, that in less 
developed and emerging contexts, decentralisation can exacerbate regional 
inequalities (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). 
 
Whether devolution yields more favourable outcomes, as in the Bolivian case, 
or less-favourable ones depends critically on the institutional context within with it is 
pursued and, more specifically, on the capacities and capabilities of subnational 
authorities. That is, capacity constraints may, according to Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra (2010:622) “limit the potential of subnational governments to make the most 
of [decentralisation]”. The implementation of capacity building exercises, as 
advocated for above, could go a considerable way towards mitigating what Parker and 
Serrano (2000: 26) term “one of the biggest challenges confronting local institutions 
as well as managers designing and implementing programs of development” and, in 
turn, ensuring that subnational authorities can fulfil their responsibilities, whether they 
relate to the design and implementation of development policies or otherwise. 
 
4.5. Where should different types of strategies be implemented? 
Designing contextually suitable strategies 
 
Different territories require, as we have asserted in previous sections, 
heterogeneous development approaches. These approaches must respond to the scale, 
scope and nature of the development challenges that the territories for which they are 
designed face, and the opportunities and potential with which they are endowed. It is 
therefore impossible to state exactly where infrastructure-based, inward investment-
based, innovation- or human capital-oriented or cluster-based approaches should be 
pursued.  
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General guidance as to how strategic approaches should be designed for 
different types of territories at different points on the development spectrum can, 
however, be provided. More specifically, the following section reflects on the nature 
of the development challenges with which different types of territories are confronted 
to construct a broad taxonomy of territorial development approaches. 
 
Our taxonomy is founded on the notions of what we term (1) complexity and 
(2) breadth of scope. Complexity is understood as a function of the number and, 
importantly, diversity of the individual elements or interventions by which a broader 
strategic approach is composed. More tangibly, an integrated strategic approach that 
features a diversity of mutually reinforcing interventions and works across a range of 
development axes is deemed more complex than one that relies on a single type of 
instrument or action to affect change. Breadth of strategic scope refers, on the other 
hand, to the narrowness of the development outcomes or objectives by which a strategy 
is guided. The strategic scope, for example, of an approach that pursues a single, 
narrowly and precisely defined development outcome is narrower than that of one that 
aims to affect more broad-based, perhaps economy-wide change.  
 
We posit that the approaches employed by territories at different points on their 
respective growth trajectories should, irrespective of the development axis (or axes) to 
which they are oriented, differ in terms of their complexity and the breadth of their 
strategic scopes in ways that reflect the nature of the most immediate development 
challenges with which they are faced.  
 
The underperformance of territories at the very bottom of the development 
spectrum is often attributable, at least in part, to what can be considered the most 
fundamental of structural deficiencies. These inadequacies are generally not difficult 
to identify nor are they insurmountable; policy-makers in Bangladesh and Central 
Yunnan, for example, found success channelling financial and other resources towards 
the construction of basic physical infrastructure – roads, bridges, etc. – the absence of 
which was both a readily apparent and particularly pronounced impediment to 
economic dynamism (Section 4.3.2).  
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Figure 4.5. A ‘complexity-strategic scope’ based taxonomy of development 
approaches 
 
Authors' elaboration 
The shoring up of deficiencies of this nature is, however, wholly prerequisite 
to the achievement of economic growth and development and, moreover, lays a 
foundation upon which subsequent development efforts can build. The scope of the 
territorial development policies pursued in these environments should therefore not 
extend beyond addressing these specific debilitating deficiencies. Their complexity 
needs to be kept to a minimum as well; not only are less integrated approaches often 
sufficient for managing deficiencies as precisely defined and comparatively basic as 
those by which the most economically underdeveloped of environments tend to be 
faced, they are less prone to derailment by the technical capacity constraints that are 
not uncommon in these contexts (Section 4.4.4).  
 
Simply stated, development approaches designed for the most economically 
disadvantaged of territories would benefit from being characterised by a minimal 
degree of complexity and a relatively narrow strategic scope. We term this first type 
of strategic approach ‘simple and narrowly-focused’ (Figure 4.5). 
 
As we move up the development spectrum to underdeveloped territories where 
pronounced challenges remain but the debilitating factors of the sort highlighted above 
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are less ubiquitous, the strategic scope of territorial development approaches can begin 
to widen. The development challenges by which territories like these are faced relate 
less to rectifying and overcoming specific barriers that are preventing economic 
growth and more to cultivating a broader socioeconomic context that underpins, and 
is itself supportive of, all manner of economic activity with an ultimate view to spark 
and actively promote dynamism and development. In Vietnam, for example, 
authorities prioritised general upskilling and human capital development to initiate the 
transformation of the country’s labour force into one that could participate in and 
contribute to the drive towards industrialisation and to its more general efforts to place 
the economy on a sustainable and rising growth trajectory (Section 4.3.2).  
 
It follows that the narrow focus that should be characteristic of the 
development approaches undertaken by the most economically disadvantaged 
territories need to be replaced here by a concern for affecting more broad-based 
change. Once again, however, these strategies need not be overly complex. They will 
in all likelihood, because of the more broadly-defined development outcomes they 
pursue, rely on a comparatively greater number and diversity of individual 
interventions. That said, technical capacity constraints that compromise policy 
efficiency and effectiveness remain a concern for policy-makers in these environments 
(Section 4.4.4) and, moreover, the change these approaches seek to affect – i.e. more 
general contextual upgrading and conditioning – is still sufficiently fundamental that 
the degree of integration and multidimensionality by which they are characterised need 
not be massive. 
 
  Development approaches that are simple in nature and but broad in strategic 
scope are most suitable for less economically developed territories. ‘Simple and 
broadly focused’ strategic approaches are the second type included in the taxonomy 
(Figure 4.5). 
 
 A different tact will need to be taken in emerging territories. The most pressing 
development challenge that they tend to face relates not to addressing debilitating 
structural deficiencies or weaknesses in underlying socioeconomic fabrics, but rather 
to the avoidance of economic stagnation and of something akin to a ‘middle income 
trap’ (e.g. Nallari et al., 2011; Kharas and Kohli, 2011; Eichengreen et al., 2013). That 
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is, these territories have often successfully navigated a range of more fundamental 
development challenges – including those addressed above – and, in turn, likely 
benefitted from a sustained period of economic expansion. The pace of that growth 
will, however, be slowing or, in more extreme cases, have stagnated.  
 
The options for escaping this so-called ‘trap’ are few. Meaningful increases in 
productivity (e.g. Kharas and Kohl, 2011) are perhaps the best, if not only, way to do 
so. Achieving these involves repositioning the economy as a whole towards higher-
value added, more knowledge-intensive activities and undertaking a range of 
institutional reforms to make the territory amenable, if not wholly conducive, to 
innovation and more technologically sophisticated activity. 
 
Figure 4.6. The ‘complexity-economic development’ nexus  
 
Authors' elaboration 
Suffice to say, strategic approaches undertaken in these emerging 
environments should, like those pursued in the aforementioned less developed 
territories, be broad in strategic scope; they will, after all, be geared towards economy-
wide reformation. The nature of the change these approaches must aim to affect, 
however, demands that they be far more complex, integrated and multidimensional 
than those designed for environments less developed than they. That is, repositioning 
an economy and, more specifically, upgrading its innovative potential and capacity to 
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engage in knowledge-intensive activities entails working across structural, 
socioeconomic and institutional dimensions which, in turn, implies that strategic 
approaches need to be composed of a diversity of mutually reinforcing interventions 
and actions that span these, and other, development axes.   
 
Emerging territories therefore have little choice but to pursue more complex, 
integrated development approaches that operate across several development 
dimensions and are oriented towards affecting broad-based, economy-wide change; 
such approaches are understood in our taxonomy as ‘complex and broadly focused’ 
(Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.7. The ‘breadth of strategic scope-economic development’ nexus 
 
Authors' elaboration 
In more developed territories, the focus shifts away from development 
challenges per se towards what can be considered development opportunities. That is, 
more economically advanced territories will likely – whether it is due to resource 
endowments or constraints, the economic activities they engage or specialise in, or any 
other number of territorially-unique factors – have specific avenues available to them 
that they may pursue to promote further growth and development. Moreover, the 
returns to broad-based reform will be limited in these more dynamic territories where 
growth-impairing structural, socioeconomic or institutional deficiencies are fewer and 
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farther between and, in turn, the scope for generalist, ‘corrective’ interventions is 
minimal.  
 
The job of policy-makers in these environments is therefore to, first, identify 
where these latent opportunities lie and, in turn, develop focused policies geared 
narrowly and explicitly towards their exploitation. More complex, multidimensional 
approaches should be relied upon to do so. Policy-makers in these environments are 
often unencumbered by resource and/or technical capacity constraints leaving little 
reason not to pursue the integrated, multi-axes approaches that, as previous sections 
have suggested (Section 4.4.1), are anticipated to yield the greatest returns. 
 
The fourth and final type of approaches included in our taxonomy are those 
that are ideally suited to the most economically developed of territories. These 
integrated approaches will pull a range of policy levers to fulfil precisely and narrowly 
defined objectives and are thus referred to as ‘complex and narrowly focused’ 
approaches (Figure 4.5). 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
The development policy landscape has, in recent years, been dominated by four 
types of interventions each of which finds its conceptual or theoretical underpinning 
in a different theoretical perspective or paradigm (Section 4.2). 
 
1. Infrastructure-oriented development approaches emerged from a neoclassical 
growth theory that understands economic growth as a function of the relative 
availability of different factors of production – capital, technology and labour 
– the productivity of which can be positively augmented by investment in and 
the expansion of regional infrastructure endowments; 
  
2. Policies and interventions geared towards the establishment of ‘growth poles’ 
via the attraction and concentration of external investment and non-local 
firms grew out of ‘growth pole’ theories that posit that the economic fortunes 
of entire regions are linked to the success and dynamism of single points or 
nodes within them;  
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3. The endogenous growth theory, and, more specifically, an awareness of the 
first-order importance of knowledge and technological progress placed both 
regional innovative capacities and regional human capital and skills 
endowments squarely in the crosshairs of policy-makers and gave rise to a 
host of innovation- and skills-oriented interventions and policies; and 
 
4. Strategic efforts to promote the physical co-location of firms and the 
establishment of clusters of economic activity are inspired by theories 
proposed by both the urban economics and new economic geography schools 
as well as by cluster and industrial districts theories that suggest that the 
operation of economic actors in close physical proximity gives rise to 
productivity enhancing externalities from which those actors, and by 
extension the cluster and the region that hosts it, benefit. 
 
Policy-makers in developed, emerging and developing context alike have 
turned to one or more of these strategic interventions to increase the economic 
dynamism of the territories for which they are responsible (Section 4.3). The 
performance history of each of the four broad policies types includes both instances of 
success (Section 4.3.2) and failure (Section 4.3.1). No one type of intervention is, 
however, on its own, more likely than the next to amount to a failure – a strategy of 
waste – or a success – a strategy of gain. That is, the success or failure of a particular 
intervention is a function not necessarily of what theoretical strand it is based on or of 
what it focuses on to impel growth but rather of where, how and by whom it is pursued. 
This, of course, begs the question: what makes for a successful development policy or 
intervention? 
 
 A review of a handful of both strategies of gain and strategies of waste revealed 
four key differences between them from which policy implications were inferred: 
 
1. Territorial development policies must operate across and address more than 
one development axis. Because of the way and extent to which processes of 
economic growth are governed and mediated by any number of contextually 
specific factors, characteristics and attributes, strategic approaches to 
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economic development are more likely to be successful if they are 
‘multidimensional’ in nature. Hence, concerted efforts are needed to integrate 
and balance actions that target all relevant development axes; 
  
2. Territorial development should rely on robust diagnoses of local economic 
conditions to facilitate the tailoring of the interventions by which they are 
composed to the specificities of the territory in which they are to be pursued. 
They also need to be targeted towards specific weaknesses, deficiencies or 
bottlenecks that represent genuine and pronounced impediments to regional 
economic growth and dynamism, and/or towards any advantages or 
opportunities with which a region might be endowed;  
 
3. Where on the development spectrum a territory finds itself should inform the 
choice of development approach. The greater the endowment shortages and 
the farther away from infrastructure, human capital and technology frontiers, 
the greater the chance that basic investments in human capital, technology 
and infrastructure lead to significant economic growth. Once basic 
endowments in one or more of these areas are covered, the risk of diminishing 
returns to additional investment increases; and 
 
4. Institutionally-oriented interventions and actions – capacity building efforts, 
technical development exercises, institutional reforms and the like – must be 
integrated directly into territorial development strategies.  
 
The potential of theory-led, territorial developed approaches – whether 
infrastructure-, inward investment-, innovation-, skills- and cluster-based – is 
considerable if the four principles outlined above are taken into consideration. 
Development approaches can, and in fact have, served as catalysts for regional 
economic growth and socioeconomic development in radically different contexts. Yet 
the line separating strategies of gain from those of waste is thin. Policies and 
programmes that are composed of and balance numerous mutually-reinforcing 
interventions; are tailored and adapted to local conditions and realities; and are 
integrated into broader strategic efforts are likely to have a greater economic impact. 
The gearing of interventions towards the challenges facing any given place and the 
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opportunities with which it is endowed and the concurrent consideration of the 
institutional context in which it is to be operationalised – and, if necessary, the pursuit 
of measures to upgrade and rectify deficiencies from which it suffers – facilitates the 
realisation of results that will likely outstrip those available to interventions that are 
based on one particular, often ‘fashionable’, theoretical strand.  Processes of economic 
growth are not governed by one single influence. They are shaped and mediated, at 
any one time, by any number of socioeconomic, structural and institutional factors all 
of which must be taken into account in and addressed by efforts that aim to stimulate 
such processes. Moreover, processes of economic growth transpire in different ways 
across heterogeneous contexts – that is, they react differently to different realities – 
simply because contextual conditions impose different challenges and offer different 
opportunities and avenues for growth. The key to success in the design and 
operationalisation of policy interventions is ensuring that approaches are not detached 
from this reality. Adherence to the aforementioned four principles will, in most cases, 
increase the probability that interventions do not fall victim to a multitude of pitfalls 
and, more importantly, that the promise and potential of economic development 
interventions is fulfilled. 
 
The provision of policy guidance more specific than this is challenging. 
Notably, we must refrain from prescribing infrastructure-based, inward investment-
based, innovation- or human capital-oriented or cluster-based approaches to 
heterogeneous territories in a categorical or definitive manner. It would be unwise, for 
example, to assert that any one of these approaches is more or less suitable for a more 
or less economically developed territory. What we can do, however, is reflect on the 
nature of the development challenges by which different types of territories at different 
points on the development spectrum are faced and devise more general guidelines 
centring on the notions of policy complexity and breadth of strategic scope.  
 
We posit that (i) the most economically disadvantaged territories should 
embrace strategic approaches that are simple in nature and narrow in scope; (ii) that 
less economically developed territories should opt for simple, but more broadly-
oriented strategies; (iii) that emerging territories should rely on broad-based 
approaches that are, on the other hand, more complex and integrated in nature; and 
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(iv) that the more developed areas should turn to strategies that are, again, complex 
but are narrowly and precisely targeted to affect change.  
 
Strategic approaches to development cannot be designed on the basis of this 
taxonomy alone. That said, it does provide policy-makers with a framework and a set 
of criteria for thinking about what a suitable approach for the promotion of economic 
development in the territories for which they are responsible should (or should not) 
look like. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis broached the subjects of innovation and economic growth in less 
developed territories from a diversity of perspectives. Its overarching objective was to 
shore up a pronounced deficiency in the literature on the economic geography of 
innovation and scrutinise an assumption that a synthesis of relevant literature 
suggested was not defensible: namely that socioeconomically and institutionally 
heterogeneous lagging territories are, from an innovation perspective, actually 
homogenous entities. 
 
The first two chapters unpacked the processes of innovation less developed 
territories host, focusing specifically on the factors and territorial characteristics that 
drive and shape them. Chapter 1 revealed considerable heterogeneity in the territorial 
dynamics that govern processes of innovation in North America’s and Europe’s less 
developed regions, respectively. Similarly, Chapter 2 unearthed evidence to suggest 
that the innovative processes and, ultimately, systems in China’s lagging cities are 
decidedly less complex, integrated and mature than those in the country’s more 
economically developed ones. The third chapter went a step further to examine the 
link between innovation and economic performance with the view to assess whether 
all lagging territories are similarly capable of mobilising knowledge and innovation 
and transforming it into economic growth. Chapter 3 confirmed that Europe’s low-
income and low-growth regions have cultivated radically different facilities for the 
translation of different types and sources of knowledge and innovation into economic 
dynamism, that are themselves reflections of their respective socioeconomic and 
institutional underpinnings.  
 
The single most academically substantive contribution of the thesis is derived 
from these first three chapters. Together they disprove the very presumption the thesis 
set out to study and test. The prevailing view has for some time been, as the 
Introduction explores, that the socioeconomic, institutional, structural and even 
geographic deficiencies from which lagging territories suffer, and the related 
challenges they impose, render these areas incapable of cultivating and sustaining 
innovative activity (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; 2001). This, coupled with the 
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perceived pervasiveness and homogeneity of the challenges by which lagging 
territories are faced, is what bred the presumption that economically disadvantaged 
areas are effectively the same from a broadly defined innovation perspective, and that, 
when they do manage to innovate, they do so in markedly similar ways.  
 
The overarching conclusion drawn from the first three chapters flies directly in 
the face of this presumption. Together they suggest that lagging territories not only 
innovate in fundamentally different ways, but also that they are differentially capable 
of translating innovation into economic growth via processes that are far from 
homogeneous across space. The heterogeneity of these places does, in fact, matter. It 
is manifested and readily visible in the way these territories introduce innovation and 
the extent to which they can leverage their innovative capacities in the pursuit of 
economic growth, development and dynamism. 
 
The importance of moving beyond the aforementioned assumption and 
correcting the discourse with the conclusions forwarded by and lessons drawn from 
the thesis cannot be overstated. Continued adherence to what seems to be a misguided 
presumption is not without consequence. The most obvious will be reflected in the 
approaches policy-makers opt to pursue to impel innovation and innovation-driven 
economic growth in lagging environments. That is, ignorance of the heterogeneity of 
innovation in economically peripheral territories can lead to the implementation of the 
same, or similar, generic instruments and actions in the pursuit of innovation in lagging 
areas the world over.  
 
If processes of innovation in lagging areas were unaffected by context and 
contextual conditions, ‘one-size-fits-all’ (e.g. Tödtling and Trippl, 2005) policies 
would be sufficient to upgrade their innovative potential. The reality, however, is that 
they are not. Policy-makers are, in turn, likely to find little success trying to impel 
innovation with a-spatial approaches that rely purely on indiscriminate investment in 
‘relevant-only-in-theory’ drivers of innovation, including the R&D-oriented policies 
that have, and continue to dominate the innovation policy landscape. 
 
The thesis is, in that respect, yet another a call for greater, if not exclusive, 
reliance on contextually tailored, spatially-targeted – or as they are increasingly 
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known, ‘spatially sensible’ – policies to promote innovation and economic growth in 
lagging territories (e.g. Tödtling and Trippl, 2005; OECD, 2009; Barca et al., 2012; 
Iammarino et al., 2017).62 There will be, in every territory, actions that are objectively 
anticipated to lead to innovation – i.e. those that identify the exact factors and resources 
that serve as catalysts for innovation, treat them as policy levers, and pull them 
accordingly – and actions that are unlikely to have any meaningful effect on their 
innovative capacities – i.e. those that are rooted purely in theory but are blind to local 
realities and processes. The most efficient and impactful expenditure of scarce policy 
resources involves the pursuit of the former. Similarly, because different places have 
different facilities for the mobilisation of innovation, it will not be sufficient for policy-
makers to simply prioritise innovation and expect growth to follow in tow. They need 
to evaluate both what kinds of knowledge and innovation are stimulants for growth in 
the territories for which they are responsible and, importantly, how they do so. Only 
then, can they devise strategies and take steps to ensure that returns, in the form of 
economic growth and dynamism, to the cultivation of innovation and innovative 
capacity are maximised. 
 
This is, in fact, the angle from which Chapter 4 approaches the topics at the 
heart of the thesis. The chapter’s contribution is no less significant than that made by 
the first three. It is, however, geared more explicitly towards the policy sphere and 
related discourse. Chapter 4 asked, and answered, what steps should be taken to ensure 
that development interventions and strategies, be they oriented towards the promotion 
of innovation or otherwise, actually amount to and function as catalysts for economic 
growth.  
 
The conclusions it yields mirror those drawn from the three that precede it: 
there is a need to address the diversity of development problems across lagging areas 
in the developed and developing world through the design of innovation and growth 
strategies that respond to their heterogeneity. The failure of territorial development 
policies is often attributable to a failure to account for and respond to the specificities 
of the territories for which they are designed. Similarly, the most effective 
                                               
62 The more exact policy implications gleaned from the thesis’ constituent components were addressed in detail at 
the end of each chapter and elaborated on extensively in the fourth. 
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interventions are those that are tailored to the exact nature of the challenges by which 
they are faced and take concerted actions to leverage their latent potential.  
 
The chapter’s primary value added lies in the policy guidance it provides. It 
outlined four specific principles and offered a series of more general guidelines that, 
if integrated into the design and operationalisation of strategic approaches to 
development, increase the likelihood that interventions and policy actions achieve their 
objectives. Its main message is that multidimensional strategic interventions that are 
both designed with a cognisance of where on the development spectrum a territory is 
situated and tailored to reflect the opportunities with which they are endowed, and the 
socioeconomic and institutional deficiencies from which they suffer, are most likely 
to succeed in driving economic growth and development in lagging areas.  
 
This final chapter renders the thesis more than a just a call for spatially-targeted 
policies for the promotion of innovation and economic growth in underdeveloped 
areas; Chapter 4 offers a general sense of how to design and operationalise these sorts 
of policies. What, however, in more practical terms should they focus on? What does 
the thesis say about how scarce financial and policy resources are best allocated to 
impel innovation and economic growth in lagging areas? There are limits, because of 
the extent to which policies need to be tailored to reflect the heterogeneity of the places 
for which they are designed, to how exact or precise the policy guidance provided here 
can be. Three actionable principles do, however, emerge.   
 
 First, efforts to cultivate and condition a structural and socioeconomic context 
that is itself conducive to and supportive of innovative activity are as, if not more, 
important than direct, explicit actions to impel innovation and economic growth in 
lagging territories. The analysis implies that a less developed territory’s capacity to 
introduce innovation is as much a function of the resources it directs to generating 
knowledge as it is of the receptiveness and amenability of its underlying structural and 
socioeconomic fabric to that knowledge. This, however, is where lagging territories 
tend to be deficient (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; 2001; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). 
Less developed territories plagued, as many are, by, inter alia, human capital and skills 
shortages; weak, innovation averse industrial fabrics; or basic infrastructural 
inadequacies will struggle to innovate and/or translate innovation into growth, 
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irrespective of how robust their respective commitments to R&D and knowledge 
generation may be. Policy-makers in less developed areas must, therefore, prioritise 
more than R&D expenditure; special attention must be paid to rectifying the unique 
contextual deficiencies by which each is faced. What exactly they focus on from a 
structural or socioeconomic perspective will be informed by diagnostic analyses – like 
those undertaken in earlier chapters – of the drivers of innovation and economic 
growth in the territories for which they are responsible. The shoring up of whatever 
innovation- and growth-impairing deficiencies the diagnostic exercises reveal is 
prerequisite to the achievement of innovation and economic dynamism. 
 
Second, institutions are, as is posited with increasing frequency (e.g. 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), of the utmost importance. While structural and socioeconomic 
conditions and factors are important for both the genesis of innovation and 
achievement of economic growth, it may very well be that it is the institutions with 
which a territory is endowed that have the most profound effect on its innovation and 
growth potential. Data limitations precluded the integration of the institutional 
dimension into the analyses upon which the first and second chapters are based (a 
limitation that is, in fact, addressed below). The third chapter, however, confirmed that 
the growth potential of lagging regions in Europe cannot be abstracted from the quality 
and functioning of their institutions. Similarly, the fourth chapter demonstrated that a 
failure to address or account for institutional conditions in the design and 
implementation of development interventions can, and often does, undermine their 
effectiveness. Suffice to say, policy makers must be attuned to the institutional 
dimension. Reforming institutions, especially informal ones, is notoriously difficult 
and, moreover, only feasible in the longer-term (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Weak 
institutions are, however, a barrier to innovation and growth in less developed 
territories that cannot be ignored. Institutional upgrading and efforts to improve the 
quality, functioning and efficiency of formal institutions, in particular, need be 
prioritised in less developed territories if their innovative capacities are to be bolstered 
and their growth potential unlocked. 
 
Third, extra-local influences cannot be overlooked. The thesis’ constituent 
components provided an indication that processes of innovation and economic growth 
in lagging territories, be they in North America, Europe or China are affected by 
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factors that exist and processes that transpire beyond their borders; economically 
peripheral territories have a somewhat unprecedented but increasingly acknowledged 
(e.g. Tödtling et al., 2012; Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2015; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2016) ability to harness knowledge and innovative outputs generated beyond their 
immediate borders and transform them into innovation and economic growth. To leave 
this facility unexploited seems unwise; should every available catalyst for innovation 
and economic growth not be exploited in territories that, by and large, have struggled 
to generate knowledge and innovation or achieve economic dynamism? Policy-makers 
must therefore be simultaneously inward and outward looking. That is, they must be 
aware of and able to address the above local conditions and influences. They must 
also, however, recognise that the economic fortunes of the territories for which they 
are responsible are affected by extra-local processes and activities that are beyond their 
immediate control. It is imperative that policy-makers take action to leverage whatever 
facilities their territories have for the mobilisation of extra-locally generated 
knowledge and innovation. The steps they take will, again, vary from territory to 
territory. That said, relevant actions may include general structural, socioeconomic or 
institutional upgrading (in a vein similar to that suggested above as part of the first 
principle) to increase territories’ ‘absorptive capacities’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), 
or the implementation of more precisely targeted ‘pipeline-type’ initiatives (e.g. 
Bathelt et al., 2004). 
 
The above summarises where this research leaves us. It is, in some respects, an 
end in itself. Like any exploratory research, however, it has proven more a means to 
expose further questions and additional avenues for investigation. The first chapter, 
for example, provides a compelling reason for more spatially granular data to be made 
available so that the heterogeneity of innovative processes hosted by lagging territories 
in North America and Europe can be assessed not at a macro-regional-level but at the 
county- or even city-level at which innovation systems also exist. The second chapter 
raises what are, at present, unanswerable (because of data limitations) but profoundly 
interesting questions about the way in which processes of innovation in China’s more 
and less developed cities are shaped by institutional factors. The same can, in fact, be 
said for the first chapter as well. The third chapter would be usefully supplemented by 
microeconomic or qualitative research to that goes beyond the identification of 
associations to the examination of the channels and mechanisms through which local 
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and extra-local knowledge and innovation are transformed into economic growth in 
the territories of interest. The fourth chapter provides just cause to devise ways to 
measure the success and quantify the defining features and characteristics of territorial 
development interventions with the view to study a large number them in a more 
systematic way to probe the generalisability of the inferences and lessons drawn from 
a sample of case studies. The pursuit of these and other avenues will enhance our 
collective understanding of innovation and economic growth in less developed 
territories beyond that which is furnished by this thesis. 
  
 277 
References 
 
Barca, F., McCann, P., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2012). The case for regional 
development intervention: Place-based versus place-neutral approaches. Journal 
of Regional Science, 52(1), 134–152.  
Bathelt, H., Malmberg, A., & Maskell, P. (2004). Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, 
global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation. Progress in Human 
Geography, 28(1), 31–56.  
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective 
on Learning and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152.  
Fitjar, R. D., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2016). Nothing is in the Air. Growth and Change, 
48(1), 22–39.  
Grillitsch, M., & Nilsson, M. (2015). Innovation in peripheral regions: Do 
collaborations compensate for a lack of local knowledge spillovers? Annals of 
Regional Science, 54(1), 299–321.  
Iammarino, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Storper, M. (2017). Why Regional 
Development matters for Europe’s Economic Future (Working Papers No. WP 
07/2017). Luxembourg. 
OECD. (2009). How Regions Grow. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013). Do Institutions Matter for Regional Development? 
Regional Studies, 47, 1034–1047. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2001). Is R&D investment in lagging areas of Europe 
worthwhile? Theory and empirical evidence. Papers in Regional Science, 80, 
275–295. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (1999). Innovation prone and innovation averse societies: 
economic performance in Europe. Growth and Change, 30, 75–105.  
 278 
Tödtling, F., Grillitsch, M., & Höglinger, C. (2012). Knowledge Sourcing and 
Innovation in Austrian ICT Companies –  How Does Geography Matter? Industry 
& Innovation, 19(4), 327–348.  
Tödtling, F., & Trippl, M. (2005). One size fits all? Towards a differentiated regional 
innovation policy approach. Research Policy, 34, 1203–1219. 
 
